UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, AND/OR LANCE Y. GOKONGWEI, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL, LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CARLOS YGA?A, LIBORIO VILLAFLOR AND RONALDO CAR…
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Universal Robina Corporation versus Court of Appeals
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Universal Robina Corporation and its officer against the Court of Appeals, the National Labor Relations Commission, and three retired employees, Carlos Ygaña, Liborio Villaflor, and Ronaldo Cardinales. The employees had won a labor case for retirement benefits under the newer retirement law, and the company sought to bring that ruling up to the Court of Appeals by a special civil action for certiorari. The Court of Appeals threw the petition out as filed out of time. The case matters because the Supreme Court uses it to settle a single, examinable point of remedial law: from what date do you count the sixty-day period for filing a petition for certiorari when a motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied.
Procedural History
The three employees filed a consolidated complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission, claiming retroactive entitlement to the more liberal retirement benefits granted by the new retirement law. The labor arbiter ruled in their favor and ordered the company to pay each of them specific sums. The company appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which affirmed the labor arbiter. The company then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Commission denied with finality.
From that denial, the company went up to the Court of Appeals by a petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time, and later denied the company's motion for reconsideration. The company then came to the Supreme Court by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, asking that the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals be annulled.
Facts
Carlos Ygaña, Liborio Villaflor, and Ronaldo Cardinales were employees of a corporation affiliated with Universal Robina Corporation. Upon retiring at the age of sixty, they received benefits under the company retirement plan equivalent to one-half month's pay for every year of service. In January 1993, Congress enacted a law providing more liberal retirement benefits for employees in the private sector. Claiming retroactive entitlement to those enlarged benefits, the three retirees filed a consolidated complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission.
The labor arbiter ruled in their favor, ordering the company to pay each of them a stated amount. The company appealed, but the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the labor arbiter. The company received a copy of that resolution on November 11, 1999. Four days later, on November 15, 1999, it filed a motion for reconsideration. The Commission denied the motion with finality, and the company received that denial on March 14, 2000.
On May 15, 2000, the company filed its petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed it, reasoning that the sixty-day period is counted from receipt of the judgment or resolution sought to be assailed, not from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Counting from November 11, 1999, four days had already elapsed before the motion was filed, and counting the remaining period from the denial, the petition was six days late. Hence the appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the company in the Court of Appeals is dismissible for being filed out of time.
Applicable Provisions
Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by the July 21, 1998 Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803, which was the prevailing rule when the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, provides:
SEC. 4. Where and when petition to be filed. – The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed x x x. If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
Under this old text, the period is interrupted by the motion and the petitioner gets only the remaining period, counted from notice of the denial, which is why the Court of Appeals found the petition late.
Section 4 of Rule 65, as further amended by AM No. 00-2-03-SC, which took effect on September 1, 2000, provides:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.
This new text resets the full sixty-day period to run from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, and it is the provision on which the Supreme Court's ruling turns.
Ruling
On the lone issue, the Court held that the petition is meritorious. It conceded that, strictly speaking, the Court of Appeals did not err, because the prevailing rule at the time was the July 21, 1998 amendment, under which the petition would indeed have been late. But the Court noted that the rule had been amended by AM No. 00-2-03-SC, effective September 1, 2000, so that the sixty-day period is now counted from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
The Court then characterized that amendment as procedural or remedial in character. It does not create new rights or remove vested ones. It operates only in furtherance of the remedy or in confirmation of rights already existing, and so it is given retroactive effect. Applying that retroactive effect, the Court held that the petition was filed on time. The company received the denial of its motion for reconsideration on March 14, 2000, and filed its petition on May 15, 2000. The sixtieth day from receipt of the denial was May 13, which fell on a Saturday, so the company had until the next working day, Monday, May 15, to file. The Court added that it had already ruled in a number of cases that the sixty-day period is reckoned from receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, and that this amendment was deemed applicable even to petitions filed before September 1, 2000, on the ground that rules regulating procedure should be made applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Doctrine
A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, under the present Section 4 of Rule 65, the sixty-day period to file a petition for certiorari is counted from notice of the denial of a timely filed motion for reconsideration or new trial, whether such motion is required or not. Second, that amendment is procedural or remedial in character, creates no new rights and removes no vested ones, and is therefore given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. Third, if the last day of the period falls on a Saturday, the petition may be filed on the next working day. These rules are tied directly to the quoted text of Section 4 of Rule 65, which fixes the reckoning point at notice of the denial of the motion.
Disposition
The petition was granted, the assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals were set aside, and the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, with no costs.
Remember This
Memorize this line: the sixty-day period for certiorari is counted from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, and that procedural amendment applies retroactively. Examiners use this case to test the reckoning of the certiorari period and the retroactive application of remedial rules to pending actions.