GENERAL SHIPPING CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND MARINA VDA. DE RICARDO, RESPONDENTS.

Appeal by certiorari against a resolution of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission en banc,
signed by two Commissioners, affirming the decision of Associate
Commissioner Nieves Baens del Rosario in Case No. R03-WCC No. 169,
entitled Marina Vda. de Ricardo, claimant, vs. General Shipping
Co., Inc., respondent. Chairman of the Commission Cesareo de Leon
dissented on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to
sustain the award. The decision of Associate Commissioner del Rosario
affirms that of the Chief Hearing Officer of the Commission, awarding
to the claimant the sum of P1,686.01, as balance of death compensation,
and P200.00, as burial expenses, for the death of Ruperto Ricardo, and
ordering payment by the company to the Commission the sum of P41.00 as
fees.

The following facts found by the Hearing Officer are not controverted:

“Claimant
Marina S. Vda. de Ricardo filed on June 11, 1956 a claim for
compensation under Act No. 3428, as amended, otherwise known as the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, for the death of her husband Ruperto
Ricardo aboard M/S ‘General Roxas’ on March 16, 1956 while in the
course of his employment.

‘The claim alleges that
Ruperto Ricardo was employed as a ship engineer of the M/S General
Roxas, a vessel belonging to the respondent, at the rate of P168.75 a
week; that he died of heart failure at about 1:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of March 16, 1956 on board said vessel; that prior to his
death he had been serving the respondent as such ship engineer in the
latter’s various boats for eight (8) years; that prior to his death, he
was physically fit for duty and that he had never been before stricken
with heart disease or any disease associated with the heart; that he
had strenuous work on the boat and had exposed himself to the hazards
of his employment at sea; and that the claiming widow expended the
total amount of P380.00 for the interment of the cadaver of the
deceased.’

‘The employer submitted its Employer’s Report
of Accident or Sickness on September 27, 1956. This employers’ report
avers that the respondent is engaged in the business of shipping with
more than P10,000.00 capital and about 389 employees and men; that
respondent employed the deceased Ruperto Ricardo as ship engineer from
March 1, 1048 to the time of his death at the rate of P675.00 a month;
that on March 16, 1956, at about 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon, Ruperto
Ricardo died of heart attack while sleeping in his cabin; and that
respondent has already made voluntary payment of compensation in the
amount of P2,313.99.”

The case was referred
to the Evaluation Division of the Commission for medical opinion, and
the doctors of said division found that there is no causal relationship
between the heart attack which resulted in Ricardo’s death and his
employment as chief engineer.

In this appeal, the sole
question for resolution is, Is there evidence to sustain the finding of
the Commission that the widow’s claim is compensable?

The notice and claims for compensation describes the factors or events that led to or contributed to the death as follows:

“At
the time of his employment (original employment) he was physically fit
for duty, as never before was he stricken with heart disease or any
disease associated with this ailment. Having worked and lived for eight
years in the various boats of the General Shipping Company, the
deceased, being exposed to the hazards of life and health in the
strenuous life on boat and the bearing of burden of responsibility
which his job entails, developed heart defects which in due time
resulted in death.” (Annex A).

The notice
is dated June 9, 1956 and the statement therein as to how the sickness
that caused the employee’s death, as above quoted, was not controverted
until the employer, petitioner herein, filed its report, Annex “C”, on
September 27, 1957, wherein it is explained that the death is not
accidental but was caused by a natural disease. Assuming without
admitting that the heart attack or disease which caused the death is
not accidental but is a natural disease, the claim alleges that said
disease (heart disease) developed from the strenuous life that the
deceased employee had on the boat for seven years, which strenuous life
developed the heart defects that resulted in the employee’s death and
was not disputed or controverted either in the employer’s report or in
the findings of the Evaluation Division. The claim that the work of the
deceased employee developed the disease which was the direct cause of
the death not being contradicted, we find that the conclusion of the
Commission that the claim is compensable is sufficiently established.

But there are other reasons why the claim may not now be contested.
Although the death of Ruperto Ricardo took place on March 16, 1956, it
was reported to the Commission by the company only on September 27,
1956, over 6 months after the death took place. Pursuant to section 45
of Act No. 3428, as amended, the company’s failure to report the death
to the Commission within the statutory period of 14 days after the
death or 10 days after notice thereof, constitutes a renunciation of
its right to controvert the claim, thereby constructively admitting
that it is compensable (Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Compensation Commissioner, et al., G. R. No. L-10533, May 13, 1957; Tan Lim Te vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al.,^[*]
55 Off. Gaz., [9] 1570). The record also shows that the company has
voluntarily paid a part of the compensation, which circumstance
likewise indicates admission of the compensability of the claim,
(Bachrach Motor Co. Inc. vs. Domingo Panaligan, 99 Phil., 288;
52 Off. Gaz., [7] 3583). The above facts are admissions against
interest and admissible in evidence against the respondent company
(Sec. 7, Rule 123, Rules of Court).

There may be no other
evidence presented by the claimant but the admissions of the company as
above-indicated together with the causes stated in the claim, are
sufficient evidence to sustain the decision sought herein to be set
aside. The finding that the claim is compensable involves an exercise
of discretion by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and the same
should not be disturbed on appeal because there is no abuse thereof.

It may also be stated here that it was not incumbent upon the widow to
prove the compensability of her claim, because the Company had by its
failure to deny the claim promptly admitted it, and by paying the
claims acquiesced therein.

“One is,
however, under no obligation to prove that which is not made an issue
in the case by the pleadings. It is not necessary for one to prove
affirmative allegations which are admitted or confessed by the
pleadings of the adverse party. * * *”. (20 Am. Jur. pp. 139-140).

“Courts of equity may act on the admissions of an answer without other proof. Cavender vs. Cavender, 114 U. S. 464, 29 L. ed. 212, 5 S. Ct. 955.” (Id)

Wherefore, the resolution of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
should be, as it is hereby, affirmed. With costs against petitioner.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

---

^[*] 104 Phil., 622.