JESUS S. DIZON, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT VS. JOSE T. GARCIA, SR., ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

On December 1, 1956, Jesus S. Dizon filed with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga an action for specific performance and damages against Jose T. Garcia,
Marcelino Garcia, Alejandro P. Dizon and Victor Serrano, the defendant first
named being sued in his personal capacity and the latter three as judicial
administrators of the estates of the deceased spouses Juan Rivera and Vicenta
Dizon. The complaint, under the first cause of action, alleges in substance that
on January 28, 1953 the defendant Jose T. Garcia and the late Juan Rivera—the
latter acting in his own name and as executor of the estate of his deceased wife
Vicenta Dizon—leased to plaintiff certain parcels of agricultural land (5 of
which were owned by them pro-indiviso) for a period of 5 years commencing from
the crop year 1953-54 up to and including the agricultural year 1957-58 at an
annual rent of P20,000.00 and 250 cavans of palay for the first year and
P21,000.00 and 250 cavans of palay for each of the succeeding years, the lands
leased having an aggregate area of more than 402 hectares as evidenced by the
contract of lease attached to the complaint as Annex “A”; that pursuant to the
real and true agreement of the parties to the lease contract, plaintiff on
different dates from June 3, 1953 to July 2, 1956 paid to defendants various
amounts totalling; P78,050.00, and delivered 757 cavans of palay; that on
November 15, 1956, plaintiff deposited in court the sum of P4,950.00, the
balance of the rents in cash corresponding to the fourth agricultural year, in
connection with a complaint for interpleader plaintiff was constrained to file
against the defendants; that as a consequence of the filing of the complaint for
interpleader, the defendants Marcelino Garcia and Victor R. Serrano threatened
to eject plaintiff from the leased premises “as in fact both defendants have
started broadcasting in the poblacion of Mabalacat, Pampanga, that they will
eject the plaintiff from the leased premises, notwithstanding the fact that the
plaintiff has religiously and faithfully complied with all the obligations
arising from the real and true agreement of the parties;” that when plaintiff
went to see the said defendants, both informed him that “they have already
agreed with others to lease the premises and to succeed the plaintiff;” and that
the plaintiff under the lease contract, Annex “A”, has an option to renew the
lease for another five years and intends to exercise said option. The complaint,
likewise, alleges, as a second cause of action, that some 25 hectares of the
leased lands had not been delivered to plaintiff; and that notwithstanding
repeated demands, defendants refused and still refuse to deliver to plaintiff
the said 25 hectares. Finally, as a third cause of action, plaintiff avers that
as a consequence of the facts above alleged, he suffered damages both moral and
actual. Plaintiff, therefore, prays, under the first cause of action, that
defendants be directed to execute a renewal of the lease contract for another 5
years and to deliver, under the second cause of action, 25 hectares of the
leased premises, plus damages as claimed in the third cause of action.

Alleging that the lease contract had not yet expired so that the option to
renew the same could not yet be exercised; that plaintiff stipulated to renew
the lease only in the event that “the lessors shall decide to have the
same property leased again”; and that the defendant judicial administrators
cannot be compelled to enter into any contract with plaintiff regarding the
properties under custodia legis, unless the proper petition be made
with the probate court that appointed them; counsel for the defendants (except
Alejandro P. Dizon) filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first cause of action.
The motion was opposed by plaintiff, but the lower court in its order of July
16, 1957 found the grounds alleged in the motion to dismiss not to be
indubitable and consequently overruled the same, without prejudice to defendants
setting up said grounds in their answer as special defenses. Submitting
documentary exhibits, defendants asked for reconsideration. Upon order of the
court, plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion for reconsideration setting
forth therein his objection to the admission of the exhibits. To this
opposition, defendants filed a reply under date of August 13, 1957 submitting
therewith four additional exhibits. In an order dated December 5, 1957, the
lower court— stating that “with the presentation of exhibits 17 and 18 attached
to the defendants’ pleading of August 13, 1957, the defendants’ motion for
reconsideration becomes now tenable for the reason that there is an allegation
of the complaint (paragraph 4 thereof) with regard to the filing of an action
for interpleader, which has already been dismissed”—reconsidered its order of
July 16, 1957, but instead of dismissing the first cause of action of the
complaint as sought by the defendants, it ordered plaintiff to amend the same
within five days from notice. On December 12, 1957, plaintiff filed his motion
for reconsideration, which was denied on January 7, 1958. As plaintiff failed or
refused to amend the first cause of action of his complaint as ordered within
the period granted, the lower court, upon motion of ifie defendants, issued its
order of March 19, 1958, dismissing said cause of action. From that order,
pl^||tiff appealed directly to this Court.

In his lone assignment of error, plaintiff contends that the lower court
erred in issuing the order of dismissal on the basis of exhibits “17” and “18”,
or of facts not alleged in the complaint. The contention, it will be observed,
is premised on the erroneous assumption that the order of dismissal complained
of was issued on the ground of lack of cause of action. It is on record,
however, that plaintiff’s first cause of action was dismissed, not because of
the ground pointed out in the assigned error, but because of the latter’s
failure or refusal to amend his complaint within the period granted him as
ordered by the court. Such dismissal is authorized under section 3 of Rule 30 of
the Rules of Court, which empowers the court, upon its own motion or that of the
defendant, to dismiss the cause or action when plaintiff fails to. comply with
its lawful orders.

In any event, considering the circumstances of the case, we think the
dismissal was justified, it appearing, as pointed out by defendants in their
motion to dismiss, that at the time of the filing of the complaint, plaintiff
could not have properly asked for the renewal of the contract of lease for the
reason that the original term of the lease had not yet expired. It also appears
that the greater portion of the lands involved in the case are in custodia
legis. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the grounds alleged in
defendants’ motion to dismiss were obviously based upon the allegations of the
complaint itself—which includes the lease Contract, Annex “A”, by reference—and
not upon facts entirely extraneous or foreign thereto.

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs against plaintiff-appellant.

Paras, C.J. Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Order affirmed.