G.R. No. 14428. July 26, 1960
AGATON SEGARRA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. FELIX MARONILLA, JR., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
Court of First Instance of Albay issued on November 29, 1954 in Civil
Case No. 301, entitled “Agaton Segarra, plaintiff, vs. Felix Maronilla, Jr., defendant”, the dispositive part of which reads:
“Wherefore,
in view of the fact that Portion A was actually delivered by the
sheriff to the defendant pursuant to the judgment of this Court, and
said plaintiff re-entered said portion after such delivery, the Courts
finds plaintiff Agaton Segarra in contempt of court and he is hereby
ordered committed to jail to be detained therein until he complies with
the judgment of this Court and the writ of execution issued by virtue
thereof.”
The record shows that way back on
July 1, 1948, the lower court rendered its decision in said Civil Case
No. 301, which reads as follows:
“This is a
forcible entry case commenced in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Libon and a decision having been rendered by the Justice of the Peace,
declaring that the plaintiff is the lawful possessor of the land
described in the complaint and entitled to its immediate possession,
the defendant was ordered to vacate the land and to pay the amount of
P200.00 as damages, with costs. The defendant appealed against said
decision.[1]“Pending
hearing before this Court, the identity of the land in question and the
land claimed by the defendant was raised by the parties, and for this
reason they agreed that Deputy Sheriff Jose A. Ante, Sr. be appointed
to relocate the land claimed by the plaintiff in his complaint and the
land claimed by defendant Felix Maronilla, Jr. Said commissioner,
pursuant to the order of the Court has made an ocular inspection of the
said lands and right in the place prepared a croquis which was
submitted to the Court on June 30, with his written report.“Before
proceeding to the reception of the evidence in this case, the parties
made the following manifestations in connection with the report and
croquis prepared by the commissioner: Attorney Kallos in behalf of his
client Felix Maronilla made of record that the portion of the land
marked capital A in the croquis, which according to the commissioner is
the land in question, is the one actually possessed and claimed by
defendant Felix Maronilla Jr.; on the other hand, Attorney Abrera and
his client the plaintiff Agaton S. Segarra, made also of record that
said parcel of land identified as Lot A in the croquis is not the land
in question, and if that is the very land actually possessed and
occupied by defendant Maronilla, the plaintiff has nothing to do with
it and does not lay any claim over the same, alleging at the same time
that the land in question lies on the Eastern portion of Quiperete
River which has been identified as Lot B in red pencil in the same
croquis, and for greater clarification it has been encircled with red
line. The defendant Maronilla thru his attorney Mr. Kallos manifested
that his client has nothing to do with said land marked parcel B in red
pencil, and that a decision may be rendered declaring the plaintiff to
be the rightful possessor of said portion of land.“In view
of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiff
Agaton S. Segarra the rightful possessor of the portion of land marked
B in the croquis of the commissioner, who is entitled to its immediate
possession without pronouncement as to costs.”
On August 17, 1948, plaintiff Agaton S. Segarra filed a motion for
reconsideration praying that he “be declared the rightful possessor of
the land described in the complaint lying about two kilometers away
from Lot marked B in the croquis submitted by the commissioner, * * *.”
He alleged that “what his counsel has manifested to the Court was that
the report and croquis prepared and submitted by the commissioner do
not represent the true location of the land in question,” and that the
property claimed and owned by him as described in his complaint is
situated in the Eastern portion of Quiperete River, two kilometers away
from the land marked B in the croquis.
Upon plaintiff’s
representations, a duly licensed private surveyor was commissioned by
the court to relocate and identify the area in controversy. In due
time, said surveyor submitted his report together with a sketch,
showing that the property in question “is entirely inside of Portion A
(as designated in Ante’s sketch).” The report was opposed by defendant.
On August 27, 1953, after hearing, the motion for reconsideration was
denied “for failure of the plaintiff to substantiate his allegations in
his motion for reconsideration by proper evidence.”
Upon
defendant’s motion, a writ of execution was issued by virtue of which
the land described as Portion A in the sketch submitted by Deputy
Sheriff Jose A. Ante was, over plaintiff’s objections, delivered to the
defendant Felix Maronilla, Jr.
On January 28, 1954,
defendant Maronilla, Jr., alleging that plaintiff through his tenants
re-entered the land (Portion A) and refused to vacate the same, filed a
verified motion to cite said plaintiff for contempt. Acting upon that
motion, the court below ordered plaintiff and his tenants to appear on
February 13, 1954 and explain “why they should not be dealt with for
contempt of court.” On this latter date, plaintiff filed a “Constancia”
questioning the validity of the writ of execution issued and served
upon him, which, he avers, is not in consonance with the judgment. Said
judgment, according to him, does not order the delivery of Portion A to
defendant, but merely declares him (plaintiff) to be the rightful
possessor of Portion B.
After hearing, the court below
issued the order now complained of finding plaintiff Agaton S. Segarra
guilty of contempt of court and ordering him “committed to jail to be
detained therein until he complies with the judgment of this Court and
the writ of execution issued by virtue thereof.” From that order,
plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, but that court has
certified the case to us on the ground that the questions raised are
purely legal.
We find merit in the appeal. It will be
observed that the decision of July 1, 1948, made no pronouncement
whatsoever as to who was entitled to the possession of the parcel of
land described in the sketch submitted by Deputy Sheriff Jose A. Ante
as Portion A, which was allegedly re-entered by plaintiff. And the
dispositive part of the decision simply awarded to plaintiff the
possession of the parcel of land appearing on the same sketch as
Portion B. It made no adjudication as to Portion A. The writ of
execution dated November 23, 1953, therefore, by virtue of which
Portion A was delivered to defendant, is not in harmony with the
judgment and consequently has pro tanto no validity. (Velez vs.
Martinez, et al., 63 Phil., 531.) Such being the case, it is evident
that the contempt imputed to plaintiff-appellant is without basis. The
writ or order of the court must be lawful in order that resistance
thereto may be punished as contempt. Courts have no power to demand
compliance with an other issued without authority. (Chanco vs. Madrilejos, 9 Phil., 356; Angel Realty Corporation vs. Galao, et al., 76 Phil., 201.)
The lower court in the order complained of upheld the validity of the
writ of execution directing the delivery of Portion A to defendant on
the theory that while the dispositive part of the decision sought to be
enforced did not so direct, the body thereof, “actually adjudicates”
said Portion A to defendant. The fact, however, remains that no such
adjudication was made either in the body or in the dispositive part of
the decision. Indeed, it would appear that the decision adjudicating
the possession of Portion B to plaintiff was made on the assumption
that Portion A was not the land in litigation. At any rate, the rule is
that the only portion of the decision that becomes the subject of
execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part.
“Whatever may be found in the body of the decision can only be
considered as part of the reasons or conclusions of the court and while
they may serve as guide or enlightenment to determine the ratio
decidendi, what is controlling is what appears in the dispositive part
of the decision. (Rosario Nery Eduards, et al. vs. Jose Arce, et al., 98 Phil., 688; 52 Off. Gaz., 2537).” (Robles, et al. vs. Timario, et al., 107 Phil., 809; 58 Off. Gaz. [8] 1507.)
In view of the foregoing, the order complained of is set aside and the
charge for contempt against plaintiff-appellant dismissed. So ordered
without costs.
Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.
[1]
It would also appear that upon motion of herein plaintiff-appellant, a
preliminary (mandatory) injunction was issued by the inferior court
restoring him in his possession of the land described in the complaint.
The defendant was declared in default. He was, nevertheless, allowed to
appeal although the order of default entered against him had never been
lifted.