IN RE VICENTE SOTTO.

Complaints having heretofore been laid before this court charging the
respondent, Vicente Sotto, an attorney practicing before this bar, with
unprofessional conduct, said complaints were by resolution of the court referred
to the Attorney-General for investigation. Upon November 30, 1917, the
Attorney-General, after inquiring into said charges, reported that the charges
were in his opinion wellfounded and recommended the institution of disbarment
proceedings under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The respondent was
thereupon notified of said report: and, after he had put in his reply, evidence
was taken, pursuant to our resolution of December 14, 1917, before the clerk of
this court. The matter is now before us for consideration upon the evidence so
taken and the arguments submitted in the form of memorandums by the
Attorney-General for the Government, and by Sotto, as respondent.

The charges involved in the report of the Attorney-General were primarily
four in number, to which the Attorney-General has added a fifth, based upon
matters connected with the present proceeding itself. The four original charges
are based upon four distinct transactions; and, in order that their nature may
be fully understood, we herewith set forth in detail the facts connected with
three of these transactions, namely, the first, third, and fourth. The other two
charges will be dealt with more summarily at the end of our detailed
statement.

On June 16, 1917, Natalia Enriquez of Paombong, Bulacan, sold to Santiago V.
SyJuco of Malabon, Rizal, two parcels of land. The contract of sale was embodied
in a document duly acknowledged before a notary public. For some reason or
other, the vendor, on or about the first days of August, 1917, instituted an
action against the vendee for the purpose of securing the rescission of said
contract. The plaintiff’s attorney of record in this proceeding was one Jose
Galan.

While the action was pending the respondent, Attorney Vicente Sotto,
intervened in representation of the plaintiff. On August 10, 1917, he went to
the house of SyJuco in Malabon and attempted to procure his consent to the
rescission of the contract above-mentioned and endeavored to induce him to sign
for that purpose a document already prepared rescinding said contract. As SyJuco
was reluctant to rescind the contract, the respondent, Vicente Sotto,
intimidated and threatened him, telling him that unless he signed such document
the respondent would procure his discharge from the office of notary public
which he then hold, would file charges of estafa against him, as a
result of which, he would enter Bilibid prison, and further that the respondent
would publish in all the newspapers an article to the efftect that SyJuco was an
impostor.

These threats, especially that relating to the publication in the newspapers
that SyJuco was an impostor, had the desired effect; and on August 11, 1917,
SyJuco, although aware that the charges imputed to him were false, and in order
to prevent the respondent from carrying his threats into execution, acceded to
the respondent’s demand and executed a document rescinding the contract in
question.

Sotto seems not to have been fully satisfied with this; and a short time
after the occurrence of the events above narrated, he wrote to SyJuco a letter
dated August 13, 1917, in which he asked the latter to pay him the sum of P2,500
as supposed losses and damages to his client Natalia Enriquez, and giving him
two days’ time within which to settle the claim extra-judicially. To make his
demand more effective and probably to impress upon SyJuco’s mind the fact that
the respondent would surely execute his threats he caused to be published in the
issue of August 13, 1917, of the newspapers “El Comercio” and “La Nacion” an
article prepared by himself and entitled “Grave Charges Against a Notary.” The
same article was by him caused to be published in the issue for August 16, 1917,
of the newspaper “El Ideal” where it appeared under the heading of “The Mother
of Dr. Valencia Victim of an Impostor.” The difference in the headline of the
article as it appeared in “El Ideal” and as it appeared in the other two papers,
and the slight difference which may be found in their context, is the result of
changes made by the corresponding editors of said papers for the purpose of
evading any responsibility. These articles refer to SyJuco and in substance
impute to him acts constituting fraud and deceit in securing the execution of
the contract first above mentioned, and further informs the public “an
information for estafa will be filed against the impostor (referring to
SyJuco) with Attorney Vicente Sotto acting as private prosecutor, unless SyJuco
should pay all losses and damages.”

Four or five days passed. The respondent, meanwhile not having received any
answer from SyJuco, wrote him a registered letter, in which he reproduced the
contents of the first letter and then concluded with this remark: “No answer
having been received from you, you are advised that I will present the complaint
with its consequences.” In this letter were inclosed two pictures, one of
Atanasia Enriquez, and another of Natalia Enriquez, the latter bearing a note in
the handwriting of the respondent and saying “To be published on the 25th.” This
note, together with the demand for the payment of P2,500, was a veiled threat to
the effect that unless this sum of money was forthcoming the publication of
scandalous charges against SyJuco would continue; and this was probably one of
the “fatal consequences” which the respondent had in mind. Such action on the
part of the respondent finds its cause in SyJuco’s not paying any attention to
his first letter, and had the object of impressing all the more upon the mind of
his intended victim that he, the respondent, had all the means of exposing him
to public ridicule and contempt.

Still no answer was received from SyJuco; and the respondent caused to be
published in “The Independent” for August 25, 1917, together with the pictures
above described and the affidavits of Natalia and Atanasia Enriquez, detailing
the acts alleged to constitute the supposed fraud and deceit, the article he had
already caused to be published in the newspapers above mentioned. As it appeared
in “The Independent” the articb was entitled “An Aged Lady of Seventy Years
denounces under oath the Adventures of a notary public of Malabon” (referring to
SyJuco) ; and, to make it appear that he had taken or copied it from “La
Nacion,” he placed upon said article an epigraph which reads, “What ‘La Nacion’
says.” However, the truth is, as has been said, that it was he who provided “La
Nacion” and the other newspapers with said article.

In spite of these publications SyJuco maintained his silence; and the
respondent, in pursuance of his threats and of his intention to make SyJuco come
to terms, committed the following acts: He asked SyJuco’s mother for a picture
of her son and for a copy of the judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in a case between SyJuco and his parents, without telling her
the purpose for which he wanted them. Then he caused both the picture and the
judgment to be published in the issue of “The Independent” for September 1,
1917, under the heading printed in big type of “Son Sued by His Parents.
Santiago V. SyJuco is sentenced by Judge McMahon.” Just below the picture is
printed the name “Santiago V. SyJuco” and above it is the satirical phrase “Men
of the day.” This publication had an introductory paragraph which states that
“SyJuco, the notary public of Malabon, Rizal, who recently, according to the
daily papers, attempted to defraud an aged lady of seventy years, making her
sign a fraudulent document of sale of a fishery worth fifteen thousand pesos,
had just lost the suit pending between him, and his father the Chinese Vicente
SyJuco and his mother Cipriana Viardo. This woman, aged more than fifty years,
has appeared at the office of ‘The Independent’ in order to ask for the
publication of the judgment.” But the truth, as already stated, was that it was
the respondent who published it without the permission or knowledge of the old
lady.

The respondent denies having made any threats against SyJuco but we think
that the proofs tend to show that such threats were made. The testimony of the
witnesses for the Attorney-General to the effect that the respondent stated that
information for estafa would be filed against SyJuco, that he would
surely enter Bilibid prison, etc., agrees with the respondent’s attempt, as
shown by Exhibits 4-A and 7-A of the Attorney-General, to make SyJuco believe
that he had committed a crime and that he admitted its commission.

Denial is also made of the truth of the charge that the respondent had sent
to SyJuco the picture of Natalia Enriquez, which bears the note “To be published
on the 25th.” There are numerous circumstances, not necessary to be here
detailed, which in our opinion conclusively show that the charge is true.

We now pass to a consideration of the third charge, with respect to which the
facts are as follows:

On June 29, 1917, Jose Tortajada, a resident of Manila, executed a document
by which he appointed the respondent as his attorney for the purpose of
settling, judicially or extra-judicially, certain differences which he had with
his wife, Amada Mestres. In said document Tortajada promised to pay the said
respondent the sum of P2,000 for his services. For the purpose of acquainting
the respondent with all the details of the case, Tortajada sent him on June 30,
1917, a letter in which he described in detail the proud, haughty, stingy, and
despotic character of his wife and the insults, humiliation, maltreatment, and
remorse that he had suffered at her hands—all of which, if published, would
surely injure the reputation of both spouses and expose them to public
ridicule.

The respondent, in pursuance of the contract of employment, began work on the
case and had some interviews with Tortajada’s wife. Whether as a result of the
respondent’s services or not; all differences between Tortajada and his wife
were soon afterwards settled extra-judicially; and the respondent, not long
after, made a demand for the payment of his fees of P2,000, which Tortajada
refused to pay. Later on, Tortajada received in the mail the following
documents: (1) a photographic copy of a letter which purported to be signed by
Tortajada and addressed to the respondent; (2) a typewritten anonymous letter
addressed to Tortajada; and (3) an envelope addressed to the same person bearing
the name of the respondent on the upper left hand corner and in all other
respects of the same class as that admitted to have been used by him. The
photographic copy above mentioned is a copy of a letter which Tortajada had
previously written to the respondent and in which the latter was urged to
expedite the case. The anonymous letter reads: “Attorney Sotto says that as you
are looking for trouble, he had decided this morning to present a complaint
against you, in which are reproduced all—absolutely all—of your letters, and, if
you compel him, he will cause the complaint together with the photographic
facsimiles of all the letters to be published in ‘The Independent* and in all
the local papers so that the public may know you and your motives.” Believing
that these things came from the respondent, Tortajada sent him a letter in which
he stated that he was not afraid of the respondent’s threats and that the latter
could do anything he wanted to do and yet the former would not pay him a cent.
To this reply no answer was received from the respondent.

Thereafter, the respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila a complaint against Tortajada for the purpose of recovering the sum of
P2,000, the amount of fees agreed upon. In paragraph 6 of this complaint there
is an exact copy of the letter of June 30, 1917, which Tortajada sent to the
respondent and in which details are given of the domestic troubles of
Tortajada.

There can be no doubt that, supposing the anonymous letter had been sent by
the respondent, its language considered with the relation of the parties at the
time, especially with the persistent refusal of Tortajada to pay the
respondent’s fee, would constitute a threat against Tortajada of a type similar
to that employed by the respondent against SyJuco. But the respondent denies the
authorship of the anonymous letter and that it was he who sent it. The
Attorney-General, however, contends that he (the respondent) is the author
thereof and that it was he who sent it. This contention is based upon the
following grounds: (1) The fact that the anonymous letter was received; (2) the
similarity of the envelope in which it was contained to the envelopes used by
the respondent; (3) the fact that Tortajada answered it addressing a letter to
the respondent, and yet the latter never made any reply denying that he sent it;
(4) the fact that only the respondent could have taken the photograph of the
letter delivered by Tortajada to Amando Calleja and addressed to the respondent;
and (5) the fact that, as was stated in the anonymous letter, all the letters
sent by Tortajada were reproduced in the complaint.

This combination of circumstances in our opinion shows beyond a reasonable
doubt that the respondent sent the anonymous letter as charged.

The respondent as a second defense to the third charge contends that it was
not he but his clerk, Amando Calleja, who prepared the complaint filed against
Tortajada and that the respondent signed it without first reading its contents.
We are, however, of the opinion that, taking all the circumstances into
consideration, it was the respondent himself who prepared the complaint, or at
least, if somebody else prepared it, the respondent ordered or approved the
insertion of the letter in the complaint.

But the respondent further contends that, even admitting that the letter in
question was inserted by him or by his order, he was under no obligation to keep
its contents a secret.

In this view we can by no means concur. The letter was written confidentially
by a client to the respondent in his capacity as attorney. Hence the respondent
was under obligation to keep the contents of the letter inviolate; and as it is
wholly immaterial in the cause of action stated in the complaint against
Tortajada, its insertion therein constitutes a gross violation of professional
conduct and of the oath taken by the respondent that he would always conduct
himself with entire fidelity to his clients.

The facts material to the fourth charge are these: Sometime in the month of
September, 1917, Natalia Enriquez was looking for someone who would buy certain
parcels of land belonging to her. Atanasia Enriquez, a niece of Natalia, was
aiding her in this work, probably in the capacity of broker. It appears that the
respondent was also acquainted with this fact and was also probably looking for
a purchaser for one of two reasons, to wit: (1) Either because prior to that
time Natalia Enriquez was indebted to him in the sum of P2,000, which he wanted
to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale, or (2) because he wished that the
document of conveyance should be executed with his aid so that he could earn his
fees. It also appears to be probable that there was an understanding between
Natalia, Atanasia, and the respondent, that when a purchaser should appear, the
document would be executed with the intervention of the respondent.

On one of the last days of September, 1917, a person named Bernardo Dagala,
or rather his wife, Enrica de Guzman, was found who was willing “to purchase the
property. When the sale had already been verbally agreed upon., Atanasia
Enriquez accompanied by Dagala went to the office of the respondent to notify
him that a purchaser had been found and probably with a view to the execution of
the proper document. But in order that they could easily withdraw and find
another notary who would draw the document for a less sum, in case the
respondent should charge them too high, they withheld the name of the purchaser
and Dagala was presented merely as a person who aided in looking for a
purchaser. But the respondent, more resourceful than they were and with the
intention of securing information from them as to who the purchaser was, met
them with the statement that he too had found a purchaser who would pay more and
who had ready money in the bank and that the sale to this person should not be
delayed. Thereupon, Dagala, anxious that the sale should be made to him only,
declared that he himself was the purchaser. Thus seeing that Dagala was so
intent to purchase the property and believing that he would be willing to pay
any sum for the drafting of the document, the respondent told him that the other
purchaser was willing to pay him P500 for that work, and that Dagala had to pay
this sum if he wanted to purchase the property. After some more discussion as to
the proper fees for drafting the document they parted with the understanding
that they would again meet the next day at the respondent’s office. However,
believing that the fee demanded by the respondent was too high, Natalia
Enriquez, her son Juan Valencia, Dagala, and his wife De Guzman went the next
day, September 30, 1917, to another notary public in Manila, Miguel de Leon, who
drafted the document of conveyance for a sum much less than the exorbitant fee
which the respondent proposed to charge.

The next day the respondent was informed that the document had been prepared
at the office of Miguel de Leon and on the afternoon of that day the former went
to the latter’s office and representing that he was the attorney of Natalia
Enriquez demanded that the document be shown to him alleging that his client had
told him that she signed it without knowing its contents. Miguel de Leon showed
him the document and explained to him in detail the circumstances under which it
was executed, and which leave no room for doubt that there was nothing illegal
about it, nothing that could invalidate it. The object of the respondent in
going to the office of Miguel de Leon was of course to verify the information
which he had received and which he found out was true. Irritated at the fact
that he had thus lost the sum of P500 which he expected to get as a fee for
drafting the document of sale, the respondent, on October 2, 1917, sent two
letters to Bernardo Dagala and two other letters to Natalia Enriquez.

In his first letter to Dagala, he states that, according to his clients,
Dagala had made them sign a document which they did not understand, that
Dagala’s conduct was improper, and requested that the latter should see him at
once. In his second letter he reproduces in effect the substance of the first
letter and adds: “Come immediately to my office if you want to avoid the
fatal consequences of what you have just done.” In his first letter to
Natalia Enriquez, he ordered her to come to his office in order to talk about
the document she had signed. In the second letter he advised her that the fault
was hers and again asked her to see him.

On October 3, 1917, Dagala went to the office of the respondent, afraid of
the “fatal consequences” which the latter covertly threatened in his letter.
Here the respondent told Dagala that he had acted improperly in not coming to
the former’s office on the day agreed upon, that the former had lost the sum of
P500 which the other purchaser promised to pay for drafting the document, that
he needed money, and that he would cause trouble unless Dagala should pay him
the P500 he had lost, and guarantee with the property acquired by his wife the
debt of P2,000 which Natalia Enriquez owed the respondent. Somehow or other,
instead of a mere guaranty, Dagala on October 3 was caused by the respondent to
sign a document by which, besides guaranteeing Natalia’s debt of P2,000 with the
property sold to his wife, he assumed the payment of the same. This done, the
respondent, who knew beforehand that the property purchased by Dagala’s wife was
subject to a lease and right of option in favor of one Marcelo Estrella, then
requested that Dagala should convince his wife to appoint him as their attorney
to secure the delivery of the property from Estrella. Dagala promised to come
back with his wife the following day, October 4, 1917, which they did, to inform
the respondent of their answer.

On this occasion Dagala paid the respondent P500 upon the account of
Natalia’s debt for which a receipt was given. The Dagala spouses then executed a
document by which they appointed the respondent their attorney to secure from
Marcelo Estrella the delivery of the property, and by which they promised to pay
him the sum of P500 as attorney’s fees. Acting under this appointment and in
representation of the Dagala spouses the respondent had an interview with
Estrella at his own office. Estrella manifested his willingness to deliver the
property provided that he be indemnified for damages and improvements he had
made upon it.

Several days later, that is, on or about October 16, 1917, the respondent
appeared at the office of the prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila and
acting as attorney for Natalia Enriquez asked that an information for
estafa be filed against the Dagala spouses upon the ground that these
persons had defrauded Natalia Enriquez in the sale of the property heretofore
referred to. It will be noted that at this time the respondent was attorney for
the Dagala spouses with respect to the same property and knew all the details of
the transaction which led to the sale thereof. An investigation was held with
the result that the prosecuting, attorney, seeing no good ground for filing the
information for estafa, refused to do so. But the respondent insisted
and stated that he desired criminal proceedings to be instituted against Dagala
and his wife because he was sure that as soon as they or at least Dagala should
be arrested, they would immediately consent to a settlement in order to avoid
the scandal which the respondent intended to create with the filing of the
information and which he would publish in his weekly, “The Independent.” In
spite of this insistence, however, no information was filed; and the respondent
on October 25, 1917, wrote a letter to the Attorney-General in which, after
relating the refusal of the prosecuting attorney to file the information, he
says, “for this reason my client comes to you in demand of
justice.”

Thereafter in the month of November a civil action against Dagala and his
wife was brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila in which the plaintiff
Natalia Enriquez sought to secure the annulment of the contract of sale, upon
the ground that it was executed through fraud, deceit, and duress. The complaint
was signed by Attorney Jose Poblete, who at that time was a salaried assistant
in the law office of the respondent.

Upon the facts above stated it is evident that the respondent in violation of
his professional duty, improperly represented conflicting interests, inasmuch
as, while obligated to act for the Dagala spouses in securing the delivery of
the property, he opposed their interest, by attempting to have the sale set
aside.

The reply of the respondent is: (1) That it was not he who asked for the
investigation held by the prosecuting attorney but Natalia Enriquez and that he
was with her during the investigation not as her attorney but merely as her
companion; (2) that it was not he but Jose Poblete who was the attorney for
Natalia Enriquez in the civil action brought by her against Dagala and his wife;
(3) that he had from the beginning acted in good faith. These assertions are not
established. The evidence shows that it was he who personally asked for an
investigation, chose the prosecuting attorney who conducted it, and delivered
the papers upon which the fiscal acted; and that he took an active part in
directing the investigation, asking now and then questions of the witnesses? It
is also clear that in the course of the investigation he acted as attorney for
Natalia Enriquez. When the prosecuting attorney, finding no good ground for it,
refused to file an information charging estafa, the respondent wrote to
the Attorney-General a letter in which he admits that Natalia Enriquez was his
client. He there says: “For this reason my client comes to you in
demand of justice.” The evidence shows that Jose Poblete was previous to and at
the time of the filing oi the complaint an assistant in the law office of the
respondent receiving a salary from the latter but with the privilege of handling
his own cases. Prior to the investigation of the professional conduct of the
respondent this person was called to the office of the Attorney-General and
there he declared under oath, after reading the complaint signed by him in the
case between Natalia Enriquez and Bernardo Dagala and his wife, that the case
was a case of the respondent, who gave it to him in his capacity of assistant in
the respondent’s law office, because the respondent desired to appear as a
witness but had the mistaken opinion that if he should sign as attorney for
Natalia Enriquez he could not appear as a witness. The said Jose Poblete was
presented as a witness in the subsequent investigation but there he turned out
to be a hostile witness, and testified, contrary to his statement at the
Attorney-General’s office, that he was surprised when he made those
declarations, that he was nervous at the time, and that he was referring not to
the case of Natalia Enriquez against Dagala but to the case of Sotto against
Alcala and Sotto against Desierto. The testimony of this witness is important in
determining (1) the capacity in which he signed the complaint against Dagala and
his wife, and (2) the propriety of the respondent’s professional conduct.
Special care therefore has been taken in perusing his testimony at the
investigation, as a result of which we come to the conclusion that his conduct
during the investigation is censurable, that his testimony thereat can not be
safely relied upon and that what he had declared at the office of the
Attorney-General was the truth.

As to the third defense, the evidence conclusively shows that from the
beginning the respondent was acting in bad faith. In writing the two letters to
Dagala in which he made the latter understand that he had committed something
wrong and that fatal consequences would follow unless he should come to the
respondent’s office, the respondent was not authorized by Natalia Enriquez. This
lady had not had any conversation or correspondence with him about the document
of sale which she had signed; and this is apparent from his letter in which he
asked her to come so that they could talk about that document.

As the Attorney-General well says, there was no ground for Sotto to believe
that Dagala and his wife had committed any crime. If he acted in good faith and
believed that the sale to Dagala and his wife was illegal and fastened upon them
grave criminal responsibilities, it would be impossible to explain why he made
them sign a document guaranteeing Natalia’s debt to him with the property
acquired by the Dagala spouses as a result of the sale. Certainly, this conduct
of the respondent is tantamount to an acknowledgment of the validity of the
sale. The terms of the contract and the circumstances under which the document
was executed were fully known to him as they had been explained by Miguel de
Leon. In fact, in his letter to Natalia Enriquez he even told her that she was
to blame for what had happened, from which statement it may safely be inferred
that Dagala and his wife were not censurable. The respondent’s purpose in trying
to secure the filing of an information against Dagala and his wife for the crime
of estafa was, as by him stated, merely to make them settle the matter
with him extra-judicially, in the hope that he could get more money out of
them.

The simple narrative of the facts connected with charges 1, 3, and 4, given
above, suffices to show that the respondent has been decidedly lacking in
fidelity to his clients and from rifotives of private gain has grossly abused
the honorable profession of which he is a member. In each of these transactions
his conduct was reprehensible and unprofessional in a high degree and evinces a
moral obtuseness incompatible with the office of attorney. For purposes of
extortion and blackmail he availed himself of his de facto power as the
responsible director of a newspaper to blacken the reputation of his refractory
clients or others who refused to submit to his demands. In this he proved
himself not only unworthy of membership in the legal profession but unfit even
for the responsible position of editor of a newspaper.

Charge No. 2, in the Attorney-General’s report relates to certain malicious
and unjustifiable insinuations against the judicial integrity of the Honorable
M. V. del Rosario, a judge of the Court of First instance of the City of Manila,
which appeared in articles published under the heading “Sin Malicia” in the
issues of “The Independent” dated respectively October 13, 20, and 27, 1917. The
occasion which called forth these Iibelous effusions from Sotto’s pen was that
Judge Del Rosario had lately imposed upon him a fine of P500 in a prosecution
for criminal libel. The publication of this matter was a manifest violation of
the oath which the respondent had taken to conduct himself with fidelity to the
courts.

Thornton, in his work on Attorneys-at-Law, speaking of offenses of this
character, says:

“Par. 788. An attorney who is guilty of writing and publishing libelous
charge against the court or any member thereof, in respect to his official
conduct, or who procures the writing or publication of such a charge, may and
should be, disbarred from further practice. * * *.

“Par. 789. Nor can an attorney-at-law shield himself as against a charge of
having libeled the court or a judge thereof, by pleading that he is also the
editor of the newspaper wherein the charges were published. His position at the
bar enables him, in such case, to inflict the greater wound, and he may be
deprived of the privileges and character which it gives him, by suspension or
expulsion, without infringing on the freedom of press.”

Charge No. 5 in the final report of the Attorney-General sets forth that in
the course of the present proceedings the respondent deliberately deviated from
the truth by testifying falsely in regard to certain important details of the
matters under investigation, namely, in denying, under oath, (1) having enclosed
the photographs of Natalia and Atanasia Enriquez in the letter that he sent to
SyJuco, and having written the note found on one of them, saying: “To be
published on the 25th;” (2) having sent to Tortajada the photograph of one of
the latter’s letters addressed to Sotto with the anonymous typewritten note; and
(3) having acted as attorney for Natalia Enriquez in the proceedings for the
institution of criminal charges against Dagala.

We agree with the Attorney-General that these denials are shown to be false
beyond reasonable doubt; and the fact that the respondent made them shows not
only the weakness of his defense but furnishes additional proof of his
unworthiness to remain a member of the legal profession.

In deciding the several charges made against the herein respondent, we
examined each and every one of them separately upon its own merits,
independently from the others. However, it must be observed that the acts
alleged in said charges taken together show a systematic tendency on the part of
the respondent, and reveals the existence of a deliberate plan to foster his own
interests, by means of an illicit use of his two-fold capacity as
attorney-at-law and newspaperman. The existence of the good faith on the part of
the respondent has thus been belied by the aforementioned acts.

One of the qualifications required of a candidate for admission to the bar is
the possession of good moral character, and, when one who has already been
admitted io the bar clearly shows, by a series of acts, that he does not follow
such moral principles as should govern the conduct of an upright person, and
that, in his dealings with his clients and with the courts, he disregards the
rules of professional ethics required to be observed by every attorney, it is
the duty of the court, as guardian of the interests of society, as well as of
the preservation of the ideal standard of professional conduct, to make use of
its powers to deprive him of his professional attributes which he so unworthily
abused.

In view of the repeated acts of gross misconduct above specified, on the part
of the respondent Vicente Sotto, and by virtue of the provisions of section 21
of the Code of Civil Procedure, the said Vicente Sotto is hereby removed from
the office of attorney and incapacitated from hereafter exercising the legal
profession. The certificate heretofore issued to him authorizing him to exercise
said profession is accordingly annulled, and let the surrender thereof to the
clerk ©f this court be required within five days after this decision becomes
effective. The costs will be taxed in accordance with section 24 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.

Torres, Johnson, Avanceña, and Fisher, JJ., concur.

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CONCURRING OPINION

MALCOLM, J., concurring:

I cannot bring myself to agree with much which is found in the majority
decision. In my judgment, charges 1, 2 and 5 against Sotto are either not proved
or, if proved, do not constitute sufficient ground for disbarment. Charges 3 and
4 are proved. Charge No. 3, being established, requires judicial enforcement,
because “a lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the confidence and preserve
the secrets of his client.” (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 31.) Charge No. 4,
being established, requires judicial enforcement, because “it is unprofessional
to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.” (Code of Ethics, par. 6.)

With reference to charge No. 2, I would not be understood for an instant as
agreeing with the statements reflecting on the Honorable Vivencio del Rosario,
judge of first instance. What I do mean is, that such criticism of judicial
action is not sufficient to withdraw from a lawyer the exercise of his
profession. Judges, being only public servants, can take unto themselves no
divine rights to be sustained by their own arbitrary powers.

The grave action taken by this court requires a word of explanation. A
reading of the prior decisions of this court on the subject of attorneys-at-law
would seem to disclose that, in some instances, the attitude that disbarment
proceedings are in the nature of punishment has been taken and that in other
instances, judicial leniency has been carried to an unwarranted extreme. In
reality, suspension or disbarment proceedings are enforced in order to deter
others from similar misconduct and as an indication to the public that the
courts will maintain the ethical standards of the profession. In well-chosen
language, a former justice of this court has said: “The disbarment of an
attorney is not intended as a punishment, but is rather intended to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important
function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable; men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence. This purpose should be borne in mind in the
exercise of disbarment, and the power should be exercised with that caution
which the serious consequences of the action involves.” (In re
MacDougall [1903], 3 Phil., 70.) An admirable statement of the reasons for
disbarment is also to be found in In re Shepard ([1917], 170 Pac. Rep.,
446), by Works, J., when he says:

“In one or two of the affidavits in the record the statement is made that the
petitioner has been punished enough, as if a disbarment were punitive in.
character. It is not. The removal of an attorney’s name from the rolls of the
profession is a measure protective in character; in a certain sense protective
of the profession, but in a higher sense protective of the public, which finds
it necessary to resort to the services of lawyers. No one not a lawyer can fully
realize the opportunities for undiscovered speculation, graft, and embezzlement
which are afforded the practitioner at the bar. No one not a lawyer can so well
understand the degree to which the public is entitled to protection from
dishonesty in the profession. When a member of the profession has been found
lacking in the requisites which go to make him a helper to his clients, and has
been discovered to possess aims, views, and purposes which indicate a moral
obliquity in him, and which might make his clients his victims, it is well that
he were removed from the possibility of doing them harm. When he has been once
disbarred, a mistaken charity should not restore him to his position. That
restoration should only come when he has lived long enough after his disbarment
in honorable intercourse with his fellow citizens to demonstrate that he is both
tried and true.”

Comparing the charges against Sotto with the charges which have been made and
establish against other attorneys, and comparing the resolution of. these other
cases with the one before us, it might seem that we are now proceeding to do an
injustice to the respondent. This may be true by way of exact comparison.
Surely, however, the time has come when the Supreme Court should give the weight
of its influence to the betterment of the legal profession. The power to
withdraw the right to practise law “should be discreetly but fearlessly
exercised.”

What has just been said has caused me to suggest that justice might here be
tempered, with mercy to the end that Sotto be permitted to continue with the
cases he now has in court, particularly, as all know, that confidence has been
reposed in his ability as a lawyer to defend an accused under sentence of death
which must come to the appellate court for review. As my colleagues failed to
see the advisability of this recommendation, I must perforce waive the same and
join in the judgment of the court.