JUAN GARGANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. TAN YANON AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

Juan Gargantos appeals by certiorari from the decision of the Court
of Appeals reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Romblon.

The record discloses that the late Francisco Sanz was the former
owner of a parcel of land containing 888 square meters, with the
buildings and improvements thereon, situated in the poblacion
of Romblon. He subdivided the lot into three and then sold each portion
to different persons. One portion was purchased by Guillermo Tengtio
who subsequently sold it to Vicente Uy Veza. Another portion, with the
house of strong materials thereon, was sold in 1927 to Tan Yanon,
respondent herein. This house has on its northeastern side, doors and
windows overlooking the third-portion, which, together with the camarin and small building thereon, after passing through several hands, was finally acquired by Juan Gargantos, petitioner herein.

On April 23, 1955, Gargantos applied to the Municipal Mayor of Romblon for a permit to demolish the roofing of the old camarin. The permit having been granted, Gargantos tore down the roof of the camarin.
On May 11,1955, Gargantos asked the Municipal Council of Romblon for
another permit, this time in order to construct a combined residential
house and warehouse on his lot Tan Yanon opposed approval of this
application.

Because both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon
recommended granting of the building permit to Gargantos, Tan Yanon
filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him from constructing a
building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying
the view through the windows of his house, unless such building is
erected at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary
line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to enjoin the
members of the Municipal Council of Romblon from issuing the
corresponding building permit to defendants. The case as against the
members of the Municipal Council was subsequently dismissed with
concurrence of plaintiff’s council. After trial, the Court of First
Instance of Romblon rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and
ordering plaintiff, to pay defendant the sum of P12,500.00 by way of
compensatory, exemplary, moral and moderate damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Romblon and enjoined defendant from constructing
his building unless “he erects the same at a distance of not less than
three meters from the boundary line of his property, in conformity with
Article 673 of the New Civil Code.”

So Juan Gargantos filed this petition for review of the appellate
Court’s decision. The focal issue herein is whether the property of
respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view against the
property of petitioner Gargantos.

The kernel of petitioner’s argument is that respondent never
acquired any easement either by title or by prescription. Assuredly,
there is no deed establishing an easement. Likewise, neither petitioner
nor his predecessors-in-interest have ever executed any deed whereby
they recognized the existence of the easement, nor has there been final
judgment to that effect. Invoking our decision in Cortes vs.
Yu-Tibo (2 Phil., 24), petitioner maintains that respondent has not
acquired an easement by prescription because he has never formally
forbidden petitioner from performing any act which would be lawful
without the easement, hence the prescriptive period never started.

It is obvious, however, that Article 538, O.C.C. (now Article 621,
N.C.C.) and the doctrine in the Yu-Tibo case are not applicable herein
because the two estates, that now owned by petitioner, and that owned
by respondent, were formerly owned by just one person, Francisco Sanz.
It was Sanz who introduced improvements on both properties. On that
portion presently belonging to respondent, he constructed a house in
such a way that the northeastern side thereof extends to the wall of
the camarin on the portion now belonging to petitioner. On
said northeastern side of the house, there are windows and doors which
serve as passages for light and view. These windows and doors were in
existence when respondent purchased the house and lot from Sanz. The
deed of sale did not provide that the easement of light and view would
not be established. This then is precisely the case covered by Article
541, O.C.C. (now Article 624, N.C.C.) which provides that the existence
of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the
proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated,
as a title so that the easement will continue actively and passively,
unless at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the
contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the
sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed. The
existence of the doors and windows on the northeastern side of the
aforementioned house, is equivalent to a title, for the visible and
permanent sign of an easement is the title that characterizes its
existence (Amor vs. Florentino, 74 Phil., 403). It should be
noted, however, that while the law declares that the easement is to
“continue” the easement actually arises for the first time only upon
alienation of either estate, inasmuch as before that time there is no
easement to speak of, there being but one owner of both estates
(Article 530, O.C.C., now Article 613, N.C.C.).

We find that respondent Tan Yanon’s property has an easement of
light and view against petitioner’s property. By reason of this
easement, petitioner cannot construct on his land any building unless
he erects it at a distance of not less than three meters from the
boundary line separating the two estates.

Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with costs against petitioner.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Barrera, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.