G.R. No. 15048. April 29, 1960
MARIANO QUITIQUIT, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. SALVADOR VILLACORTA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY ENGINEER OF THE CITY OF DAGUPAN, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
The facts are not disputed. Appellant Mariano Quitiquit served as
temporary checker-computer in the Office of the Auditor, Bureau of
Public Works, Manila, from January 1, 1939 to December 8, 1941; as
temporary computer in the Accounting Division of the same Bureau from
December 23, 1948; and as temporary right-of-way agent in the
Department of Public Works, Dagupan City, from January 3, 1949 to July
31, 1956.
On August 1, 1956, he was extended a promotional appointment to the
same position, which corresponded to Item No. 29 of the Consolidated
National Plantilla of Floating Personnel, Fiscal Year 1956-57. This
last appointment was authorized by the Commissioner of Civil Service
under Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code [1]
“to continue until replaced by an eligible but not beyond (30) days
from receipt of certifications of eligibles.” On July 1 1957, the City
Engineer of Dagupan City, herein appellee, recommended appellant for
promotion from a salary of P1,680.00 to P1,800.00 per annum, but the
proposed appointment was not favorably acted upon by the higher
authorities in view of the policy of “not allowing promotions to
non-eligible employees who are occupying positions in the classified
service.” Subsequent to the disapproval of this last proposed
appointment, appellee requested for the extension of appellant’s
appointment dated August 1, 1956 to be effective only from February
2,1958 to May 2,1958. The request was granted and the appointment was
approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service under Section 682 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
About a month before the expiry of appellant’s extended appointment, appellee wrote him a letter in the following tenor:
”In view of the austerity program of the Government
and due to temporary character of your appointment, the undersigned
regrets to advise you that your services will no longer be needed
effective May 2, 1958. However, as soon as there will be available
projects with funds in which your services can be utilized to
advantage, you will be duly notified.”
In answer to the above quoted letter, appellant replied as follows:
“I am in receipt of your letter dated March 27,
1968, in which you have stated, among other things, that my services
are no longer needed effective May 2, 1958.With due respect
to your opinion, I regret to differ with your opinion on this matter
for the reason that my position and employment is guaranteed by Civil
Service Rules and Regulations and that I cannot be separated from the
government service without cause. I wish to take exception to the
contents of your letter it being a clear case of persecution and
conviction without due process and will be ready to take up the matter
to proper authorities if necessary.”
Not having been allowed to continue working after May 2, 1958,
appellant filed the present petition for mandamus against the City
Engineer of Dagupan City for allegedly excluding him without just cause
from the use and enjoyment of his office. He claims that under and by
virtue of Republic Act No. 186,[2]
he is a civil service eligible with permanent status.” The respondent,
herein appellee on the other hand, maintains the contrary and argues
that appellant’s appointment being of a temporary character, made
pursuant to Sec. 682 of the Revised Administrative Code, he may be
removed at the pleasure of the appointing power. Appellee also claims
that appellant is estopped from asserting a right to remain and occupy
his position beyond May 2, 1958 because he accepted the appointment and
enjoyed the right and privileges thereunder knowing that the
appointment was temporary and of limited duration; and that appellant
has adequate administrative remedy by appealing from appellee’s
actuations to the Secretary of Public Works or to the President.
After the submission of the case on the pleadings and a short
stipulation of facts, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing
the petition for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal.
The decision appealed from must stand.
The appointment of appellant being temporary in character, the same can be terminated at pleasure by the appointing power.
“* * * temporary appointment is similar to one made
in an acting capacity, the essence of which lies in its temporary
character and its terminability at pleasure by the appointing power.
And one who bears such an appointment cannot complain if it is
terminated at a moment’s notice.“Thus, in Villanosa, et al. vs. Alera, et al., G. R. No. L—10586, May 29, 1957, we held:
‘*
* * Since it is an admitted fact that the nature of the appointments
extended to petitioners was merely temporary, the same cannot acquire
the character of permanent positions. What characterizes an appointment
is not the nature of the item filled but the nature of the appointment
extended. If such “were not the case, then there “would never be
temporary appointments for permanent positions. This is absurd. The
appointments being temporary, the same have the character of “acting
appointments” the essence of which is that they are temporary in
nature.”‘ (Cuadra vs. Cordova, 103 Phil., 391; 51 Off. Gaz. [35] 8063; see also Reyes, et al. vs. Dones, et al., 103 Phil., 884; 56 Off. Gaz. [3] 509; University of the Philippines vs. CIR, et al., 104 Phil., 086; 66 Off. Gaz. [27] 5012.)
Even assuming, therefore, that appellant had become a civil service
eligible by virtue of Republic Act No. 186 because he had continuously
served the government for more than ten years, he cannot now claim such
permanency in the civil service as would entitle him to protection
under the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution. In the
case of Roque, et al. vs. President of the Senate, etc. (G.
R. No. L-10949, July 25, 1958), which was a petition for reinstatement,
the petitioners originally held office as permanent employees but
accepted temporary appointment and actually entered the service in such
temporary capacity. Holding that by repeatedly accepting employment of
temporary character in the same office said petitioners have acquiesced
or assented thereto, this Court ruled that they were barred from
questioning the legality of their dismissal or lay-off. (See also Pinullar vs. President of the Senate, 104 Phil., 131.) And in Tolentino, et al. vs.
Torres, etc. (96 Phil., 522; 51 Off, Gaz, 753), which was also an
action for reinstatement, this Court upheld the termination of
petitioner’s employment the same being temporary notwithstanding the
latter’s civil service eligibility. (See also Ramon vs. Porras, et al., CA decision, 53 Off. Gaz. 7285.)
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with cost against appellant.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
[1] The pertinent portion of
this section provides; “Temporary appointment without examination and
certification by the Commissioner of Civil Service or his local
representative shall not be made to a competitive position in any case,
except when the public interests so require, and then only upon the
prior authorization of the Commissioner of Civil Service; and any
temporary appointment so authorized shall continue only for such period
not exceeding three months as may be necessary to make appointment
through certification of eligibles, and in no case shall extend beyond
thirty days from receipt by the chief of the bureau or office of the
Commissioner’s certification of eligibles * * *.”
[2] Sec. 2, of Rep. Act
No. 186, which took effect on June 21, 1947, provides that “Officials
or employees holding civil service positions ill any branch of the
government service other than that provided for in the preceding
section (referring to teachers) continuously for at least ten
successive years, shall be considered civil service eligibles with
permanent status under the following classification. * * *.”