BARANGAY SINDALAN, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, REP. BY BARANGAY CAPTAIN ISMAEL GUTIERREZ, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE MAGTOTO III, AND PATRICIA SINDAYAN, RESPONDENTS.

Barangay Sindalan versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Barangay Sindalan of San Fernando, Pampanga against the Court of Appeals, joined by the registered owners of the land it sought to condemn, Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan. The barangay filed a complaint for eminent domain to convert a portion of the spouses' land into a barangay feeder road. The case matters because the Supreme Court uses it to draw the outer boundary of the power of eminent domain: the taking of private property must be for a public purpose, and a taking that in truth benefits a private subdivision owner is an abuse of that power, a deprivation of property without due process of law.

Procedural History

The barangay filed its Complaint for eminent domain before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 43. After trial, the trial court issued an Order of Condemnation declaring that the barangay had a lawful right to take the property for a public purpose, upon payment of just compensation, and directed the appointment of three commissioners to ascertain that compensation.

The spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed and set aside the trial court's order and dismissed the complaint for eminent domain, holding that it was the duty of the subdivision owner, not the barangay, to provide the right of way, and that the expropriation in effect relieved that private owner of spending his own funds. The Court of Appeals denied the barangay's Motion for Reconsideration.

The barangay then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, assigning errors to the appellate court and raising, in substance, the question of whether the proposed expropriation was for a public purpose.

Facts

On April 8, 1983, acting on a resolution of the barangay council, Barangay Sindalan, through its Barangay Captain Ismael Gutierrez, filed a complaint for eminent domain against the spouses Magtoto and Sindayan, the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by a transfer certificate of title. The barangay sought to convert a portion of the spouses' twenty-seven thousand square meter property into a barangay feeder road, claiming it was the most practical and nearest way to the municipal road. The barangay resolution recited that the land would serve as a feeder road for the agricultural and other products of the residents and as an inlet for their basic needs, since residents had to take a long circuitous dirt road to reach the concrete provincial road. Pending resolution, the barangay deposited an amount equivalent to the fair market value of the property.

The spouses resisted. They alleged that their lot was adjacent to Davsan II Subdivision, privately owned by Dr. Felix David and his wife, and that before the expropriation case was filed, the subdivision was linked to MacArthur Highway only through a pathway across the land of a certain Torres family. Long before the barangay resolution, the wives of the subdivision owner and of the barangay captain, known agents of the subdivision, had proposed buying a right of way across the spouses' property, but never returned after learning the price demanded. The spouses contended that the expropriation was really for the private benefit of the subdivision homeowners, that the barangay deliberately omitted the subdivision's name and instead invoked the residents of Sitio Paraiso, and that under Presidential Decree Number 957 it is the subdivision owner who must provide a feeder road.

At trial, the barangay's own witness, Ruben Palo, testified that Sitio Paraiso is within Davsan II Subdivision; that the subdivision had no road linking it to the barrio road; that residents passed through the Torres lot; and that the proposed road would benefit mainly the lot buyers and homeowners of the subdivision, which had no portion devoted to agricultural production. The trial court nonetheless upheld the condemnation; the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint.

Issues

• Whether or not the proposed expropriation of the respondents' property is for a public purpose or use.
• Whether or not the expropriation, though clothed in a public purpose, is in truth for the benefit of a private individual, the owner of Davsan II Subdivision.
• Whether or not the failure of the subdivision owner to provide an access road may be shifted to the barangay through expropriation.

Applicable Provisions

Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution provides:

Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

This is the primary constraint on the power of eminent domain, and the case turns on whether the taking is for public use.

Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

The Court holds that taking property for a private use, or without just compensation, is a deprivation of property without due process of law.

Section 29 of Presidential Decree Number 957 provides:

Right of Way to Public Road. The owner or developer of a subdivision without access to any existing public road or street must secure a right of way to a public road or street and such right of way must be developed and maintained according to the requirement of the government authorities concerned.

This fixes the obligation to secure the right of way on the subdivision owner, and its breach cannot be passed on to the barangay at the expense of the respondents.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the expropriation was not for a public purpose. While the number of persons benefited does not determine public use, the intended road was confined solely to the residents of Davsan II Subdivision and was not exercisable in common. The trial court's finding that the subdivision was part of the barangay was unsupported by evidence; on the contrary, the barangay's own witness testified that Sitio Paraiso is within the subdivision. The Court stressed that the expropriator must prove that the taking is for a public use.

On the second issue, the Court held that the expropriation was for the actual benefit of the private subdivision owner, with only incidental benefit to the homeowners, since it relieved him of providing road access in conjunction with his development permit and license to sell, and of spending his own funds for a right of way. The Court quoted the classic limitation:

Although the sovereign power in free government may appropriate all property, public as well as private, for public purposes, making compensation therefore; yet it has never been understood, at least never in our republic, that the sovereign power can take the private property of A and give it to B by the right of eminent domain; or that it can take it at all, except for public purposes; or that it can take it for public purposes, without the duty and responsibility of ordering compensation for the sacrifice of the private property of one, for the good of the whole.

On the third issue, the Court held that under Section 29 of Presidential Decree Number 957 it is the subdivision owner who must secure the right of way, and that his failure does not shift the burden to the barangay. To deprive the respondents instead of compelling the subdivision owner to comply is an abuse of the power of eminent domain and patently illegal. The Court added that public funds may be used only for a public purpose, and that the barangay's proper remedy was to require the subdivision owner to file a complaint for an easement of right of way under the Civil Code, where the respondents could show that their lot is not a servient estate.

Doctrine

Eminent domain is the power of the State to take private property for a public use, upon payment of just compensation, without the owner's consent. Two requisites are essential: the taking must be for a public purpose, and just compensation must be paid. Public use means whatever is beneficially employed for the community; the number of beneficiaries does not control, but the use must be exercisable in common and not limited to particular individuals. A taking of the private property of one person to give it to another, in the guise of a public purpose, is prohibited. Where the real beneficiary is a private subdivision owner who is legally bound to provide the right of way, the expropriation is an abuse of the power and a deprivation of property without due process of law. When serious doubt arises as to the supposed public use, the doubt is resolved in favor of the property owner and against the State.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint for eminent domain, with costs against the barangay.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: the sovereign cannot take the private property of A and give it to B by right of eminent domain. Examiners use this case to test the public purpose requirement, the private beneficiary rule, and the rule that doubt in condemnation is resolved in favor of the property owner.