TERESITA PACAÑA CONEJOS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND EUTIQUIO PLANIA, RESPONDENTS.

Respondent EUTIQUIO PLANIA alleged in his Complaint for specific performance/rescission with damages^[1] filed with the municipal trial court that on 19 September 1989 he entered into a ^[2]
with Teresita Pacaña Conejos whereby they agreed that each of them
would pay half of the purchase price of the 134-square-meter residential
lot situated in Tisa, Labangon, Cebu City, subject matter hereof, and
that upon full payment they would equally divide the lot and register it
in their individual names.

Plania averred that after paying P22,804.91 corresponding to the
value of his one-half share, petitioner Teresita Pacaña Conejos, despite
repeated demands, refused to divide the subject lot and register it in
their individual names conformably with their agreement.

Respondent Plania brought the matter to the Office of the Barangay
Captain of Tisa, Labangon, Cebu City, and, as borne out by the Minutes of Hearing of 4 May 1995^[3]
Plania shelled out the amount of P22,804.91 to the Borromeo Bros.
Estate, Inc., as payment for his one-half (1/2) portion of the lot. At
the same time Plania admitted having authorized herein petitioner
Teresita Pacaña Conejos to sell his share in the property to Nenita
Gavan but petitioner Conejos failed to remit the proceeds of the sale to
him. This admission was likewise evidenced by the Minutes.

During their meeting, Teresita Pacaña Conejos promised to pay the
amount of P22,804.91 to Plania in June 1995, but Conejos reneged on her
promise so that Plania instituted this instant action before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Cebu City.

In her Answer^[4] Conejos alleged that the
dated 19 September 1989 was mutually abandoned by the parties and that
Plania’s alleged payment was frowned upon by the Statute of Frauds.
According to Conejos, the stipulations contained in the Minutes of the Hearing were mere proposals by Plania for an amicable settlement which she rejected.

On 9 March 1999 the MTCC-Br. 7, Cebu City, dismissed the complaint^[5] ruling that Plania had failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegations.^[6]
The municipal trial court noted that the official receipts offered in
evidence by Plania were not issued in his name but in the name of
Conejos. It lent more credence to the testimony of Conejos that the
had been mutually abandoned by the parties considering that Plania did
not even attempt to inform the Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc., about the
aforesaid Agreement. It opined that had Plania done so, then the
official receipts and the Deed of Sale would have been issued
in both their names and not in the name of Conejos alone. It did not
give any probative value to the Minutes of the Hearing before the Office
of the Barangay Captain on the ground that it was only signed by the
Pangkat Secretary and the Barangay Chairman but not by Plania and
Conejos.

The Regional Trial Court, Br. 9, of Cebu City^[7] reversed the MTCC. It ruled that except for the unilateral claim by Conejos that the
had been cancelled no other evidence was proffered to prove the same.
It ratiocinated that a written agreement like the subject could not be
considered abandoned by the mere say-so of one of the parties thereto.
The Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc., need not even be informed of the
Agreement for its validity because the latter was not a party to it and
as such the Agreement remained binding as between Plania and Conejos.

The trial court validated the Minutes of the Hearing noting that it was an official document issued by the Pangkat
Secretary and attested by the Pangkat Chairman and that its
authenticity was never put in question. It ruled that the Minutes was
admissible and should be given weight as it did not lose its evidentiary
value as a record of what transpired during the meeting despite the
lack of signatures of Plania and Conejos. It also observed that when
Pangkat Secretary Samuel F. Valderama testified in open court and
identified the document under oath he appeared to be objective and
unbiased.

In lending credence to the claim of Plania that he paid some
amounts of money to the Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc., the trial court
stressed that it was understandable that the official receipts were
issued in the name of Conejos and not in the name of Plania considering
that Conejos was considered by the Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc., as the
original buyer of the property. To require the Borromeo Bros. Estate,
Inc., to issue official receipts in the names of both Plania and Conejos
would have complicated the matter considering that Borromeo Bros.
Estate, Inc., was not privy to the .

Likewise, the trial court noted that since Plania had authorized
Conejos to sell his portion of the property and that Conejos had in fact
sold the property to Nenita Gavan, then Plania could not very well
recover his portion of the property. Considering the foregoing, Conejos
should reimburse the value of the property sold to Gavan or, if she was
so minded, to turn over her portion of the property to Plania.

Conejos moved for reconsideration^[8] but the same was denied,^[9] hence she filed a Petition for Review^[10]
with the Court of Appeals. Finding no merit in her arguments, the
appellate court affirmed the Regional Trial Court concluding that there
was dearth of evidence that the had been mutually abandoned by the
parties. It likewise debunked the thesis of petitioner that the Minutes of the Hearing was unenforceable for lack of signatures.^[11] Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration^[12] having been denied,^[13] she filed the instant Petition for Certiorari.^[14]

Petitioner basically argues that the Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction (a) in not
ruling that there was mutual cancellation by both parties of the of 19
September 1989; and, (b) in giving any probative value to the Minutes of
Hearing of 5 May 1995 and the official receipts presented in evidence
by Plania.^[15]

In support of her arguments, petitioner insists that she never admitted the veracity of the contents of the Minutes of the Hearing.
She alleges that what she admitted instead was the confrontation
between her and Plania before the Lupon. She maintains that the contents
of the Minutes of the Hearing were mere proposals of Plania for a
possible amicable settlement that never materialized.

Petitioner likewise asserts that the was mutually cancelled
considering the failure of Plania to prove payments to the Borromeo
Bros. Estate, Inc., and the fact that the certificate of title to the
lot was issued solely in the name of Conejos.

At first glance, petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari should be
summarily dismissed for adopting the wrong mode of appeal. The Court of
Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing petitioner’s petition for
review on 9 January 2001 and received by petitioner on 22 January 2001.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on 29 January 2001 but the
Court of Appeals denied the same in its Resolution of 31 May 2001,
notice of which was received by petitioner on 13 June 2001. Petitioner’s
remedy would have been to file a petition for review on certiorari
before this Court, and, counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
resolution denying her motion for reconsideration petitioner had until
28 June 2001 to file a petition for review on certiorari before this
Court. However, instead of a petition for review on certiorari
petitioner filed on 13 August 2001 a petition for certiorari or one (1)
month and twenty-five (25) days after the lapse of the allotted period
within which to file a petition for review on certiorari.

Apparently, petitioner resorted to this special civil action after
failing to appeal within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period. This
cannot be countenanced. The special civil action of certiorari cannot be
used as a substitute for an appeal which petitioner already lost.
Certiorari lies only where there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. There is no reason why
the question being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate
court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitions,
could not have been raised on appeal.^[16]

Concededly, there were occasions when this Court treated a petition
for certiorari as one filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
However, the circumstances prevailing in the instant case do not justify
a deviation from a general rule. Notably, the instant petition was
filed way beyond the reglementary period allowed under Rule 45 without
any justifiable reason therefor nor any reasonable explanation being
proffered by petitioner. In addition, the arguments she cited are
without merit and are in fact mere rehash of the issues raised before
and judiciously resolved by the courts a quo. The issues require a
review of the factual findings which, verily, could not be done because
this Court is not a trier of facts. More importantly, a reading of the
records of the case strengthens our disposition that both the trial and
the appellate courts did not abuse their discretion in assessing their
factual findings. We find their conclusions amply supported by the
records of the case and grounded in law.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED as a wrong remedy and for utter lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Corona, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Filed at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City; Docketed as Civil Case No. R-36148; CA Rollo, pp. 36-38.
^[2] CA Rollo, p. 40.
^[3] Id., p. 41.
^[4] Id., pp. 42-49.
^[5] Penned by Judge Amado B. Bajarias, Sr.; CA Rollo, pp. 102-106.
^[6] MTCC Decision, p. 3; CA Rollo, p. 104.
^[7] Penned by Judge Benigno G. Gaviola; CA Rollo, pp. 120-129.
^[8] CA Rollo, pp. 130-140.
^[9] Id., pp. 142-143.
^[10] Id., pp. 3-35.
^[11] Decision penned by
Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis, concurred in by Associate
Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Eliezer R. De los Santos; CA Rollo, pp.
453-463.
^[12] CA Rollo, pp. 464-472.
^[13] Id., p. 483.
^[14] Rollo, pp. 5-35.
^[15] Id., p. 26.
^[16] Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129846, 18 January 2000, 322 SCRA 81, 86.