PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. DANILO ANDRADE, APPELLANT.

People versus Andrade

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Danilo Andrade, a criminal appeal from a conviction for rape. The appellant was charged with having carnal knowledge of a thirteen-year-old girl by force and intimidation on the morning of December 28, 1996, in a barangay in Butuan City. The case matters to a reviewee because it gathers, in one decision, the Court's settled rules on the credibility of a child rape victim, on the sufficiency of force and intimidation, on the effect of the absence of spermatozoa, and on the weight of a police blotter against testimony in open court.

Procedural History

The complaint was filed on February 27, 1997. Upon arraignment on October 15, 1997, the appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 4, rendered its decision on April 16, 2001, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Number 7659. The trial court sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties, ordered him to serve at the Davao Prison and Penal Farm, and to pay the offended party 50,000 pesos as civil indemnity and another 50,000 pesos as moral damages. The appellant elevated the case to the Supreme Court by ordinary appeal. The appeal was deemed submitted for decision on December 10, 2002, upon receipt of the appellee's brief.

Facts

About half past eleven in the morning of December 28, 1996, the complainant, then thirteen years old, was walking home from the creek after washing clothes. She saw the appellant, a neighbor, seated under a star apple tree. As she walked past him, he pulled her left hand and dragged her toward the bushes. Her basin of laundered clothes fell and the clothes got dirty. She shouted for help many times, but he covered her mouth, pointed a bolo at her, and warned her not to make any noise. She struggled, but her strength was no match for his. He pushed her down, removed her pants and her panty, removed his own pants, placed himself on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain and told him to stop, but he continued until he was satisfied. He then warned her not to tell anyone, otherwise he would kill her.

Upon reaching home, she immediately told her mother about the rape, because it was the second time the appellant had sexually abused her. Later that day, the mother confronted the appellant at his house. He denied raping the girl but admitted that he had only hugged and kissed her. His wife was enraged and hit him, and he apologized and asked for forgiveness. The following morning, December 29, 1996, the complainant and her mother reported the matter to a barangay kagawad, who accompanied them to the police station, where the complainant executed her affidavit. She was then examined at the City General Hospital. The physician found an old hymeneal laceration, a rounded fourchette contour, cervical erosions, and no spermatozoa. She explained that the rounded contour results from a stretch, and that the cervical erosions could be caused by force, such as the constant rubbing of the penis against the cervix.

The defense presented alibi and revenge. The appellant claimed he was working in a farm in another place when the crime occurred, and that the complainant's mother was his paramour who, spurned, convinced her daughter to file the case. His wife corroborated him and testified that the complainant told her she was not raped. A police officer identified a blotter entry of December 30, 1996 describing the complaint as attempted rape. The trial court rejected both defenses, holding that no mother would subject her daughter to the shame of a rape prosecution merely to assuage her own hurt feelings, and that the two places were only three kilometers apart, so alibi could not exculpate him.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full faith and credit to the testimony of the private complainant despite the alleged implausibility and inconsistencies in her account.
• Whether or not the conviction for rape may stand considering that the private complainant did not offer tenacious resistance.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in not giving full faith and credence to the evidence proffered by the defense.
• Whether or not the prosecution established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Applicable Provisions

Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Number 7659, defines the crime charged:

Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

This is the provision under which the appellant was convicted, and the Court measures the evidence against its first mode, carnal knowledge by force or intimidation.

Ruling

On the first and fourth issues, the Court held that the appeal has no merit. Rape is committed when a man has carnal knowledge of the victim with the use of force and intimidation. The victim's testimony showed clearly that she resisted the appellant's advances but was forced and intimidated into submission. She stuck to her story on cross-examination, and her claims were supported by the medical report of the physician who examined her the day after the incident. The Court stressed that it is inconceivable for a young girl to cry rape, allow an examination of her private parts, and undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial unless she were motivated to bring to justice the person who had defiled her. Since her testimony was straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examination, and unflawed by inconsistencies on material points, it must be given full faith and credit.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the attack on the victim's credibility. Delay in reporting rape does not generally imply that the charge is false, because a victim usually prefers to bear her pain silently rather than expose her shame to the world. In this case, however, there was no delay: the complainant told her mother the same day, and the complaint was filed the next day. Her failure to report the alleged first rape does not belie her narration of the second, because evidence of a first occurrence is not a requirement for proving the second. The exact day of the week and the precise time of the rape need not be proved. As to her taking lunch at the appellant's house, the Court noted that she never did so when she knew she would be alone with him; she was always with his wife. On the absence of tenacious resistance, the Court ruled that force and intimidation need not be overwhelming, and it is not essential for the victim to have resisted her assailant to death. Physical resistance need not be established when threats and intimidation were employed and the victim submitted herself out of fear. On the absence of spermatozoa, the Court held that it does not disprove rape, since the medical examination sufficiently supported penetration. Finally, the Court reiterated the time-tested rule that the trial court's evaluation of a witness's credibility is given great weight and respect on appeal, absent a showing that it overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact of weight and substance.

On the third issue, the Court held that the police blotter, like any other extrajudicial statement, cannot prevail over testimony in open court. The declaration of a child-victim during an initial investigation cannot be expected to be completely coherent with her testimony taken in much greater detail during trial. Because of the rapist's threats on her life, her fear of public humiliation, or simply her lack of courage, it is not uncommon for a young, immature girl to conceal the rape for a time.

Doctrine

A conviction for rape under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, may rest on the sole and credible testimony of the victim, provided it is straightforward, candid, unshaken on cross-examination, and unflawed by inconsistencies on material points. Force and intimidation need not be overwhelming; it is not essential for the victim to resist to death, and physical resistance need not be established when threats and intimidation were employed and the victim submitted out of fear. The absence of spermatozoa does not disprove rape, because what must be shown is penetration, not ejaculation. Delay in reporting rape does not by itself impair the victim's credibility, and the failure to report an earlier rape does not belie the narration of a later one. A police blotter, being an extrajudicial statement, cannot prevail over testimony in open court. The trial court's assessment of credibility binds the appellate court absent a showing of overlooked or misapplied facts of weight and substance.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting Danilo Andrade of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, with the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages sustained.

Remember This

Memorize the line that force and intimidation need not be overwhelming, for it is not essential for the victim to have resisted her assailant to death. Examiners use this case to test the sufficiency of the victim's lone testimony, the irrelevance of the absence of spermatozoa, and the rule that a police blotter cannot prevail over testimony in open court.