ARISTON ANDAYA, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. DR. MELENCIO MANANSALA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Originally brought to the Court of Appeals, this appeal was
forwarded to us by said court because it raises only legal questions.

There is no dispute as to the antecedents of the case, which the lower court found to be as follows:

“On June 13, 1934, one Isidro Fenis sold the land in
question to Eustaquia Llanes, with right of repurchase within a period
of five years. After the expiry of said period, and without
repurchasing the said properly, Isidro Fenis sold it again to Maria
Viloria on January 13, 1944. Seven months later, or on August 21, 1944,
Maria Viloria sold by way of sale with right to repurchase within a
period of one year, the said property together with another parcel of
land to the herein defendant Melencio Manansala. On August 1, 1946,
upon the expiry of the said period, Manansala registered with the
Register of Deeds an affidavit consolidating his title on the property.
A year later, or on September 28, 1947, Maria Viloria sold by way of
absolute sale the same property to Ciriaco Casiño, Fidela Valdez, and
the plaintiff spouses Ariston Andaya and Micaela Cabrito, for
P4,800.00, which deed contained the following stipulation:

The
following month, or on October 18, 1947, Eustaquia Llanes, instituted
Civil case No. 399 to quiet title and to recover possession of said
parcel from Ciriaco Casiño. Eight months later, or on June 9, 1949, a
defendant Melencio Manansala sold by way of absolute sale, the property
in question to the spouses Ciriaco Casino and Fidela Valdez, and the
plaintiffs for P1,500.00, which deed contained the following
stipulation:

‘That from and after this
date, the vendee herein named are the lawful owners of the land herein
sold which I warrant to be free from all kinds of liens and
encumbrances whatever and in case of eviction, I promise, agree and
covenant to answer to and for the vendee in the form and manner
provided by law.’

This document of conveyance was recorded in the Register of Deeds under Act No. 3344, on June 9, 1948.

In
the meantime, on September 28, 1948, Eustaquia Llanes, included as
co-defendant in Civil Case No. 399, Melencio Manansala (Annex C), and
on September 2, 1950, as additional defendants, Fidela Valdez and the
spouses Ariston Andaya and Micaela Cabrito (Annex D). The said
defendant filed a joint answer to the second amended complaint,
claiming title on said property on the basis of the conveyance made in
favor of Manansala, and from the latter to the other defendants.
Judgment was rendered in that case in favor of Eustaquia Llanes, and on
October 17, 1955, the said judgment having become final, a writ of
execution was issued against Ciriaco Casino, Fidela Valdez, Ariston
Andaya and Micaela Cabrito. In the enforcement of said writ, the
properties of Fidela Valdez were attached and sold at public auction to
cover the damages, representing the value of the produce of the land,
amounting to P676.00, costs of the suit in the amount of P33.20, or a
total of P709.20 (Annex H-1).”

On March 23, 1956, plaintiffs spouses Ariston Andaya and Micaela
Cabrito commenced this case in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur against defendant Melencio Manansala to recover damages suffered by
them by reason of the latter’s breach of his warranty of title or
against eviction embodied in his sale of the land in question to
plaintiffs. Defendant Manansala denied liability for the damages
claimed, and alleged that it was plaintiffs and their co-purchasers who
pleaded with him to sell said land to them at a low price after they
had been sued by Eustaquia Llanes in Civil Case No. 399, considering
that Manansala had registered the land in his name with the office of
the Register of Deeds. After the case was submitted for a summary
judgment and the parties had agreed on a statement of facts, the lower
court entered the following decision:

“Considering that the same land was already sold to
the plaintiffs and their co-vendee, Ciriaco Casiño and Fidela Valdez,
it is obvious that their only purpose in acquiring the same land from
the defendent at the low price of P1,500 was to enable them to register
the prior deed of sale executed by Maria Viloria. This is true, because
the title of the defendant had already consolidated pursuant to Article
1509 of the Spanish Civil Code as shown by an affidavit of the
defendant registered with the Register of Deeds of this province. This
was clearly the understanding of the parties, and the plaintiffs
apparently knew that the stipulation on warranty in the deed was made pro forma,
and could not have been intended, considering the above circumstances
and from the fact that said property was then subject of a pending:
litigation as an actual warranty on the title and possession of the
purchasers. This being so, it would be inequitable now to hold that the
defendant is liable under the provisions of Article 1555 of the new
Civil Code or under Act 1478 of the Spanish Civil Code which is the law
that should be applied, the said transaction being before August 30,
1950.

“In determining therefore the obligations of the
defendant, those applicable to a vendor in cases of rescission of a
contract should be applied.

WHEREFORE, the Court renders
judgment sentencing the defendant to return to the plaintiffs the sum
of P750.00 which represent one-half of the purchase price with interest
at 6% from June 9, 1948 until fully paid, and to pay the costs of this
suit.”

From the above decision, defendant Melencio Manansala appealed,
claiming that after finding that he was not liable to
plaintiffs-appellees for breach of warranty against eviction, the lower
court erred in holding him liable as in rescission of sale and ordering
him to return to plaintiffis-appellees the price of the land in
question with interests.

There is merit in the appeal.

The vendor’s liability for warranty against eviction in a contract
of sale is waivable and may be renounced by the vendee (last par., Art.
1475, Old Code; last par., Art. 1548, New). The contract of sale
between herein appellant and the appellees included a stipulation as to
the warranty; but the lower court found that the parties understood
that such stipulation was merely pro forma and that the
appellant vendor was not to be bound thereby, in view of the fact that
the same land had been previously bought by appellees from Maria
Viloria and that their only purpose in buying the same, again from
appellant was to enable them to register their prior deed of sale; and
the further fact that when the sale between appellant and appellee was
made, the property was already the subject of a pending litigation
between appellees and one Eustaquia Llanes, who claimed its title and
possession by virtue of an earlier sale from the original owner, and it
was by final judgment in this litigation that appellees were evicted
from said land. Not having appealed from the decision of the court
below, appellees are bound by these findings, the implication of which
is that they not only renounced or waived the warranty against
eviction, but that they knew of the danger of eviction and assumed its
consequences.

Now, according to Article 1477 of the old Code, (the law applicable when the contract in this case was made),

“When the vendee has waived the right to warranty
in case of eviction, and eviction shall occur, the vendor shall only
pay the price which the thing sold had at the time of the eviction,
unless the vendee has made the waiver with knowledge of the danger of
eviction and assumed its consequences.” (Same as Art. 1554 of the new
Code)

As already stated, appellees knew of the danger of eviction at the
time they purchased the land in question from appellant, and assumed
its consequences. Therefore, the appellant is not even obliged to
restore to them the price of the land at the time of eviction, but is
completely exempt from liability whatsoever.

Neither may appellant be condemned to return the price, received
from appellees on the theory of rescission of their contract of sale,
as held by the court below. In the first place, the remedy of
rescission contemplates that the one demanding it is able to return
whatever he has received under the contract; and when this can not be
done, rescission can not be carried out (Art. 1295, Old Code; Art.
1385, New). It is for this reason that the law on sales does not make
rescission a remedy in case the vendee is totally evicted from the
thing sold, as in this case, for he can no longer restore the thing to
the vendor. It is only when the vendee loses “a part of the thing sold
of such importance, in relation to the whole, that he would not have
purchased it without said part” that he may ask for rescission, but he
has “the obligation to return the thing without other encumbrances than
those which it had when he acquired it” (Art. 1479, old Code; 1356,
New). In the second place, appellees, as already stated, assumed the
risk of eviction, which stops them from asking for rescission even were
it possible for them to restore what they had received under the
contract.

On their part, appellees claim that in view of their eviction from
the land in question, they are entitled to recover from appellant more
items of damages under Article 1555 of the New Code than the mere
return of the price with interests as ordered by the trial court. The
claim is untenable, not only because appellant, as we have held, is
exempt from any liability for appellees’ eviction, but also because not
having appealed from the decision of the court below, appellees can not
ask for a modification thereof or an award of damages not included
therein (David vs. De la Cruz, 103 Phil., 380; 54 Off. Gaz. [35] 8073; Pineda & Ampil Mfg. Co. vs. Bartolome, 95 Phil., 930; Gorospe vs. Peñaflorida, 101 Phil., 886).

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and the complaint
dismissed, with costs against appellees Ariston Andaya, et al.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.