EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITER RICARDO N. OLAIREZ, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND ALICIA ABAD TENORIA, RESPONDENTS.

Olairez versus Sandiganbayan

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari brought by Executive Labor Arbiter Ricardo N. Olairez against the Sandiganbayan, its Second Division, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the private complainant Alicia Abad Tenoria. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to annul the Sandiganbayan resolution that refused to reconsider the finding of probable cause against him, and to stop his prosecution for violation of the anti-graft law. The case matters because it fixes the boundary between the labor arbiter's discretion in executing a final labor judgment and the reach of the Ombudsman's power to prosecute, and because it restates when the Supreme Court will, by way of exception, overturn the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause.

Procedural History

The story begins in the labor tribunals. Alicia Abad Tenoria filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Combate Clinic, St. Peter Thelmo Drug, Mercury Drug Aparri Branch, Doctor Valeriano Combate and Mrs. Hedy Combate. The case was first assigned to Executive Labor Arbiter Adrian Pagalilawan, and when he was appointed a Regional Trial Court judge, it passed to Executive Labor Arbiter Olairez. Olairez dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission vacated the dismissal, declared the dismissal of Tenoria illegal, ordered her reinstatement with full backwages, and remanded her money claims to the labor arbiter of origin for further proceedings. The employer's attempts to bring the matter to the Supreme Court failed, and the Commission's decision became final.

In execution, Olairez issued an order conditioning reinstatement on a medical certificate and declaring that there was nothing to execute on backwages because Tenoria's earnings elsewhere exceeded them. Tenoria challenged that order before the Commission, which granted her petition and directed Olairez to issue a writ of execution in accordance with the original decision. A second pre-execution hearing followed, and Olairez then ordered the employers to pay Tenoria full backwages and separation pay.

Meanwhile, Tenoria filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of the anti-graft law. The Ombudsman approved a resolution finding probable cause against Olairez and clearing the Combates, and an Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan. Olairez's motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman was denied, and his motion for reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan was likewise denied. He then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari, which was consolidated with another case, later deconsolidated, and which led the Court to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining further hearing of the criminal case.

Facts

Tenoria won a final and executory judgment from the National Labor Relations Commission declaring her dismissal illegal and awarding reinstatement with full backwages, with her money claims remanded to the labor arbiter for appropriate proceedings. When Tenoria moved for execution, proceedings were suspended because a motion for reconsideration was pending before the Commission and the employers were elevating the case to the Supreme Court. Both attempts failed, and the judgment became final in September 1996.

Acting on the motion for execution, Olairez issued an order in May 1997 requiring reinstatement only upon presentation of a medical certificate and stating that there was nothing to execute on backwages because Tenoria's earnings elsewhere, deductible from her backwages, were computed to be much more than her supposed full backwages. The Commission struck down these conditions as an amendment of its final decision and ordered Olairez to issue the writ. After another pre-execution hearing, Olairez in March 2000 ordered the employers to pay Tenoria full backwages and separation pay.

Tenoria had, in the meantime, filed a criminal complaint before the Ombudsman in March 2000, a day before Olairez issued that final order. The Ombudsman found probable cause and charged Olairez with failing to issue a writ of execution despite the finality of the Commission's decision and despite the Commission's later order to issue it, allegedly through evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence, causing undue injury to Tenoria.

Issues

• Whether or not Article 254 of the Labor Code bars the filing of a criminal case against a labor arbiter in a matter involving or growing out of a labor dispute.
• Whether or not Tenoria's complaint before the Ombudsman amounts to forum shopping.
• Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against Olairez for violation of the anti-graft law.

Applicable Provisions

Article 254 of the Labor Code provides:

No temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity, except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of this Code.

This is the provision Olairez invoked as an alleged bar to his prosecution, and which the Court held to be a mere prohibition on injunctions, not on criminal complaints.

Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019 provides:

Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

This is the offense charged, and its elements of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence are what the Court found to be absent from the records.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Article 254 of the Labor Code has no bearing. The provision merely prohibits courts and other entities from issuing injunctions or restraining orders in labor disputes, except as provided in Articles 218 and 264. Tenoria's complaint before the Ombudsman is not an injunction, so the provision does not bar it. The Court distinguished the cases Olairez cited: the Deltaventures case involved a Regional Trial Court, a co-equal body, enjoining the execution of a Commission decision, while the Dolalas case involved an administrative case against a judge filed in disregard of the Supreme Court's exclusive administrative supervision over courts and court personnel.

On the second issue, the Court held that there was no forum shopping. The complaint before the Ombudsman is confined to an alleged act of malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance committed by Olairez, which is well within the Ombudsman's authority under the Ombudsman Act, and it would not necessarily affect in any material way the outcome of the labor action.

On the third issue, the Court began with the general rule that it respects the Ombudsman's assessment of probable cause, because it is within his sound judgment to evaluate whether a criminal case should be filed, and it is not for the Court to review that paramount discretion. The Court quoted its earlier ruling that this rule rests on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman and on practicality, since otherwise the courts would be swamped by petitions assailing the Ombudsman's findings. But the Court recognized one important exception: when grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman is evident, the act can justifiably be assailed.

The Court found that exception present. The Information charged Olairez with failing to issue a writ of execution despite the finality of the Commission's decision and despite the later order to issue it. The records showed that no writ was issued after the original decision because a motion for reconsideration was pending and the case had been elevated to the Supreme Court, and that after finality Olairez issued the May 1997 order, which Tenoria challenged before the Commission, leading to the order to issue the writ, another pre-execution hearing, and finally the March 2000 order directing payment of full backwages and separation pay. That final order came a day after Tenoria's complaint before the Ombudsman and long before the Information was filed. The Court held that while there might have been undue delay, there was no showing of manifest partiality, bad faith, malicious intent or gross inexcusable negligence; at most it was poor judgment. It closed with the reminder that it is neither right nor just to put a person to anxiety and anguish by an indictment that, on its face, cannot stand.

Doctrine

First, Article 254 of the Labor Code is a prohibition on injunctions and restraining orders in labor disputes; it is not a proscription against criminal complaints against labor arbiters, and it does not bar the Ombudsman from investigating and prosecuting them.

Second, a complaint before the Ombudsman for malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance is not forum shopping where it is confined to the public officer's own acts and would not materially affect the outcome of the related labor case.

Third, the Supreme Court generally respects the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause, but it will intervene where grave abuse of discretion is evident.

Fourth, to sustain a charge under Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019, the prosecution must show that the public officer caused undue injury or gave unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; mere delay or poor judgment in executing a final labor judgment does not supply these elements.

Disposition

The petition was given due course; the Ombudsman's resolution was set aside, and the Sandiganbayan was directed to dismiss the Information against Executive Labor Arbiter Olairez, with no costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause is respected except where grave abuse of discretion is evident, and delay or poor judgment in executing a labor award is not the manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence that the anti-graft law requires. Examiners use this case to test the exception to the non-reviewability of the Ombudsman's probable-cause determination and the elements of Section 3(e) of the anti-graft law.