SEVERINO SALEN AND ELENA SALBANERA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. JOSE BALCE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

On February 5, 1957, plaintiffs brought this action against
defendant before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte to
recover the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest thereon from July 18,
1952, plus attorney’s fees and other incidental expenses.

Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense that the law upon which
plaintiffs predicate their right to recover does not here apply for the
reason that that law refers to quasi-delicts and not to criminal cases.

After trial, the court sustained the theory of defendant and dismissed the complaint with costs. Hence the present appeal.

Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died
single from wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of
defendant. At the time, Gumersindo Balce was also single, a minor below
18 years of age, and was living with defendant. As a result of Carlos
Salen’s death, Gumersindo Balce was accused and convicted of homicide
and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay the heirs of the deceased
an indemnity in the amount of P2,000.00. Upon petition of plaintiffs,
the only heirs of the deceased, a writ of execution was issued for the
payment of the indemnity but it was returned unsatisfied because
Gumersindo Balce was insolvent and had no property in his name.
Thereupon, plaintiffs de manded upon defendant, father of Gumersindo,
the payment of the indemnity the latter has failed to pay, but
defendant refused, thus causing plaintiffs to institute the present
action.

The question for determination is whether appellee can be held
subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity of P2,000.00 which his son was
sentenced to pay in the criminal case filed against him.

In holding that the civil liability of the son of appellee arises
from his criminal liability and, therefore, the subsidiary liability of
appellee must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, and not under Article 2180 of the new Civil Code which only
applies to obligations which arise from quasi-delicts, the trial court
made the following observation:

“The law provides that a person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable (Art. 100 of the Revised Penal
Code). But there is no law which holds the father either primarily or
subsidiarily liable for the civil liability incurred by the son who is
a minor of 18 years. Under Art. 101 of the Penal Code, the father is
civilly liable for the acts committed by his son if the latter As an
imbecile, or insane, or under 9 years of age or over 9 but under 15,
who has acted without discernment. Under Art. 102, only inkeepers and
tavern-keepers are held subsidiarily liable, and under Art. 103 of the
same Penal Code, the subsidiary liability established in Art. 102 shall
apply only to ’employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in
any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices or employees in the discharge, of their duties.’
By the principle of exclusio unus execlusio ulterius, the
defendant in this case cannot be held subsidiary liable for the civil
liability of Gumersindo Balce who has been convicted of homicide for
the killing of the plaintiff’s son Carlos Salen.

“Art. 2180
of the Civil Code, relied upon by the plaintiffs, is not applicable to
the case at bar. It applies to obligations which arise from
quasi-delicts and not to obligations which arise from criminal
offenses. Civil liability arising from criminal negligence or offenses
is governed by the provisions of the. Penal Code and civil liability
arising from civil negligence is governed by the provision of the Civil
Code. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code
expressly refers to obligations which arise from quasi-delicts. And
obligations arising from criminal offenses are never obligations
arising, from quasi-delicts (Commissioner’s note). And according to
Art. 2177, the responsibility for fault of negligence under Art. 2176
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code * * *.'”

While we agree with the theory that, as a rule, the civil liability
arising from a crime shall be governed by the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, we disagree with the contention that the subsidiary
liability of persona for acts of those who are under their custody
should likewise be governed by the same Code even in the absence of any
provision governing the case, for that would leave the transgression of
certain rights without any punishment or sanction in the law. Such
would be the case if we would uphold the theory of appellee as
sustained by the trial court.

It is true that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a
father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only
if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or over
9 but under 15 years of age, who acts without discernment, unless it
appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is
because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by
law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and
3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely
unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has
the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control. But a minor
over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal
liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary
liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case,
resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code.

The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the
pertinent portion of which provides: “The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by
the minor children who lived in their company.” To hold that this
provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which
arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may
stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no
liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.
Verily, the void that apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is
subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be
gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or
identical cases.

A case in point is Exconde vs. Capuno, 101 Phil., 843, the facts of which are as follows:

“Dante Capuno, a minor of 15 years of age, lives in
the company of his father, Delfin Capuno. He is a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School in the City of San Pablo and a member of
the Boy Scout Organization of his school. On March 31, 1949, on the
occasion of a certain parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in the City of
San Pablo, Dante Capuno was one of those instructed by the City School
Supervisor to join the parade. From the school, Dante Capuno, together
with other students, boarded a jeep. When the jeep started to run,
Dante Capuno took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat
on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle
and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidro Caperiña died as a
consequence. The corresponding criminal action for double homicide
through reckless imprudence was instituted against Dante Capuno. During
the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidro Caperiña
reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against
the accused. Dante Capuno was found guilty of the criminal offense
charged against him. In line with said reservation of Sabina Exconde,
the corresponding civil action for damages was filed against Delfin
Capuno, Dante Capuno and others.”

In holding Delfin Capuno jointly and severally liable with his minor
son Dante Capuno arising from the criminal act committed by the latter,
this Court made the following ruling:

“The civil liability which the law imposes upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them is
obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they
exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the ‘duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them in
proportion to their means’, while, on the other hand, gives them the
‘right to correct and punish them in moderation (Arts. 134 and 135,
Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves
of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art.
1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code.) This defendants failed to
prove.”

Another case in point is Araneta vs. Arreglado 104 Phil., 524; 55 Off. Gaz. [9] 1961. The facts of this case are aft. follows:

“On March 7, 1961, while plaintiff Benjamin Araneta
was talking with the other students of the Ateneo de Manila while
seated atop a low ruined wall bordering the Ateneo grounds along Dakota
Street, in the City of Manila, Dario Arreglado, a former student of the
Ateneo, chanced to pass by. Those on the wall called Dario and
conversed with him, and in the course of their talk, twitted him on his
leaving the Ateneo and enrolling in the De La Salle College.
Apparently, Arreglado resented the banter and suddenly pulling from his
pocket a Japanese Luger pistol (licensed in the name of his father Juan
Arreglado), fired the same at Araneta, hitting him in the lower jaw,
causing him to drop backward, bleeding profusely. Helped by his
friends, the injured lad was taken first to the school infirmary and
later to the Singian Hospital, where he lay hovering between life and
death for three days. The vigor of youth came to his rescue; he rallied
and after some time finally recovered, the gunshot wound left him with
a degenerative injury to the jawbone (mandible) and a scar in the lower
portion of the face, where the bullet had plowed through. The behavior
of Benjamin was likewise affected, he becoming inhibited and morose
after leaving the hospital.”

Dario Arreglado was indicted for frustrated homicide and pleaded
guilty, but in view of his youth, he being only 14 years of age, the
court suspended the proceedings as prescribed toy Article 80 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thereafter, an action was instituted by Araneta and
his father against Juan Arreglado, his wife, and their son Dario, to
recover material, moral and exemplary damages. The court of first
instance, after trial, sentenced the Arreglados to pay P3,943.00 as
damages and attorney’s fees. From this decision, the Aranetas appealed
in view of the meager amount of indemnity awarded. This Court affirmed
the decision but increased the indemnity to P18,000.00. This is a
typical case of parental subsidiary liability arising from the criminal
act of a minor son.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. Judgment is
hereby rendered ordering appellee to pay appellants the sum of
P2,000.00, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the
complaint, and the costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.