G.R. No. 15129. June 30, 1961
MARIA VELASCO AND MARIA ABORDE, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. CARLOS VELASCO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
PAREDES, J.:
and Santiago M. Velasco, were brothers. Plaintiff Maria Velasco was the daugther
of Graciano Velasco, a son of Exequiel Velasco; while plaintiff Maria Aborde,
was the daughter of Balbina Velasco, deceased daughter of Exequiel Velasco. In
1917, Exequiel died intestate, leaving properties designated as Parcel 1, Parcel
II and Parcel III, in the complaint, which were placed under his administration.
In 1929, defendant Carlos Velasco, a natural son of Fr. Mariano, took possession
of Parcels I and II and claimed ownership thereof. Parcel III was the subject of
a litigation, for recovery of ownership, between Maria Aborde and her husband
Pascual Bihag, as plaintiffs, and Carlos Velasco, as defendant (Annex D, Case
No. 833, CFI, Camarines Sur), but the former lost the case because of the
presentation of certain documents (Annexes A, B, & C of the complaint), by
the defendant, the validity and genuineness of which have not been questioned.
The decision of the lower court in said case No. 833, was confirmed by the Court
of Appeals (CA—G. R. No. 8085—R).
Annex A of the complaint, some as Exhibit 5-A, purports to be a document
signed by Exequiel Velasco grandfather of the appellants, as administrator of
certain parcels of land, Fr. Mariano Velasco, Filomena, Jose and Santiago,
evidencing the distribution of the properties supposedly purchased by the late
Fr. Mariano and acknowledging that they did not belong to Exequiel. Annex B,
same as Exhibit 6-A, is apparently a document signed by Exequiel, ceding the
properties situated in Bantolinao, Gotob, Sabang, Mainit and Ermita, to Carlos
Velasco. Annex C, same as Exhibit 1-A, is supposed to be an undated letter
written by Exequiel and addressed to Maria Aborde and Pascual Bihag, confirming
the fact that the lands mentioned in Exhibit 6-A, originally belonged to Fr.
Mariano.
The present complaint prays: (1) under the first cause of action, that
plaintiffs be declared the owners in common of parcels I and II and that
co-plaintiff Maria Aborde be declared the exclusive owner of parcels III; that
the defendant Carlos Velasco vacate parcels I and II and deliver the possession
thereof to plaintiffs; and that the documents Annexes A, B, and C of the
complaint, be declared null and void for being false and forged; (2) under the
second cause of action, that the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA G. R.
No. 8085—R (CFI Civil Case No. 833, Cam. Sur), be annulled and set aside the
same having been obtained by defendant thru fraudulent means and machinations,
by presenting in said case falsified and forged exhibits; that the Provincial
Sheriff of Camarines Sur be impeded from executing the judgment in CA-G.R. No.
8085-R; which had already become final and executory; and (3) under the third
cause of action, that the defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P500.00 for attorney’s fees and costs and the further sum of P2,000.00 for
actual and moral damages.
On October 24, 1956, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the grounds that the plaintiffs’ causes of action are barred by a prior
judgment and their causes of action have long prescribed.
In a resolution handed down on November 14, 1956, the lower court held:
“The first ground alleged in support of the motion to dismiss is not tenable
because there is no identity of the parties and subject-matter. In the former
case, one of the plaintiffs herein was not a party and the two parcels of land
sought to be recovered in this action were not involved in the prior litigation.
Prescription cannot be alleged either as a ground for dismissal for the reason
that although the complaint alleges that the defendant took possession of the
lands in question in 1929, it does not aver that since that year he has been
possessing the land openly, publicly and under a claim of title exclusive of any
other right. The complaint merely states that the defendant now claims ownership
over two of the parcels in litigation.”
On November 27, 1956, defendant filed an answer, with affirmative defenses
and counterclaim, to which plaintiffs replied.
On October 11, 1956, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order denying the motion to dismiss. An order was issued on October 24, 1957,
stating that “the motion to dismiss this case as to Maria Aborde so far as
parcel III is concerned is hereby sustained“. Plaintiffs appealed the
order, but the Court of Appeals certified it to Us, the question raised being
purely legal in nature.
In upholding the cause of the defendant-appellee, the trial court held that:
(1) the issue of genuineness and validity of annexes A, B, and C, of the
complaint, were necessarily involved in Civil Case No. 833; (2) the judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. 833 is conclusive on the validity and genuineness of
said annexes, between Maria Aborde and Carlos Velasco, with respect to parcel
III; (3) Annexes A, B and C can no longer be drawn in any subsequent case, as
far as parcel III is concerned, even if said documents are in truth forgeries;
and (4) the judgment rendered in said case No. 833, can no longer be
annulled.
The primordial question, therefore, to determine is whether or not the former
judgment in case No. 833 is at bar, under the principles of res
judicata, on the present case, as far as parcel III is concerned.
Appellants even admit that “If ever the decision in case No. 833 would be
conclusive, its conclusiveness would only affect plaintiffs therein, namely,
Maria Aborde and Pascual Bihag” (appellants’ brief). The fact that Maria Velasco
is an additional plaintiff in the present case,’ and was not a party-plaintiff
in the former case, does not remove the case from the operation of the principle
of res judicata.
“* * * although in the second action there are joined parties who were not
joined in the first action, there is still res adjudicata if the party
against whom the judgment is offered in evidence was a party in the first action
(Peñalosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil., 303-323). Otherwise, no matter how
often a case be decided, the parties might renew the litigation by simply
joining new parties (Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil., 308,
374″) (San Diego vs. Cardona, 40 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 12,
116).
Maria Velasco and Maria Aborde were first degree cousins and had a community
of interest. They alleged co-ownership over the properties in question, with
defendant Carlos Velasco. One plaintiff is a privy to her co-plaintiff. The
subject matter in case No. 833 is the same parcel of land situated in Mainit,
described as Parcel III, in the present complaint. The cause of action in case
(No. 833), was for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession; the
present complaint seeks to avoid Exhibits 5-A, 6-A and 1-A (same as annexes A,
B, and C) presented in the said case (No. 833), on the ground of forgery, and to
annul the decision of the Court of Appeals, in order that they
(plaintiffs-appellants), may be declared owners of the properties in question.
It should be noted that the same evidence would support and established both the
present and the former causes of action. The probability that the documents were
forged is irrelevant.
“* * * “Briefly stated, this doctrine is that an existing final judgment or
decree rendered upon the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of
the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions, or suits in
the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, on the
points and matters in issue in the first suit. (15 R. C. L., 949-951.)” National
Bank vs. Barreto, 52 Phil., 823-824).“* * * an adjudication is finally conclusive not only as to the matter
actually determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might have
litigated and have had decided incident to or essentially connected with the
subject matter of litigation, and every matter coming within the legitimate
purview of the original action, both with respect to matter of claim and of
defense” (Miranda vs. Tiangco, et al., 96 Phil., 526; 51 Off. Gaz., [3]
1366; NAMARCO vs. Macadaeg, 98 Phil., 185; 52 Off. Gaz., 182; Alfredo
Pua vs. Lapitan, 107 Phil., 95; 57 Off. Gaz., 4914).
The judgment in Civil Case No. 833 (CA-G. R. No. 8085-R) can no longer be
annulled. As a general rule, extrinsic or collateral fraud, would warrant a
court of justice to set aside or annul a judgment, based on fraud (Labayen, et
al. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., 68 Phil., 376). 45843, June 30, 1939, L. J. Aug. 15, 1939). In seeking the annulment of the decision of Civil Case
No. 833 (CA-G. R. No. 8085-R), the alleged fraud does not refer to jurisdiction,
but to the admission by the trial court in said case of supposedly false or
forged documents, which is intrinsic in character.
It appearing that the issue of prescription of action has not been mentioned
by any of the parties in their briefs, the same is deemed abandoned.
Wherefore, the order dated October 24, 1958, dismissing the complaint of
Maria Aborde, with respect to Parcel III is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellants.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, De Leon, and Natividad, JJ., concur.