BENITO SYMACO, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. HON. PATERIO AQUINO, ETC., RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

Symaco versus Aquino

The Case

This is a petition for mandamus brought by Benito Symaco against Paterio Aquino, the Municipal Mayor of Malabon, Rizal, to compel the Mayor to issue a building permit. Symaco owned a lot covered by a Torrens title and had complied with the requirements of the municipal ordinance for a building permit, yet the Mayor withheld it. The case matters because it draws the classic line between a ministerial duty and a discretionary duty, and because it teaches when mandamus lies despite the existence of another statutory remedy.

Procedural History

Symaco filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, praying that the Mayor be compelled to issue the building permit. The Mayor answered, and the parties submitted a stipulation of facts. After hearing the matters not covered by the stipulation, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Symaco, ordering the Mayor to issue the permit immediately and dismissing the claim for damages. The Mayor appealed to the Supreme Court, which resolved the appeal on the sole question of whether the trial court erred in granting the writ of mandamus.

Facts

Symaco was the registered owner, under a transfer certificate of title, of a lot on General Luna Street in Malabon, Rizal. On May 22, 1957, he applied to the Office of the Mayor for a building permit to repair the eaves and partitions of his house of strong materials. The next day, the Mayor granted the permit.

On July 2, 1957, however, a building inspector of Malabon, acting under the Mayor's orders, wrote Symaco informing him that an ocular inspection showed that, instead of mere repairs, the old building had been demolished and a new one was being constructed, so that a new building permit was required. Symaco then applied with the District Engineer of Rizal for a permit to construct a new building. The District Engineer investigated and endorsed the matter to the Mayor's office.

Meanwhile, on July 1, 1957, A. M. Raymundo and Company filed a civil action for forcible entry, with a prayer for preliminary injunction, against Symaco before the Justice of the Peace Court of Malabon, covering a portion of the land on which he was building. Counsel for that company wrote the Mayor asking him to withhold the building permit. On September 23, 1957, the Mayor replied that the issuance of the permit was being held in abeyance pending final determination of the ownership of a portion of the lot.

Issues

• Whether or not the Mayor's duty to issue the building permit, once the applicant has complied with the requirements of the municipal ordinance, is ministerial rather than discretionary.
• Whether or not the pendency of a private forcible entry case over a portion of the lot is a lawful ground for the Mayor to refuse the permit.
• Whether or not Symaco is barred from mandamus because he had another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, namely, the supervisory remedy under Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant, with costs.

This fixes the two elements Symaco must establish: an unlawful neglect of a duty specifically enjoined by law, and the absence of any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.

Article I of Ordinance Number 20, series of 1941, of the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal, provides:

ARTICLE I.—Every owner, tenant, manager or contractor, shall, before beginning the construction or repair of any edifice, obtain the necessary permit from the Municipal Mayor, stating in the application the name of the owner, location of the building, kind of materials to be used, and the floor area.

This is the ordinance whose requirements Symaco complied with, and it contains no grant of discretion to the Mayor to refuse the permit.

Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

SEC. 2188. Supervisory authority of provincial governor over municipal officers.—The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. For minor delinquency, he may reprimand the offender and if more severe punishment seems to be desirable, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Where suspension is thus effected the written charges against the officer shall be filed with the board within five days.

The Mayor invoked this as the other remedy that should bar mandamus, but the Court held it neither plain, speedy, nor adequate.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Mayor's duty was ministerial. A purely ministerial act is one which an officer performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to his own judgment upon the propriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. Since the ordinance requires only that the applicant state the name of the owner, the location of the building, the kind of materials, and the floor area, and since Symaco complied, the Mayor had no discretion to refuse. The Court noted that there is nothing in the ordinance granting the Mayor discretion to refuse a permit.

On the second issue, the Court held that the pendency of the forcible entry case was not a sufficient reason to deny the permit. The dispute was a purely private affair between Symaco and the company, which did not concern the Mayor. As the trial court observed, if Symaco is allowed to build, no damage results to the third party, and the only one who suffers, should the decision be adverse, is Symaco himself, who must remove the building.

On the third issue, the Court held that the remedy under Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code is neither plain, speedy, nor adequate, because its primary object is the removal, suspension, or other disciplinary action of the erring municipal officer, rather than to compel the performance of a legal duty. The Court ruled that the other remedy which would bar mandamus must be specific and appropriate to the circumstances, efficacious to afford relief upon the very subject matter involved, and equally as convenient, complete, beneficial, and effective as mandamus, and sufficiently speedy to prevent material injury.

Doctrine

A ministerial act is one performed in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to the officer's own judgment on the propriety of the act; the duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither official discretion nor judgment. Where an ordinance fixes the requirements for a building permit and grants no discretion to refuse, compliance by the applicant entitles him to the permit as a matter of right, and the mayor's duty to issue it becomes ministerial, enforceable by mandamus under Section 3 of Rule 67. The pendency of a private land dispute over the property is not a lawful ground for withholding the permit. Finally, the other remedy that would bar mandamus must be as plain, speedy, adequate, convenient, complete, beneficial, and effective as mandamus itself; a disciplinary remedy against the officer, such as that under Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, does not qualify.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, with costs, holding that the writ of mandamus was properly granted and ordering the Mayor to issue the building permit to Symaco.

Remember This

Memorize the line: once the applicant complies with the ordinance, the mayor's duty to issue the building permit is ministerial, not discretionary. Examiners use this case to test the ministerial versus discretionary distinction and the rule that a disciplinary remedy against a public officer is not the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy that bars mandamus.