AURELIO P. REYES AND FRANCISCO REYES, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. GUILLERMO ROMERO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF PARAÑAQUE, RIZAL AND CONCURRENTLY ACTING MUNICIPAL J…

Reyes versus Romero

The Case

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction filed directly before the Supreme Court by Aurelio Reyes and Francisco Reyes, the accused in a criminal case for maintaining a gambling den, against Judge Guillermo Romero, who sat as acting municipal judge of Pasay City by designation of the Secretary of Justice. The petitioners sought to stop Judge Romero from continuing to try their criminal case after the regular municipal judge, Judge Lucio Tianco, had returned to office, on the theory that the administrative order extending the designation was illegal and that the continuation of the trial violated the independence of the judiciary. The case matters because it fixes the rule on the validity of temporary designations of judges and on when a judge may be compelled by prohibition to inhibit himself, and it teaches that a designation made in the interest of justice, at the behest of the regular judge himself, is not an encroachment on judicial independence.

Procedural History

The criminal case against the petitioners for violation of Article 195, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay City and was assigned to the branch presided by Judge Lucio Tianco. Because Judge Tianco was on leave, the Secretary of Justice designated Judge Guillermo Romero, Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, to preside over that branch, and the trial began before Judge Romero with Captain Adelio Cruz on the witness stand. When Judge Tianco returned to office, Judge Romero nonetheless ordered the continuation of the trial, and the petitioners moved for his inhibition, which motion was denied, as was their motion for reconsideration. The petitioners then went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction, and the Court denied the petition and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction it had earlier issued.

Facts

On July 29, 1958, a team of Philippine Constabulary Rangers raided a house on Park Avenue in Pasay City, described as a gambling casino. Twelve persons were charged with violation of the gambling law before the Municipal Court of Pasay, and they were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence in the branch presided by Judge Lucio Tianco. A second offshoot of the raid was the prosecution of the petitioners Aurelio Reyes and Francisco Reyes for violation of Article 195, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code as maintainers of a gambling den, filed before the same court and likewise assigned to the branch of Judge Tianco.

Because Judge Tianco was on leave, the Secretary of Justice designated Judge Guillermo Romero to preside over that branch, and the hearing of the criminal case began before him with Captain Adelio Cruz, the head of the raiding party, on the witness stand. On December 11, 1958, Judge Tianco returned to office and resumed his duties, yet Judge Romero ordered the continuation of the trial before him and set the case for hearing on December 26, 1958. On that date the petitioners filed a motion asking Judge Romero to inhibit himself in view of the return of Judge Tianco, but the motion was denied on the same day, as was the motion for reconsideration.

The continuation of the hearing by Judge Romero was authorized by the Secretary of Justice in Administrative Order Number 183, which designated Judge Romero as acting municipal judge of Pasay City on December 17, 1958, and every time he had to try the criminal case, provided that Judge Tianco went on leave every time the case was set for hearing. It turned out that Judge Tianco himself had written the Secretary of Justice requesting a vacation leave of one day so as to enable Judge Romero to continue with the trial, and asking that he be considered on leave every time Judge Romero had to try the case until its final termination, a request to which Judge Romero gave his conformity.

Issues

• Whether or not Administrative Order Number 183 of the Secretary of Justice is proper and valid.
• Whether or not Judge Romero, in refusing to inhibit himself from continuing with the trial of the criminal case, acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Applicable Provisions

Section 76 of Republic Act Number 183, the Charter of the City of Pasay, as invoked in the administrative order, provides:

In the interest of the administration of justice and pursuant to the provisions of Section 76 of Republic Act Number 183, as amended, otherwise known as the Charter of Pasay City, Mr. Guillermo Romero, Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal, is hereby designated Acting Municipal Judge of Pasay City, on December 17, 1958, and every time Judge Romero has to try Criminal Case Number 8370, entitled People versus Aurelio P. Reyes, et al., of the Municipal Court of Pasay City, provided Municipal Judge Lucio Tianco goes on leave every time the case is set for hearing.

This is the very order whose validity the petitioners challenged, and the Court upheld it as a lawful exercise of the authority to designate an acting judge in case of absence of the municipal judge.

Section 70 of Act Number 296, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, provides:

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended and the Charter of the City of Pasay, authorized the designation of a temporary judge in the municipal court of the City of Pasay, if the exigencies of the service demand, to be taken from the place nearest to it.

This provision supplies the statutory basis for detailing a judge from a nearby court to serve temporarily when the exigencies of the service demand it.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Administrative Order Number 183 is valid. It noted that the order was issued after Judge Tianco had already reported for work and at his own behest, for Judge Tianco had written the Secretary of Justice requesting leave so as to enable Judge Romero to continue with the trial he had already started, and asking to be considered on leave every time the case was set for hearing until its final termination. The Court found that Judge Tianco was evidently motivated by a desire to have the case terminated by someone who had already started it, for the convenience of and in fairness to all parties concerned, and in the interest of justice. The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the Charter of the City of Pasay authorized the designation of a temporary judge in the municipal court of Pasay if the exigencies of the service demand, and Section 76 of the Pasay City Charter permits the designation of an acting judge in case of absence of the municipal judge.

On the second issue, the Court held that prohibition would not lie. It observed that the petition contained no allegation whatsoever charging the respondent judge with lack of jurisdiction or with having committed grave abuse of discretion. And even if there were such an allegation, the Court said there can be no abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, for the respondent judge to comply with a valid and legal administrative order of the Secretary of Justice.

Doctrine

A temporary designation of an acting municipal judge, made under the Judiciary Act and the city charter in case of absence of the incumbent and upon the request of the incumbent himself in the interest of justice, is valid and does not violate the independence of the judiciary. A judge who merely complies with a valid and legal administrative order of the Secretary of Justice cannot be said to have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Prohibition will not lie against a judge where the petition alleges no lack of jurisdiction and no grave abuse of discretion, for the writ corrects jurisdictional excess and grave abuse, not the mere continuance of a trial lawfully assigned.

Disposition

The petition was denied and the writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was dissolved, with costs against the petitioners.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: there can be no abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, in a judge complying with a valid and legal administrative order of the Secretary of Justice. Examiners use this case on the validity of temporary designations of judges and on the strict requirements for prohibition against a judge who refuses to inhibit himself.