ZAMBOANGA BARTER GOODS RETAILERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [ZAMBAGORA], REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, HADJI MAHMUD GUMAMPANG, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MARIA CLARA L. LOBREGAT[]IN HER CAPACI…

Zambanga Barter Goods Retailers Association versus Lobregat

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by the Zamboanga Barter Goods Retailers Association, known as ZAMBAGORA, against the City Mayor of Zamboanga City. The Association sought to annul the orders of the Regional Trial Court denying its application for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction that would have stopped the city government from evicting its members from a reclaimed area near the city hall. The case matters because it gathers in one decision three lessons every examinee must carry: the strict observance of the hierarchy of courts, the requisites for injunctive relief, and the rule that one who occupies another's land by mere tolerance holds no right that injunction can protect.

Procedural History

The Association filed a complaint for injunction with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 14. After a summary hearing, the trial court denied the application, holding that the Association had failed to establish a clear and unmistakable right for injunctive relief. The trial court likewise denied the motion for reconsideration, although it recommended that the Association be allowed to stay until the end of the year because it had already paid its business permit. The city government agreed to that recommendation. Instead of going up to the Court of Appeals, the Association filed its petition for certiorari directly with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirmed the assailed orders in all respects, and taxed the costs against the petitioner.

Facts

The Association is a corporation with two hundred eighty-eight barter traders as members. Sometime in 1994, the city government of Zamboanga allowed the members to occupy temporarily a reclaimed area at the Port Area, and the members built their stalls there and sold their wares. A fire gutted most of the stalls in July 1994. The city building officials then issued a building permit for a one-storey building on the reclaimed area behind the city hall. The Association paid monthly rentals, occupied the building, declared it for taxation purposes at an assessed value of 1,591,100 pesos, and paid realty taxes on the improvements.

In 1998, the city decided to construct its fire station on the property and asked the Association to vacate. Upon representations of some members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, the city granted several extensions for the Association to look for a new site, but it never vacated. On October 18, 2000, Mayor Maria Clara Lobregat sent a letter through the Association's president, Hadji Gumampang, giving a last extension until October 31, 2000, in view of the urgency of the fire station construction. The Association replied through counsel that it must first be adequately compensated for the value of the building and improvements. The city took no action, and the requested audience with the Mayor did not materialize.

On October 25, 2000, the Association filed its complaint for injunction. At the hearing, it presented proof of its quarterly business permit fees effective until December 31, 2000, garbage fees, and real estate tax payments. The trial court denied the application the next day, and denied reconsideration four days later, while recommending that the Association stay until December 31, 2000, which the city accepted. On November 6, 2000, the Association filed this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the petition may be filed directly with the Supreme Court notwithstanding the hierarchy of courts.
• Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.
• Whether or not the Association is estopped from assailing the trial court's orders after the parties agreed to defer the eviction until December 31, 2000.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on where the petition is filed, provides:

Section 4. Where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

This provision fixes the proper forum and underlies the Court's ruling that the petition should have been filed with the Court of Appeals, not directly with the Supreme Court.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Association blatantly disregarded the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Court of Appeals have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction, such concurrence does not give a petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of forum. No special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance was shown to justify direct recourse. The petition should have been filed with the Court of Appeals under Section 4 of Rule 65.

On the second issue, the Court held that even setting aside the procedural lapse, there was no grave abuse of discretion. A petitioner must establish two requisites for injunctive relief: the existence of a right to be protected, and that the acts against which the injunction is directed violate that right. The Association established neither. It occupied the property at the sufferance of the city after its right to occupy expired in 1998. The Court ruled that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand. The business permit until December 31, 2000, and the payment of realty taxes, did not give the Association the right to continue staying over the city's objection. The property was needed for the much delayed construction of a fire station, a public infrastructure project.

On the third issue, the Court held that the Association was estopped from assailing the trial court's orders, since the parties had already agreed before that court to defer the eviction of its members until December 31, 2000, in the spirit of the Christmas season.

Doctrine

First, the hierarchy of courts is mandatory in practice: where the Supreme Court, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Court of Appeals have concurrent jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs, a petitioner may not freely choose the Supreme Court as forum absent a special and important reason or an exceptional and compelling circumstance.

Second, an applicant for a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction must establish the existence of a right to be protected and that the acts against which the injunction is directed violate that right. Absent a clear legal right, the application must fail.

Third, a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand. Neither a business permit nor the payment of realty taxes on improvements creates a right to remain against the owner's objection.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, the assailed orders were affirmed in all respects, and costs were taxed against the Association.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a person who occupies another's land by mere tolerance is bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, and that a business permit and tax payments create no right that injunction can protect. Examiners use this case for the requisites of injunctive relief and for the hierarchy of courts in petitions for certiorari.