ENRICO P. QUIAMBAO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), AND CIELO MACAPAGAL-SALGADO, RESPONDENTS.

Quiambao versus Desierto

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Enrico Quiambao, the former Provincial Administrator of Pampanga, against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, the Sandiganbayan First Division, and former Vice-Governor Cielo Macapagal-Salgado. Quiambao asks the Supreme Court to annul the Ombudsman's approval of an amended information charging him, along with Governor Manuel Lapid and other provincial officials, with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, arising from a 104 million peso land purchase for a low-cost housing project. He also asks the Court to prohibit the Ombudsman from further prosecuting the case and the Sandiganbayan from hearing it. The case matters because it fixes the standard for judicial review of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, and because it teaches that the evidentiary elements of bad faith and undue injury are matters for trial, not for a petition filed before the Supreme Court.

Procedural History

On January 28, 1998, then Vice-Governor Cielo Macapagal-Salgado and three members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan wrote the Ombudsman requesting an investigation of Governor Lapid, Quiambao, and Provincial Treasurer Jovito Sabado for any act of impropriety, dishonesty, irregularity, or misconduct in the purchase of the lots. On August 21, 1998, the Ombudsman filed an information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019 against Quiambao, Governor Lapid, and Treasurer Sabado. On January 13, 1999, the Ombudsman filed an amended information before the Sandiganbayan impleading other provincial officials, the sellers, and their agent Abelardo Miranda, Junior. The case was docketed as Criminal Case Number 24790.

Quiambao filed a motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charge against all the accused, but the Ombudsman disapproved that recommendation and directed the prosecution of the criminal charge. The Ombudsman likewise denied Quiambao's motion for reconsideration. Quiambao then went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and prohibition, asking that the Ombudsman's memoranda and orders and the amended information be annulled and set aside, and that the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan be enjoined from proceeding with the case.

Facts

Quiambao served as Provincial Administrator of Pampanga from July 1, 1995 until June 30, 1998. During his term, the Provincial Government of Pampanga, headed by then Governor Manuel Lapid, undertook a low-cost housing project for provincial employees displaced by the Mount Pinatubo eruption in 1991. On October 13, 1997, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution Number 340, authorizing Governor Lapid to negotiate for the purchase of a parcel of land within San Fernando, Pampanga suitable for the project, and Resolution Number 341, authorizing him to enter into a contract of loan with the Philippine National Bank or any financing institution for the project.

On October 30, 1997, Governor Lapid wrote the Philippine National Bank requesting a loan of 104 million pesos, to be secured by a hold-out on the province's deposit with the bank amounting to 130 million pesos. The bank eventually granted the loan, and the loan documents and promissory note were executed on November 3, 1997. On the same date, the property owners, through their attorney-in-fact Abelardo Miranda, Junior, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale for two parcels of land totaling 40 hectares for a consideration of 104 million pesos. Quiambao, as Provincial Administrator, and Provincial Treasurer Sabado prepared and signed the 104 million peso check paid to Miranda. The exact numbers of the transfer certificates of title were initially left blank and filled only on November 20, 1997, when the titles were issued in the name of the Municipality of San Fernando, Pampanga.

Records showed, however, that the sellers executed a second Deed of Absolute Sale on November 17, 1997, pegging the consideration at only five million pesos, and this deed was used as the basis for payment of the transfer tax, registration fees, and capital gains tax. The signature of Governor Lapid or any representative of the province did not appear on the second deed. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan later wrote Governor Lapid and the bank confirming his full authority, and passed Resolution Number 118 and Ordinance Number 5, both dated April 22, 1998, ratifying the loan and appropriating the 104 million pesos for the payment of the lots.

Issues

• Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in disapproving the recommendation of the Special Prosecutor for the dismissal of the case against all the accused.
• Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in approving the recommendation to deny Quiambao's motion for reconsideration, despite his claim that there is no probable cause against him.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019, the provision allegedly violated, provides:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

This provision defines the offense charged and supplies the elements the Ombudsman must find probable cause for before filing the information.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause and sanctioning the filing of the information. The Court defined probable cause as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The term does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty; it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief, and it does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. The Court stressed that the existence or lack of bad faith and the injury that may have been caused to the province are evidentiary in nature, and that the issues upon which the charges are built pertain to factual matters that cannot be threshed out conclusively during the preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for the presentation of the prosecution's evidence in support of the charge.

On the second issue, the Court rejected Quiambao's claim that his participation was purely ministerial, that he merely countersigned the check upon the instructions of the Governor. The Court agreed with the Ombudsman that the magnitude of the transaction should have placed the petitioner and all the provincial officials concerned on guard to see to it that every precaution was set to ensure that the province would not be at a disadvantage. The Court noted the allegation that of the province's total deposit of 167 million pesos, 130 million pesos was used as a hold-out for the 104 million peso loan, effectively leaving the provincial government with only 37 million pesos, of which only 26 million pesos was classified as general fund. The Court also observed that the second Deed of Sale allegedly executed by the sellers almost cheated the government of millions of pesos in capital gains and documentary stamp taxes, and that whatever corrective measures were undertaken after the fact would not undo whatever violation may have attached. Nonetheless, the exact culpability of the accused, or the lack thereof, would have to be determined in a full-blown trial after the presentation of the evidence.

The Court anchored its ruling on its consistent policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, giving sufficient latitude of discretion to the investigating prosecutor to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. It quoted its earlier holding that the prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman, which is endowed with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive, or judicial intervention, and that the Ombudsman, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service. Ultimately, the discretion to determine whether a case should be filed or not lies with the Ombudsman; it is basically his call, and absent any good and compelling reason which indicates otherwise, his findings of probable cause deserve great respect.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, probable cause for purposes of filing an information is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted; it does not import absolute certainty and does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. Second, the elements of Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019, namely, undue injury and manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, are evidentiary in nature and are properly threshed out in a full-blown trial, not in a petition for certiorari against the Ombudsman. Third, the courts adopt a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause deserves great respect absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Fourth, a public officer cannot escape liability by claiming that his participation was purely ministerial, where the magnitude of the transaction should have placed him on guard to protect the government from disadvantage.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari and prohibition was dismissed for lack of merit, so the Ombudsman prevailed and the criminal case against Quiambao and his co-accused was allowed to proceed before the Sandiganbayan.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that probable cause does not require absolute certainty, and the evidentiary elements of bad faith and undue injury under Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019 must be litigated at trial, not raised to annul the Ombudsman's information. Examiners like to use this case on the standard of probable cause, on the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutory powers, and on the liability of a public officer who pleads that his act was merely ministerial.