PIO L. CABALLES, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LAGUNA, RESPONDENTS.

This is an original application to this
court by Pio L. Caballes, a resident of Pagsanjan, in the Province of
Laguna, for relief from the effects of a judgment by default entered in
a cadastral case in the Court of First Instance of said province with
respect to the parcel of land designated as lot No. 171 in the
cadastral survey. The matter is now before us for determination upon
petition and answer, together with the proof submitted by the
petitioner and by the Attorney-General, as representative of the
respondents.

It appears that on December 26, 1917, the Director of Lands, in
behalf of the Government, filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna for the settlement and adjudication of several
parcels of land in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2259,
known as the Cadastral Act. The lands affected by this proceeding are
located in the municipality of Cavinti, in said province, and among the
lands included therein is the parcel designated as lot No. 171.

Notice of the proceeding was published on February 1, 1918,
according to law; and the cause was set for hearing upon April 1, £918.
Between that date and April 20, 1918, the case was called for trial
more than once; and upon the date last named general default was
declared as to all unclaimed lots, and the same were declared to be
public land. Among the pieces of property included in this default is
said lot No. 171, as to which no claimant had appeared.

The petitioner herein, Pio L. Caballes, alleges that he is the
exclusive owner of said lot; and he has in fact proved to our
satisfaction that he was the true owner thereof upon the date the
judgment by default was taken.

The explanation given by the petitioner of his failure to appear in
the court and make timely claim to said property is that the said lot
No. 171 in the cadastral proceeding, had been combined in the revised
assessment in the municipality of Cavinti with the lot No. 169, also
belonging to the petitioner, and that when the petitioner appeared in
the cadastral proceeding to claim lot No. 169, it did ngt occur to him
to interpose a separate claim to lot No. 171, believing, as he did,
that said lot was comprised in No. 169. The good faith of this
assertion is in our opinion shown by the fact that he united to the
documents relating to lot No. 169 his title papers with reference to
lot No. 171. It appears that the petitioner had but lately purchased
lot No. 171 from one Florencio Ansay; and among the circumstances
contributing to the error into which the petitioner fell with respect
to this parcel, is the fact that Florencio Ansay was the owner of this
land at the time it was surveyed, and the petitioner had purchased it
between the time of the survey and the date when he should have
appeared in court to claim it. For this reason the notice sent out in
the cadastral proceeding with respect to lot No. 171 was apparently
sent to Florencio Ansay. It may be added that the petitioner had
purchased both lots from the same Florencio Ansay but at different
times.

After the default had been declared on April 20, 1918, as above
stated, this fact was not brought to the petitioner’s attention until a
full month had elapsed, when information concerning the matter was
communicated to him by his vendor, Florencio Ansay. Immediately upon
receiving this information, the petitioner proceeded to take steps to
correct the error and to this end, through his attorney, on May 23,
1918, interposed a motion for reconsideration before the Court of First
Instance, explaining his failure to claim the property sooner, and
asking the court to set aside the judgment by default in order to allow
him to prove his title.

The facts stated in the application aforesaid indubitably supply a
good ground for setting aside the default, and if it had been filed
within the period of thirty days, the judge of the Court of First
Instance would, we presume, have acceded to the request. The
application, however, though filed with all reasonable promptitude
after the fact of default had been discovered by the petitioner, came
too late, by the space of two or three days, to be entertained in the
character of a motion for a new trial.

Although, for the reason stated, the application to which reference
has been made supplies no ground for the granting of a new trial, in
the ordinary acceptance of that term, nevertheless it is our opinion
that this application could be viewed as an independent application for
relief under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if applicable
to cadastral cases. Said section in very broad terms authorizes a court
to give relief against any judgment, order, or other proceeding taken
against a party “through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect, provided application be made within a reasonable
time, but in no case exceeding1 six months, after such judgment, order,
or proceeding was taken.” We can, however, discover no sufficient basis
for holding said section to be applicable in cases of this kind.

In this connection it may be observed that the law immediately
applicable to cadastral cases is Act No. 2259, as amended. Section 11
of said Act provides, among other things, as follows:

“SEC. 11. The trial of the case * * * shall be
conducted in the same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings in the
Court of Land Registration, and shall be governed by the same rules.
Orders of default and confession shall also be entered in the same
manner as in ordinary cases in the same court and shall have the same
effect. All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court and
decrees awarded in favor of the persons entitled to the lands or the
various parts thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the basis
for original certificates of title in favor of said persons, which
shall have the same effect as certificates of title granted on
application for registration of land under the Land Registration Act,
and except as herein otherwise provided all of the provisions of said
Land Registration Act, as now amended, and as it hereafter may be
amended, shall be applicable to proceedings under this Act, and to the
titles and certificates of title granted or issued hereunder.”

Under this provision it is evident that, as regards procedure,
cadastral cases are governed by exactly the same rules and provisions
of law as ordinary cases for the registration of land. In order to
discover the procedure to be followed in a cadastral case, it is
therefore only necessary to examine the law applicable to the procedure
in registration cases.

Upon examination of the provisions of Act No. 496 (the Land
Registration Act) it will be found that the Code of Civil Procedure has
not in general terms been made applicable in registration proceedings,
though certain provisions of said Code have been made applicable, and
even this is done in a guarded manner. Thus, we find that in section 14
of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 1108, provision is made for the
review of registration proceedings in the Supreme Court, and to this
end the appropriate sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, touching
appeal, are expressly adopted. It is needless to say that section 113
is not mentioned in this connection, for that section has nothing to do
with the subject of review in the Supreme Court. On the contrary it
makes provision for independent review in the court of origin.

Furthermore, it will be found that Act No. 496, so far from
adopting section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, contains
provisions inconsistent with that section. Thus, in section 38 of Act
No. 496, as amended, we find the following, among other provisions,
touching the effect of the decree in registration cases:

“Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the
absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees;
subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud
to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within
one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for
value has acquired an interest. If there is any such purchaser, the
decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full
force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal
hereinbefore provided.’*

There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the Court
of First Instance was powerless to grant the relief sought in the
petitioner’s motion of May 23, 1918, for a new trial in that court. It
follows that said court, in denying that motion, as it did on August 8,
1918, was acting regularly, and within the scope of its judicial
authority. Consequently there is no basis for the annulment of that
order by this court in the present proceeding, considered in the light
of an application for the writ of certiorari.

The petitioner supposes, however, that the facts set forth by him
are sufficient to afford a basis for relief under section 513 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, which provides for relief, upon direct
application to the Supreme Court, in any case where a judgment is
rendered by default and a party thereto is deprived of a hearing by
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Now, the remedy
provided in that section is undoubtedly applicable in, cadastral cases,
for said section is expressly mentioned in section 14 of Act No. 496,
as amended by Act No. 1108, as one of the sections of the Code of Civil
Procedure applicable to registration proceedings. The trouble here is,
however, that an application for relief under section 513 must be made
to the Supreme Court within sixty days after the aggrieved party /first
learns of the judgment against which relief is sought; and this
condition has not been complied with in the present case.

In this connection it must be borne in mind that, upon the
admission of the petitioner himself, he first learned of the default on
or about May 20, 1918.. The present petition was filed in this court on
August 23, 1918, which was more than three months after he was apprised
of the default in question. It was therefore too late, considered in
the character of an application to this court under section 513 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. It is hardly necessary to add that in applying
the provision of that section in regard to the time of the filing of
the application, we aje not at liberty to deduct the time consumed in
this case in the fruitless effort of the petitioner to get relief in
the Court of First Instance. In any view which can be taken of the case
the situation is one which has passed beyond the possibility of
judicial relief.

We regret our inability to grant relief, but the positive mandate
of the law must be obeyed. Of course there was no design on the part of
the legislature, in adopting the Cadastral Act, to create a system
under which the property of an individual could be acquired by the
Government without compensation. But it was deemed necessary in the
general interest to require owners to appear in the cadastral
proceedings to claim their own; and where default occurs, its legal
effects must follow, unless application for relief is made within the
time allowed.

Before closing this opinion we may be permitted, without intending
criticism upon the course pursued below, to admonish the courts against
precipitancy in making default in cadastral cases effective as to
parcels in respect to which ho claimant at all has appeared, and
especially where the situation and character of the land is such as to
suggest that it belongs to somebody and could not be public land. In
the proceeding now before us, judgment by default was declared about
four months after the original petition was filed. If the interval had
been longer, the notoriety and publicity of the proceedings might have
contributed to the timely correction of the error into which the
petitioner had fallen in this case.

Furthermore fiscals, and other attorneys representing the
Government in these matters, will do well to bear in mind that the
policy of the Cadastral Act is to procure the registration of property
in the name of the true owner and the public interest cannot be well
served otherwise than by the intelligent and sympathetic promotion of
this end.

The petition is dismissed, with costs. So ordered.

Mapa, C. J., Araullo, Malcolm, and Villamor, JJ., concur.