MARIANO BENITEZ ALIAS YU BON CHIONG AND RUFINO IBAÑEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY FISCAL OF MANILA AND UY LIAM CHIU ALIAS ONG HO, RESPO…

This is a petition to prohibit the respondent Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., in
his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, from proceeding with the investigation of
a criminal charge (I. S. [Investigation Slip] No. 15190) for falsification of
deeds of real estate mortgage.

On May 4, 1946, petitioner Yu Bon Chiong, as Debtor, petitioner Rufino
Ibañez, as Mortgagor, and Ong Ho, as another mortgagor, and Ching Siok Eng (wife
of Petitioner Yu Bon Chiong) also as a mortgagor, executed in favor of the
Philippine National Bank a real estate mortgage to secure the payment of Yu Bon
Chiong’s indebtedness in the amount of P50,000.00. The mortgage was amended on
March 26, 1947, to secure the payment of the increased indebtedness of
petitioner Yu Bon Chiong which had risen to P170,000.00. Yu Bon Chiong failed to
pay the indebtedness, so that on December 17, 1949, the Philippine National Bank
filed with the CFI of Rizal, Civil Case No. 994, against both petitioners
herein, Ching Siok Eng (wife of Chiong) and respondent Ong Ho, for the
foreclosure of the mortgages. Against a decision in favor of the bank, the
defendants in said case appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified it to
this Court, being G. R. No. L-14244.

On July 24, 1957, respondent Ong Ho filed a complaint in the CFI of Manila
(Civil Case No. 33251), against the Philippine National Bank, petitioners Yu Bon
Chiong, alias Mariano Benitez, Rufino Ibañez and Heirs of Ching Siok Eng, for
the annulment of the two deeds of mortgage, claiming that the signatures
purporting to be his in said documents were forgeries.

The defendants in said case No. 33251 adopted the special defense of the
pendency of another case between the same parties involving the same subject
matter. During the hearing of the special defense, Ong Ho raised the issue that
he was not the same Ong Ho involved in Civil Case No. 994.

On June 16, 1958, respondent Ong Ho filed a criminal complaint before the
respondent City Fiscal of Manila (I. S. No. 15190), charging the herein
petitioners of falsification of the deeds of mortgage involved in Civil Case No.
994. On July 2, 1958, petitioners filed a motion before the respondent City
Fiscal, for the dismissal of the criminal complaint, on the ground that civil
prejudicial questions are involved which should first be resolved. On September
24, 1958,the respondent City Fiscal, denied the motion to dismiss or suspend the
proceedings in the criminal ca.se and set the same for hearing. The motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss was also denied.

Claiming that respondent City Fiscal, in denying the motion to dismiss or
suspend the proceedings in I.S. No, 15190, and the motion for reconsideration
filed thereto, acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
and that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, petitioners filed the present action for prohibition,
with preliminary injunction. Respondent City Fiscal interposed Special and/or
Affirmative Defenses, which were adopted in substance by respondent Ong Ho.

Is the question in the civil case prejudicial so as to warrant the suspension
of the hearings and/or investigation of the criminal case at the City Fiscal’s
office? This seems to be the dominant issue for our consideration.

No dispute arises from the fact that both civil case No. 33251 and criminal
case I.S. No. 15190 arose from the same transactions and/or facts. The general
rule is—where both a civil and a criminal case arising from the same facts are
filed in court, the criminal case takes precedence [Rule 107, sec. 1
(b)]. An exception to this general rule would be—if there exist prejudicial
questions which should be resolved first before action could be taken in the
criminal case and when the law provides that both the civil and criminal case
can be instituted simultaneously (Art. 33, new Civil Code). A prejudicial
question has been defined as—

“* * * One based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused.” (Civil Code Annotated by Padilla, Vol. I, 1956 Ed., p. 83; see
also De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil., 202, as to the definition of the
term).

“Under the foregoing doctrine, for a civil case to be considered prejudicial
to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending its (civil
case) final determination, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the aforesaid civil action the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.” (D.S. Mendiola, et al., vs. Hon. H.
Macadaeg, et al., 111 Phil., 169).

In Civil Case No. 33251, for annulment of the deed of mortgage, the issue is
that the signatures of Ong Ho appearing therein are forged. In the criminal
case, I.S. No. 15190, the issue is likewise the falsification of the deeds in
question. It appearing that the principal issues in both cases are the same,
and/or arise from the same facts, it stands to reason that it is not necessary
that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case. This
being the case, the proposition is simply reduced to a matter of preferences. In
the case of Pisalbon, et al., vs. Tesoro, et al., 92 Phil., 931: 49 Off.
Gaz. [11] 1398, one Estefania Pisalbon found in the records of the cadastral
case an affidavit purporting that she renounced her rights over the land,
subject of the cadastral case, to Eugenia Pisalbon, subscribed and sworn to
before Notary Public Felix Villaflores. Estefania filed a complaint with the
Justice of the Peace of Asingan, Pangasinan, against the Notary Public for
Falsification of Document, The Justice of the Peace without conducting a hearing
or investigation, dismissed the complaint on the ground that he could not
proceed with the criminal case until the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
had decided the Cadastral case in which the alleged falsified affidavit had been
presented. The CFI of Pangasinan denied the petition for certiorari and mandamus
against the Justice of the Peace, on the ground that since the alleged falsified
affidavit had been presented in the cadastral case, the criminal case should be
suspended until after the cadastral case had been terminated. On Appeal to this
Court, we ruled—

“The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan erred in holding that the criminal
case should be suspended. In the present proceedings, the civil case does not
involve a question pre-judicial to the criminal case, for to whomsoever the land
may be awarded after all the evidence has been presented in the civil case, may
not affect the alleged crime committed by the notary public, which is the
subject of the criminal case. But, even supposing that both the civil and the
criminal case involve the same questions and one must precede the other, it
should be the civil which should be suspended rather than the criminal, to await
the result of the latter”(Section 1, Rule 107; Almeda, et al. vs. Abaroa,
8 Phil. 178; See also par. 2, Art. 35, N.C.C.)

In view of all the foregoing, the petition for prohibition is denied, and the
writ of preliminary injunction issued is dissolved. With costs against
petitioners.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, De Leon, and Natividad,
JJ., concur.