ERNESTO FRANCISCO Y SPENOCILLA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Ernesto Francisco versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is the case of Ernesto Francisco versus People of the Philippines, decided by the Supreme Court in July 2004. Ernesto Francisco, a jewelry dealer in Meycauayan, Bulacan, was convicted by the trial court and the Court of Appeals of violating Presidential Decree Number 1612, the Anti-Fencing Law, for allegedly buying pieces of jewelry stolen by a household helper. The case matters because the Supreme Court acquits him, and in doing so it teaches two enduring lessons: the strict elements of fencing, and the rule that the extrajudicial statements and admissions of a person who never takes the witness stand cannot be used against the accused, because that would violate his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.

Procedural History

Ernesto Francisco was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, under an Information filed in June 1993. After trial, the court rendered judgment in November 1995, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Anti-Fencing Law. It sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor maximum as minimum, to twenty years of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum, ordered him to pay the value of the jewelry in the total amount of 655,000 pesos with interest, and imposed the accessory penalties.

He appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning errors on the sufficiency of the evidence and on the hearsay character of the prosecution's testimony. In December 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in full. He then elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari, again insisting that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the testimonies relied upon were hearsay.

Facts

Jovita Rodriguez kept several pieces of jewelry inside a locked cabinet in a locked room of her house. She hired Pacita Linghon as a household helper in February 1989, and Pacita periodically cleaned that room. Pacita left the employ sometime in May 1991. In the third week of October 1991, Pacita asked her brother Macario to sell some jewelry, telling him that a friend owned it. Macario went to the shop of Ernesto Francisco, which carried a poster saying, "We buy gold," and sold two rings and one bracelet for 25,000 pesos. Sometime in November 1991, Pacita again asked Macario to sell a pair of earrings, and he sold them to Ernesto for 18,000 pesos. On both occasions Ernesto gave Macario a small tip.

Also in November 1991, Jovita opened her cabinet and found the jewelry box empty, although the lock was not broken. Among the missing pieces were a pair of diamond heart-shaped earrings worth 400,000 pesos, a heart-shaped diamond ring worth 100,000 pesos, a white gold bracelet worth 150,000 pesos, and a ring with a small diamond worth 5,000 pesos. She suspected Pacita. In August 1992 she filed a complaint for theft with the police, and Pacita, without counsel, gave a sworn statement naming "Mang Erning" of Meycauayan as the buyer. Pacita later pointed Ernesto out to the police, who invited him for questioning. At the municipal police station he allegedly offered 5,000 pesos to the policemen, which they refused; he denied the offer and demanded a warrant of arrest.

Pacita was charged with qualified theft and Adoracion Linghon with fencing before the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76, and in August 1993 both were convicted. Meanwhile, Jovita persuaded Macario to testify against Ernesto, assuring him that he would not be prosecuted for fencing. An Information for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law was then filed against Ernesto before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, which convicted him. He appealed, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and he brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Ernesto Francisco bought the jewelry from Pacita and Macario Linghon, considering that Pacita never testified in court.
• Whether or not the testimony of Jovita Rodriguez about Pacita's alleged confession, and the testimony of the police officer about Pacita's pointing to the petitioner, are admissible against the petitioner.
• Whether or not the testimony of Macario Linghon is credible and sufficient to sustain a conviction.
• Whether or not the prosecution proved that the petitioner knew or should have known that the jewelry was derived from the proceeds of theft.

Applicable Provisions

Presidential Decree Number 1612, the Anti-Fencing Law, defines the crime of fencing in this way:

Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

This definition supplies the elements the prosecution must prove, including the accused's knowledge that the goods came from robbery or theft.

The same decree creates a presumption from possession:

Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.

The Court notes that fencing is malum prohibitum, a wrong prohibited by law regardless of intent, and that this presumption arises only from proven possession of goods that were in fact the subject of robbery or theft.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner bought the jewelry from Pacita and Macario. The trial and appellate courts had relied on several items of evidence, but the Court found most of them inadmissible. Jovita's testimony about Pacita's confession was inadmissible against the petitioner because he was not a party to the other criminal cases, and strangers to a case are not bound by its judgment. Pacita's testimony during the preliminary investigation and her supplemental affidavit were likewise inadmissible, since she never testified in court and the petitioner was deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine her. The police officer's testimony that Pacita pointed to the petitioner was admissible only to prove that she made the pointing, not to prove the truth of what she said, because the policemen had no personal knowledge of the sale. Only Macario's testimony, given in court and subjected to cross-examination, remained.

On the third issue, the Court found Macario's testimony dubious and barren of probative weight. He admitted that his testimony at the preliminary investigation and at trial were inconsistent, and the records showed that the inconsistencies concerned material points: the dates, the prices, whether the earrings sold for 18,000 or 25,000 pesos, and whether Pacita accompanied him on the second transaction. The trial court itself observed his confusion on the stand.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that even assuming the petitioner bought the jewelry from Macario, there was no evidence that he knew it was stolen. Macario himself did not know the jewelry was stolen; Pacita had told him it belonged to a friend. The Court stressed that the stolen property is not indispensable to prove fencing, and that the conviction of Pacita for theft could not be used against the petitioner because there was no showing that the judgment had become final and executory when the trial court rendered its decision.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain the four elements of fencing: first, a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; second, the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in that crime, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes of, or deals in any article of value derived from its proceeds; third, the accused knew or should have known that the article was so derived; and fourth, there is intent to gain. Fencing is malum prohibitum, and the law creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from mere possession of goods that were the subject of robbery or theft.

The second rule is evidentiary: the extrajudicial statements and admissions of a person who does not take the witness stand are hearsay and cannot be used against the accused, because they violate his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. A judgment in another criminal case binds only the parties to it, and strangers are not bound. Finally, the testimony of a single witness may suffice for conviction, but only if that testimony is credible and reliable.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, and acquitted Ernesto Francisco of the crime charged.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the admissions of a person who never testifies cannot be used against the accused, for that would deny him his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Examiners use this case to test the elements of fencing under the Anti-Fencing Law and the hearsay rule as applied to extrajudicial statements and judgments in other cases.