SUSAN MENDOZA-ARCE, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), PRIMO C. MIRO, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ROXAS CITY, EXECUTIVE JUDGE, HONORABLE SAL…

Mendoza-Arce versus Office of the Ombudsman

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Susan Mendoza-Arce, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, against the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas. The Ombudsman had found a prima facie case against her for violation of Section 3, paragraph e of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification of an official document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, arising from a letter of administration she prepared in an estate proceeding. The case matters because it defines the limits of a clerk of court's ministerial duty, and because it is a leading authority on when the Supreme Court will intervene to stop a prosecution that rests on no probable cause at all.

Procedural History

Santiago Villaruz filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas, charging the petitioner with falsification and with corrupt practice. A Graft Investigation Officer recommended further investigation, and after the parties submitted their affidavits and counter-affidavits, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding a prima facie case and directing that the corresponding informations be filed in court. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, and the motion was denied in an order dated June 29, 2001. Instead of going to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Facts

Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz died leaving an estate, and a special proceeding for the approval of her will was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City. Her son Santiago was originally the administrator, but the trial court removed him in an order dated June 10, 1998 for patent neglect of his duties, and appointed his eldest brother Nicolas as regular administrator upon the filing and approval of an administrator's bond of 50,000 pesos. Santiago opposed the approval of Nicolas's bond, invoking a certification from their mother authorizing him to manage her nipa lands for twenty years or during her lifetime, whichever was longer, and an agreement among the heirs to honor the lease until August 23, 2008.

The trial court denied the opposition in an order dated September 22, 1998, recognizing the validity of the certification and the agreement in the body of the order, although the dispositive portion mentioned neither. The case was later reassigned to Judge Sergio Pestaño, who issued an order dated October 12, 1998 approving the administrator's bond. Receiving a copy of that order, the petitioner, as Clerk of Court, prepared a letter of administration in favor of Nicolas, copying substantially the form prescribed in the Manual for Clerks of Court. Armed with that letter, Nicolas took possession of the entire estate, including the nipa lands then leased to Santiago.

Santiago then complained to the Ombudsman, alleging that the petitioner had falsely attributed to Judge Pestaño the appointment of Nicolas, and that she had caused him undue injury and given Nicolas an unwarranted benefit. The Ombudsman found a prima facie case on both charges, and denied reconsideration, bringing the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not a petition for certiorari questioning a resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman in a criminal case may be filed directly with the Supreme Court rather than with the Court of Appeals.
• Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of authority in finding probable cause for violation of Section 3, paragraph e of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against the petitioner.
• Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of authority in finding probable cause for falsification under Article 171, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3, paragraph e of Republic Act Number 3019 provides:

SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: .... (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

This is the graft charge against the petitioner, and the Court measures her conduct against its elements of undue injury, unwarranted benefit, and manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

Article 171, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastical minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: .... 3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them.

This is the falsification charge, which the Court holds requires criminal intent, since falsification is a felony committed by means of dolo.

Ruling

On the procedural issue, the Court held that the contention has no merit. Although appeals from the orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are now cognizable by the Court of Appeals, a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed directly with the Supreme Court where it is alleged that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court also held that it has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases.

On the graft charge, the Court held that the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of authority in ordering the filing of an information despite the absence of probable cause, which it defined as such ground as engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof. The Court listed the recognized exceptions to the policy of non-interference in preliminary investigations, including when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority and when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused. It then examined the elements of the offense and found no basis for saying that the petitioner acted with partiality, with bad faith, which connotes a dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing, or with gross negligence, which is a want of even slight care. The petitioner performed a ministerial duty in preparing the letter of administration based on the dispositive portions of the orders, and she merely copied the form prescribed in the Manual for Clerks of Court. The letter may not be accurate for lack of reference to the lease, but it cannot be said with certainty that she acted with gross negligence or from a corrupt motive.

On the falsification charge, the Court likewise disagreed with the Ombudsman. Criminal intent must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as falsification, and there was no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite criminal intent was present. By the approval of his bond, Nicolas qualified as administrator, so that in a sense the statement in the letter that he had been appointed administrator by order of Judge Pestaño was correct. There was nothing willful or felonious in the petitioner's act warranting her prosecution for falsification.

Doctrine

First, while the policy of the Court is non-interference in preliminary investigations, the Court will intervene where the Ombudsman acts without or in excess of authority, and among the recognized exceptions is the situation where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused. Second, the elements of Section 3, paragraph e of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act must all be proven, and manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence each carry distinct meanings that a compliant act done in a ministerial capacity will not satisfy. Third, falsification under Article 171 is a felony by dolo, so criminal intent must be shown, and a clerk of court who copies the prescribed form in the Manual for Clerks of Court, in obedience to a court order, acts without the willfulness that the crime requires.

Disposition

The petition was granted, the resolutions of the Ombudsman were set aside, and the complaint against Susan Mendoza-Arce for violation of Section 3, paragraph e of Republic Act Number 3019 and for falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code was dismissed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a clerk of court who copies the prescribed form in the Manual for Clerks of Court in obedience to a court order acts ministerially and without criminal intent, so no probable cause exists for graft or falsification. Examiners use this case to test the elements of Section 3, paragraph e, the meaning of evident bad faith and gross negligence, and the exceptions to non-interference in preliminary investigations.