CIRILA ARCABA, PETITIONER, VS. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADE…

Arcaba versus Tabancura

The Case

This is Arcaba versus Tabancura, a petition for review on certiorari decided by the Supreme Court in November 2001. Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, received a deed of donation inter vivos over a house and a portion of a lot from the late Francisco Comille, for whom she had cared for many years. After Francisco died, his nephews and nieces, the respondents, sued to annul the donation on the ground that Cirila was Francisco's common-law wife, and that the donation was therefore void under Article 87 of the Family Code. The case matters because it fixes what "living together as husband and wife" means for purposes of that prohibition, and because it shows how the Supreme Court treats the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.

Procedural History

The respondents filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City for declaration of nullity of the deed of donation, recovery of possession, and damages. The trial court ruled for the respondents, declared the donation void under Article 87 of the Family Code, ordered Cirila to deliver possession of the house and lot, and ordered her to pay attorney's fees. Cirila appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court with modification. The Court of Appeals denied her motion for reconsideration. Cirila then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Facts

In January 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of a lot in Dipolog City with an area of 418 square meters. Zosima died in October 1980. Francisco then executed with his mother-in-law a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, and the lot was registered in his name alone. Having no children, and after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, Leticia's cousin Luzviminda Paghacian, and Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his house and the store inside it. When Leticia and Luzviminda married, only Cirila remained to care for him. Cirila testified that she was a 34-year-old widow and Francisco a 75-year-old widower when she began working for him, and that his health eventually deteriorated until he became bedridden. Francisco did not pay her a regular cash wage, although he provided her family with food and lodging.

In January 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed a deed of donation inter vivos ceding to Cirila a portion of the lot consisting of 150 square meters, together with his house. The deed stated that the donation was made in consideration of the faithful services Cirila had rendered over the past ten years. Cirila accepted the donation in the same instrument, had it notarized, and later registered herself as absolute owner. Francisco died in October 1991 without any children.

In 1993, the respondents, Francisco's nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, sued to annul the donation. They alleged that Cirila was Francisco's common-law wife, making the donation void under Article 87 of the Family Code. The trial court agreed, relying on the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and on documents bearing the signature "Cirila Comille," namely an application for a business permit as real estate lessor, a sanitary permit with a health certificate, and Francisco's death certificate. The Court of Appeals affirmed, also relying on the testimonies, on a pleading in another civil case referring to Cirila as Francisco's common-law spouse, and on the fact that she received no regular cash wage.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied Article 87 of the Family Code to the circumstances of this case.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco, and in shifting the burden of evidence to her.

Applicable Provisions

Article 87 of the Family Code provides:

Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.

This is the provision on which the entire case turns, because it voids the donation if Cirila and Francisco were living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly applied Article 87. The Court first addressed the procedural objection that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45. It held that the general rule applies here because the Court of Appeals based its findings on evidence presented by both parties, and none of the recognized exceptions was present.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that the finding of a common-law relationship was supported by the evidence. The Court defined the key term. In Bitangcor versus Tan, it had held that the term cohabitation or living together as husband and wife means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. The Court added that cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such cohabitation; they are merely meretricious.

Applying this standard, the Court found that Cirila admitted residing under one roof with Francisco for a long time, and that their public conduct showed a relationship of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife, not merely caregiver and patient. The Court relied on several circumstances. Erlinda Tabancura testified that Francisco told her Cirila was his mistress. Documents showed Cirila signing as "Cirila Comille," which showed she saw herself as Francisco's common-law wife. The lessees of Francisco, in another civil case, referred to Cirila as the common-law spouse of Francisco. And Cirila never demanded a regular cash wage, although she was entitled to one under the law, which made it difficult to believe she stayed out of pure beneficence. On these facts, the respondents proved by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, and the donation was void under Article 87.

Doctrine

For the prohibition in Article 87 of the Family Code to apply, the parties must be shown to have lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. Cohabitation means not only residing under one roof but also having repeated sexual intercourse; more than that, it is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, holding themselves out to the public as husband and wife. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, are merely meretricious and do not amount to cohabitation. A donation of gratuitous advantage between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage is void. Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive and may not be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45, save for the recognized exceptions.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which had affirmed the trial court's ruling declaring the donation void and ordering Cirila to deliver possession of the house and lot to the respondents.

Remember This

Memorize this line: cohabitation for Article 87 means the public assumption of the marital relation, holding out as husband and wife, not secret meetings however often repeated. Examiners use this case to test the void-donation rule between common-law spouses and the conclusiveness of the Court of Appeals' factual findings under Rule 45.