A. RAFAEL C. DINGLASAN JR., PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Dinglasan versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is the case of Dinglasan versus Court of Appeals, a petition for new trial, and in the alternative for the reopening of the case, grounded on alleged newly discovered evidence. A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Junior, who had been convicted of violating the Bouncing Checks Law for issuing a check that was dishonored for insufficiency of funds, asked the Supreme Court to reopen a judgment that had long become final, offering affidavits and a transmittal letter which, he claimed, proved that he had made good the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor. The case matters because it teaches the two great barriers that stand against such a petition: the rule on the finality of judgments, and the strict requisites of newly discovered evidence.

Procedural History

Dinglasan was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, and on 16 December 1991 that court convicted him beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Bouncing Checks Law, sentencing him to imprisonment of one year, a fine of 200,000 pesos, and indemnification of Antrom, Incorporated in the amount of 515,000 pesos with legal interest. His motion for reconsideration was denied, so he appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 26 October 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court in its entirety.

Dinglasan then went up to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. The Supreme Court denied the petition for failure to show reversible error; denied his motion for reconsideration; merely noted his second motion for reconsideration without action, since a second motion is a prohibited pleading; and directed that no further pleadings be entertained. The denial became final and executory on 14 October 1999, as shown by the Entry of Judgment.

When the prosecution moved for execution, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest, a writ of execution, and a hold-departure order. Dinglasan then filed before the Supreme Court this petition for new trial and, in the alternative, for reopening of the case, based on newly discovered evidence.

Facts

On 17 August 1985, Elmyra Trading Corporation, represented by its President, Dinglasan, and Antrom, Incorporated, represented by its President, Antonio Garcia, Junior, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement under which Antrom would extend credit accommodation to finance Elmyra's prawn business, and Elmyra would issue checks to guarantee payment of its obligations. After several financing transactions, Elmyra's indebtedness reached 1,476,000 pesos and 58 centavos.

As initial payment, Dinglasan issued a Commercial Bank check postdated 3 October 1985 in the amount of 515,000 pesos, with Antrom as payee. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. An information for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law was filed, and this led to his conviction, his failed appeal, and the final denial of his petition for review.

In his petition for new trial, Dinglasan offered the affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan, Executive Vice-President and Treasurer of Elmyra, and of Ma. Encarnacion Vda. De Dinglasan, widow of Elmyra's former Cashier and Liaison Officer, together with a transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 attached to a Solidbank Manager's Check dated 3 October 1985. He claimed these would prove he made good the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor. Antrom and the Solicitor General opposed, arguing that the petition was filed out of time and that the evidence was neither newly discovered nor material, since the transmittal letter had already been offered in earlier proceedings.

Issues

• Whether or not the petition for new trial was filed on time.
• Whether or not a new trial or reopening of the case based on newly discovered evidence should be allowed.

Applicable Provisions

Section 14 of Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 14. Motion for New Trial. At any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of the Court of Appeals convicting the accused becomes final, the latter may move for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence material to his defense. The motion shall conform to the provisions of section 4 Rule 121.

This fixes the deadline: the motion must come before the judgment of conviction becomes final, and here it came a year too late.

Section 2 of Rule 52 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or a final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.

This is why the second motion for reconsideration did not delay the running of the period of finality.

Section 10 of Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory.

This establishes that the judgment was entered as final on 14 October 1999, long before the petition was filed.

Section 2 of Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds: (a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed during the trial; (b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.

This supplies the requisites of newly discovered evidence that Dinglasan failed to satisfy.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition was filed out of time. The rule is explicit that a motion for new trial must be filed before the judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused becomes final. Dinglasan argued that finality should be counted from receipt of the resolution denying his second motion for reconsideration, but the Court rejected this. A second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, and to count finality from its denial would force courts to act on prohibited motions and would let a party stall the finality of judgments at will. The Court stressed that the finality of a decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made to depend on the convenience of a party. Since the judgment became final on 14 October 1999 and the petition was filed on 30 October 2000, it came too late.

On the second issue, the Court held that the evidence was not newly discovered. The requisites are that the evidence was discovered after the trial, that it could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence, and that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and of such weight that if admitted it would probably change the judgment. The Court noted that the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 had already been considered by the Court of Appeals in the earlier appeal, and had even been annexed to the petition filed there. Hence it was not newly discovered at all, but an attempt to relitigate a defense already weighed. The Court also recalled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law.

Doctrine

A motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence must be filed before the judgment of conviction becomes final, and the finality of a judgment is a jurisdictional event that cannot be made to depend on the convenience of a party. A second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and does not toll the running of the period of finality. The requisites of newly discovered evidence are cumulative: the evidence must have been discovered after trial, could not have been discovered and produced at trial with reasonable diligence, and must be material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and of such weight that if admitted it would probably change the judgment. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, with costs against Dinglasan, and the judgment of conviction stood final and executory.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the finality of a decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made to depend on the convenience of a party. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of newly discovered evidence under Rule 121 and the rule that a second motion for reconsideration does not delay finality.