PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. WILLY YANG, APPELLANT.

People versus Yang

The Case

This is the automatic review by the Supreme Court of a judgment of conviction for a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, arising from a buy-bust operation in Manila in March 2000. The People of the Philippines prosecuted Willy Yang, also known as Yang Yung-hi and several other aliases, a Chinese citizen engaged in the dry goods and garments trade, for selling, delivering, and transporting 4.450 kilograms of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly called shabu. The case matters to a reviewee for three reasons: it teaches how the Court treats the classic defense attacks on a buy-bust operation, it fixes the rule that the absence of payment does not defeat the crime of illegal sale because the law punishes the delivery itself, and it is a clean illustration of the rule that a qualifying circumstance not alleged in the Information cannot be appreciated in fixing the penalty.

Procedural History

An Information was filed against the appellant in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, charging him with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. He was arraigned with the assistance of a Chinese interpreter and pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment convicting him of the offense, appreciating the aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed by an organized or syndicated crime group, and imposing the penalty of death by lethal injection, a fine of 30,000 pesos, and the costs, and ordering the forfeiture of the shabu in favor of the government. Because the penalty imposed was death, the case came to the Supreme Court on automatic review. While the case was pending, the appellant's counsel withdrew his appearance after the appellant engaged another lawyer, and substitute counsel filed a reply brief raising additional arguments.

Facts

Sometime in February 2000, the National Bureau of Investigation received a tip from a confidential informer that the appellant and one Henry Yeung were dealing in prohibited drugs. The agents asked the informer to arrange a purchase of five kilos of shabu worth 3.5 million pesos so that a buy-bust operation could be mounted. A deal was set for the afternoon of March 6, 2000 at the Savory Restaurant on T.M. Kalaw Street in Ermita, Manila, with Special Investigator Rodrigo Mapoy acting as poseur-buyer.

At around five o'clock in the afternoon, the appellant arrived at the restaurant with two unidentified male companions. The informer introduced him to Mapoy. On the appellant's suggestion, the informer and Mapoy boarded the appellant's car, and they proceeded to the rear parking area of the Manila Doctors Hospital. There the appellant asked to see the payment, and Mapoy showed him bundles of boodle money topped and bottomed with genuine 1,000 peso bills. The appellant and his companion then led Mapoy to an unmanned black Kia Sportage van in the parking lot, took out a carton from the front seat, and showed him five transparent plastic bags of white powder and a smaller sachet. As Mapoy was examining the bags, a group of people suddenly emerged from the back of the hospital. The appellant and his companion ran to their waiting car and sped away.

The NBI team brought the van to its office, where they found the carton of shabu and an identification card bearing the appellant's picture and the name Alex R. Yu, with an address in Karuhatan, Valenzuela. Agents went to that address, learned he had moved, and arrested him at his new residence at eight o'clock that evening. The 4.450 kilograms were turned over to a forensic chemist and tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. At trial, the appellant raised denial and alibi, claiming he had been in his apartment the whole day, admitting the identification card was his but denying he was Alex R. Yu, and insisting the van belonged to his common-law wife, who had lent it to a friend. The trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible and convicted him.

Issues

• Whether or not the evidence for the prosecution sufficed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the improbabilities and inconsistencies he pointed to in the testimony of the poseur-buyer.
• Whether or not the death sentence was properly imposed upon the appellant, particularly on the strength of the aggravating circumstance of an organized or syndicated crime group.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2, paragraph f of Article I of the Dangerous Drugs Act defines delivery, and the Court quotes it to show that payment is not an element:

To deliver refers to a person's act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration.

This definition is decisive because the appellant argued that no sale was consummated since no money changed hands.

Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure governs what the Information must allege, and the Court invokes it to strike down the aggravating circumstance:

A complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

Because the Information was silent on any organized or syndicated crime group, that circumstance could not be used to raise the penalty.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the evidence sufficed. Credibility is generally left to the trial court, which observed the witness's demeanor, and its findings are respected absent a showing that it overlooked facts of weight and substance. Investigator Mapoy positively identified the appellant as the person who transacted with him, and as an NBI officer he enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, with no proof of improper motive. The Court addressed each supposed improbability: drug dealers are known to sell even to strangers, and here the poseur-buyer was accompanied by the informer whom the appellant knew; the van was parked in a guarded and secured lot, so leaving the drugs and the identification card inside was not unusual; and flight at the sight of people emerging from the hospital is not unthinkable, since fear of a trap preys on the mind of every drug pusher.

The Court also rejected the argument that no sale was consummated because no money was paid. The Information charged not only selling but also dispensing, delivering, transporting, and distributing. Under the quoted definition, delivery is knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, with or without consideration, so the absence of payment is irrelevant. The offer and the sale arose when the poseur-buyer showed the money and the appellant showed and handed over the carton. Nor is the buy-bust money required to be presented, so long as the illicit transaction is shown and the corpus delicti is presented in court. On the claim that the prosecution failed to prove lack of authority, the Court held that where the negative averment lies peculiarly within the accused's knowledge, the burden shifts to him; the appellant could have produced a license and did not.

On the second issue, the Court held that the death sentence could not stand. The prosecution showed only that the appellant had two companions, which does not establish membership in a syndicated or organized crime group. Membership in such a group must be alleged in the Information as a specific qualifying circumstance, and since the Information was silent, it could not be appreciated. The trial court therefore erred in using it to impose the maximum penalty, and the sentence was reduced to reclusion perpetua. The fine of 30,000 pesos was likewise not in accord with law, since the statute fixes the fine at not less than 500,000 pesos nor more than 10,000,000 pesos, and it was modified accordingly.

Doctrine

First, the crime of illegal sale of a dangerous drug is consummated upon delivery of the drug to the buyer, and payment of consideration is immaterial, because the law penalizes the very act of delivery. Second, the non-presentation of the buy-bust money does not defeat the prosecution, provided the illicit transaction is established and the corpus delicti is presented. Third, where the absence of authority to deal in drugs is a negative averment peculiarly within the accused's knowledge, the burden to show authority rests on him. Fourth, instigation or inducement, which is an absolutory cause, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and a buy-bust operation is an approved police technique, not inducement. Fifth, any objection to the validity of a warrantless arrest is waived if not raised before arraignment. Sixth, and most examinable, a qualifying or aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the Information, and one not so alleged cannot be appreciated in fixing the penalty.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the conviction but modified the judgment, reducing the penalty to reclusion perpetua and ordering the appellant to pay a fine of one million pesos, plus the costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: delivery of a dangerous drug consummates the crime with or without consideration, but an organized or syndicated crime group must be alleged in the Information before it can raise the penalty. Examiners use this case for the elements of illegal sale, the burden of proving lack of authority, and the rule on qualifying circumstances omitted from the Information.