BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND REP. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, RESPONDENTS.

Cawaling versus Commission on Elections

The Case

This is a case about a city that was born by merger. Benjamin Cawaling, Junior, a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsogon, went to the Supreme Court against the Commission on Elections and Representative Francis Joseph Escudero. He asked the Court to strike down Republic Act Number 8806, the law that created the City of Sorsogon by merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, and to annul the plebiscite that ratified its creation. The case matters because it settles two things every local government lawyer must know: that the merger of existing local government units is a constitutionally recognized mode of creating a city, and that the one hundred twenty day period for holding the plebiscite runs from the effectivity of the law, not from its approval.

Procedural History

The case reached the Supreme Court as an original action, not as an appeal from any lower court. Cawaling filed a petition for certiorari on January 2, 2001, seeking to annul the plebiscite. Two days later, on January 4, 2001, he filed a second petition, this time for prohibition, seeking to enjoin the further implementation of Republic Act Number 8806 on constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court later consolidated the two petitions. There were no proceedings in a trial court or in the Court of Appeals; the questions raised were pure questions of law and constitutionality, which the Supreme Court took up directly.

Facts

On August 16, 2000, then President Joseph Estrada signed into law Republic Act Number 8806, entitled an act creating the City of Sorsogon by merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and appropriating funds therefor. The law was first published on August 25, 2000 in a newspaper of general circulation, and then on September 1, 2000 in a newspaper of local circulation in Sorsogon. Its effectivity clause provided that it would take effect upon publication in at least two newspapers of general and local circulation, so publication was completed on September 1, 2000.

Pursuant to the plebiscite requirement of the Constitution, the Commission on Elections conducted a plebiscite on December 16, 2000 in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. The next day, December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers proclaimed that the creation of the City of Sorsogon had been ratified by a majority of the votes cast.

Cawaling then challenged both the law and the plebiscite. He argued that the plebiscite was held one day beyond the one hundred twenty day period counted from the approval of the law on August 16, 2000, and that the Commission failed to conduct the required twenty day information campaign. He also argued that the law was unconstitutional because it created a city by merging two municipalities rather than by converting a single municipality or a cluster of barangays, and because it allegedly embraced two subjects under one title. In the meantime, during the May 14, 2001 elections, the new City of Sorsogon held its first election of officials and began discharging its corporate and political powers.

Issues

• Whether or not Republic Act Number 8806 is unconstitutional for creating a city by merging two municipalities instead of converting a single municipality or a cluster of barangays under Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
• Whether or not Republic Act Number 8806 violates the one subject, one bill rule of the Constitution because its title does not expressly state the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.
• Whether or not the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was validly conducted within the one hundred twenty day period, counted from the effectivity of the law rather than from its approval.
• Whether or not the Commission on Elections failed to conduct the required extensive information campaign before the plebiscite.

Applicable Provisions

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

This provision expressly allows the merger of local government units, which defeats the argument that a city may only be created by conversion.

Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:

Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos for the last two consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

The Court construed the phrase on conversion not as a criterion but merely as one mode of creating a city.

Section 8 of the Local Government Code provides:

Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division.

This provision confirms that merger is a recognized mode of creating a new local government unit.

Section 26, paragraph 1, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

This is the one subject, one bill rule against which the title of the law was measured.

Section 10 of the Local Government Code provides:

Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Such plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections within one hundred twenty days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.

This provision supplied the reckoning point for the one hundred twenty day period, which the Court held to be the effectivity of the law.

Section 54 of Republic Act Number 8806 provides:

Plebiscite. The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence upon the ratification of its creation by a majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters in a plebiscite to be conducted in the present municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon within one hundred twenty days from the approval of this Act.

The Court read the word approval in this section together with the effectivity clause of the same law.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the law is not unconstitutional. The phrase in Section 450 of the Code stating that a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units, and Section 8 of the Code expressly recognizes division and merger of existing local government units, provided the requirements for creation are met. The argument that there was no compelling reason to merge, since the Municipality of Sorsogon alone could qualify, went into the wisdom of the law, which the judiciary does not pass upon.

On the second issue, the Court held that the law embraces only one subject, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition of the two municipalities was not a separate and distinct subject; it was the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger, the necessary means by which the city was created. The one title, one subject rule does not demand language of such precision as to catalogue every minute detail; it is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include the general object, and it is construed liberally so as not to cripple legislation.

On the third issue, the Court upheld the plebiscite. Section 10 of the Code mandates that the plebiscite be conducted within one hundred twenty days from the date of the effectivity of the law, not from its approval. The word approval in Section 54 of the law, read together with its effectivity clause, could only mean effectivity. Since publication was completed on September 1, 2000, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the period. A strict literal reading would make the law effective even before publication, a result condemned in the landmark Tañada doctrine.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that Cawaling presented no proof of any failure in the information campaign, so the presumption that official duty was regularly performed stood.

Doctrine

A city may be created not only by converting a single municipality or a cluster of barangays, but also by merging existing local government units, for the Constitution and Section 8 of the Local Government Code expressly recognize merger as a mode of creation, subject to the same requirements prescribed for creation.

The one subject, one bill rule is satisfied where the title is comprehensive enough to include the general object of the statute; incidental consequences, such as the abolition of merged municipalities, need not be separately stated in the title.

The one hundred twenty day period for holding the plebiscite is counted from the effectivity of the law, not from its approval, because a law cannot take effect before publication.

Every statute carries a presumption of constitutionality, and the grounds for nullity must be shown beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain.

Disposition

The petitions were dismissed for lack of merit, with costs against Cawaling, and the creation of the City of Sorsogon and the plebiscite that ratified it were upheld.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the one hundred twenty day plebiscite period runs from the effectivity of the law, not from its approval. Examiners use this case to test the modes of creating local government units, the liberal construction of the one title, one subject rule, and the reckoning point for the plebiscite under Section 10 of the Local Government Code.