G.R. No. 144116. November 22, 2002
CESAR MONTANEZ, PETITIONER, VS. NESTOR MENDOZA, RESPONDENT.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In general, a petition for review under Rule 45 refers merely to
errors of law allegedly committed by lower courts. However, as an exception, when the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) reverses factual findings of the regional trial court (RTC) and
municipal trial court (MTC), the Supreme Court may pass upon the controverted
issues of fact. Indeed, in the present
case, the CA erred in reversing the lower courts; thus, it becomes the duty of
this Court to correct the error.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the April 17, 2000 Decision[1] and
the July 13, 2000 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 49368. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. [T]he assailed decision of the Municipal
Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal dated August 1, 1996 in Civil Case No. 1163
which was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77
in its decision dated September 16, 1998 is hereby REVERSED and accordingly SET
ASIDE. Petitioner is furthermore awarded
attorney’s fees in the sum ofP10,000.00”[3]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
The reversed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo,
Rizal (Branch 77) disposed as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the appeal.
“The Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.”[4]
The Facts
The antecedents of the case are summarized by the Court of
Appeals thus:
“Sometime in April 1995, [herein Petitioner] Cesar Montañez filed a
complaint for forcible entry with damages against Nestor Mendoza before the
Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal. The complainant alleged, among other things, that: he has been in
possession of a parcel of land situated at Sitio Lumbangan, Barangay Pintong
Bukawe (formerly part of Maarat) San Mateo, Rizal consisting of more or less,
six (6) hectares bounded on the east by property of Danilo Laceste, on the west
by property of Herminia Ramos, on the north by a barangay road and on the south
by property of Domingo Montañez; that since 1970, he and his family have lived
on the said land cultivated the same by planting crops like ri[c]e, corn,
camote, etc.; that the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) has certified that he is the actual occupant and possessor of the land
in Sitio Lumbangan, Maarat, San Mateo, Rizal; that sometime in the middle of
May 1994, [private respondent] Nestor Mendoza entered the land and dispossessed
him and his family by force and intimidation; that [private respondent] and his
goons destroyed standing crops and trees planted by private respondent.
“In his answer, [private respondent] denied the material
allegations in the complaint and as affirmative defense, averred that he built
his house in the land owned and titled in the name of Ramon Mendoza; that he
was expressly authorized by the administrator to construct a house therein as
shown by the Authority to Construct Residential House; that any and all plants,
crops and other improvements that were then and up to now existing in the
aforesaid land also belong to and/or were introduced thereat by the Mendoza
family; that he did not employ armed goons as the land on which his house was
constructed belonged to Ramon Mendoza and at no time did private respondent
occupy said land.
“After the proceedings, the Municipal Trial Court rendered a
decision in favor of the [petitioner], the dispositive portion of which reads:
‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff Cesar Montañez and against defendant Nestor Mendoza and all
other persons claiming rights under him, as follows:
1. To vacate the property subject of
this case and surrender possession thereof to plaintiff;
2. To remove the improvements
introduced by him on the subject property;
3. To pay the plaintiff the amount of P5,000.00
as and by way of attorney’s fees; and
4. To pay the costs.
Defendant’s counterclaims is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.’
“Aggrieved by the decision, [private respondent] appealed the case
to the Regional Trial [C]ourt of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77. In his appeal, [private respondent] disputed
the finding of the Municipal Trial Court that the land where he built his house
is the same land that has been in possession of [petitioner]. Unfortunately, the Regional Trial Court
upheld the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in favor of [petitioner],
hence, this petition.”[5]
(Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC and the MTC, the CA ruled that in civil cases,
the burden of proof is on plaintiffs who must establish their allegations by a
preponderance of evidence.[6] It
reasoned that, in the present case, the identity of the land being questioned
by petitioner has not been sufficiently proven to be the same one where
respondent had constructed a house; hence, the issue of the legality of the
former’s possession of that land cannot be the basis for a forcible entry suit.[7]
Thus, the present Petition.[8]
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner assigns this sole issue for our
consideration:
“x x x [W]hether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
petitioner has not prove[n] that the property he claims to cultivate is the
same property which respondent took possession [of].”[9]
Simply put, the issue for resolution is whether petitioner has
sufficiently established his cause of action by a preponderance of evidence.
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main
Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to possession of the parcel
of land that is the subject of the forcible entry case, because its area is not
part of that which is covered by OCT No. P-658 in the name of Ramon Mendoza.[10]
On the other hand, respondent claims that he possesses an
authority to construct a residential house on the latter parcel of land. He adds that it was incumbent upon
petitioner to adduce substantial evidence to prove that the land from which he
was ousted illegally was the same one from which he had lawfully built the
house in question.[11]
We agree with petitioner.
An action for forcible entry is a quieting process that is
summary in nature. It is designed to
recover physical possession through speedy proceedings that are restrictive in
nature, scope and time limits.[12] In
forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.[13]
The presence of any of these elements in the present case implies that the
possession of the disputed land by the defendant has been unlawful from the
beginning; that is, he acquired possession by illegal means.[14]
Further, it is a basic rule in civil cases that “the party having
the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.”[15]
Preponderance of evidence simply
means “evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which
is offered in opposition to it.”[16]
Hence, parties who have the burden of proof must produce such quantum of
evidence, with plaintiffs having to rely on the strength of their own evidence,
not on the weakness of the defendant’s.[17]
In the present ejectment case, petitioner (as plaintiff) has the
burden of proving that he was illegally deprived of possession of the parcel of
land, which is the subject of the forcible entry case.[18]
To obtain a judgment in his favor, he must therefore establish a preponderance
of evidence for this essential fact.[19]
Obviously, the issue in this case is shrouded by a conflict in
factual perception, a conflict that is ordinarily not subject to a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[20] But
the Court is constrained to resolve it, because the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.[21]
Thus, we will rule on such factual issues as an exception to the general rule.[22]
In this light, we have meticulously scoured the records of this
case and found that the appellate court had erred in appreciating the evidence
presented.[23]
Respondent failed to provide a reason, let alone an adequate one, to justify
the reversal of the lower courts’ Decisions.[24]
Indeed, the findings of the MTC, which were adopted by the RTC, had adequately
supported the allegations in the Complaint.[25]
First, petitioner
alleged and proved that he had been in prior physical possession of the
property in litigation until respondent deprived him of it.[26]
In ejectment cases, the plaintiff merely needs to prove prior de facto possession and undue
deprivation thereof.[27] The
sole question for resolution is the physical or material possession (possession
de facto) of the subject
property. Neither a claim of juridical possession
(possession de jure) nor an averment
of ownership[28]
by the defendant can outrightly prevent the court from taking due cognizance of
the case.[29]
Petitioner’s actual physical possession has been sufficiently
proven by the Certification[30]
dated April 10, 1992, issued by Land Management Officer Maximo M. Pentiño of
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). This document lists petitioner as one of the
actual occupants of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Lumbangan, Maarat, San
Mateo, Rizal – the same land that is the subject of the forcible entry
case. Not having been successfully
overturned, the validity of the Certification, as well as the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official function stands.[31]
Similarly, if respondent alleges any irregularity in the issuance of the
Certification, he should come forward with clear and convincing proof.[32]
Petitioner’s prior possession was further corroborated by the Sworn
Statements of Carlito Solano,[33]
Claudio Laceste Sr.,[34]
Agripino Madrona,[35]
Efren Montanez,[36]
Danilo and George Laceste,[37] and
Alfredo Blanco.[38]
These affidavits should be given evidentiary value. The Rule on Summary Procedure precisely provides for the submission
by the parties of affidavits and position papers and enjoins courts to hold
hearings only when it is necessary to do so to clarify factual matters.[39]
This procedure is in keeping with the objective of the Rule: to promote the
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.[40]
Second, not only has
petitioner proven his possession of the parcel of land he had cultivated since
1970, but has also satisfactorily proven the identity of the property.[41]
There are marked differences between the land that is the subject of the
forcible entry case and that which is covered by OCT No. P-658 in the name of
Ramon Mendoza.
1. The technical description[42]
prepared by Geodetic Engineer Eleuterio M. de las Alas for the parcel of land
being cultivated by petitioner states that it consists of six hundred fifty-one
thousand nine hundred eighty-one square meters (651,981 sq m) or 6.5 hectares,
more or less. On the other hand, the
parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-658,[43] Free
Patent No. 045811-91-925, consists of forty-three thousand and fifty-nine
square meters (43,059 sq m) or 4.3 hectares. For our purposes, a certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only
of ownership of the land referred to, but of other matters as well such as its
technical description and location.[44]
2. The parcel of land being cultivated by petitioner, as alleged
in the Complaint,[45] is
timberland and thus part of the public domain, while that covered by OCT No.
P-658 is private property.
Third, it was
categorically stated by Geodetic Engineer Priscillano S. Aguinaldo in his
Affidavit[46]
dated October 6, 1995, that the area covered by OCT No. P-658 was not the same
as the subject matter of the forcible entry case. The pertinent portions are quoted hereunder:
“That, after my d[i]ligent examinations and researches of the
technical descriptions appearing on the above-mentioned Original Certificate of
Title N. P-658; compared to my actual verifications on the ground I have
found out that the area covered by the Original Certificate of Title No. 658 is
not the same area which is the subject matter of the Case filed by MR. CESAR
MONTANEZ vs. NESTOR MENDOZA for ‘FORCIBLE ENTRY’ with the Municipal Trial
Court of San Mateo, Rizal.” (Emphasis in the original)
Fourth, while
respondent insists that he constructed a house on a parcel of land that is
covered by OCT No. P-658 and is in the name of Ramon Mendoza, the records of
this case are bereft of evidence to support such allegation.[47] Doubts on the very existence of that parcel
of land actually persist, as shown by the following.[48]
1. The Registry of Deeds of Marikina issued a Certification[49]
that “the original copy of Original/Transfer Certificate of Title No.
P-658/T-409-1093 registered in the name of Ramon F. Mendoza cannot be located,
as of this date [September 28, 1995], in the general file of this Registry
despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the same.”
2. A Memorandum[50]
dated November 14, 2000, prepared by Rizal Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Officer Maximo F. Soriano Jr., included OCT No. P-658 in the name of
Ramon Mendoza in the list of questionable titles that had been denounced as
patently defective.
3. Respondent failed to substantiate his assertion that the house
he had allegedly built was within the perimeter of the aforementioned parcel of
land.[51] It is a basic rule on evidence, as clearly
stated in Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,[52]
that affirmative allegations of each party must be proven.[53]
Verily, petitioner has sufficiently established by a
preponderance of evidence that the subject of the ejectment proceedings is not
the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-658 in the name of Ramon Mendoza, but
the property alleged in the former’s Complaint.[54]
Since petitioner was able to prove his prior possession of the property he
claims and to fix its identity, his action for possession cannot fail.[55]
Thus, as correctly observed by the MTC, he is entitled to be restored to his
possession thereof, pursuant to Article 539[56] of
the Civil Code.[57]
WHEREFORE, the
Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the MTC of San Mateo, Rizal dated August 1, 1996, as affirmed by the RTC, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales,
JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on official leave.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 28-33. Penned by Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria
(Division chairman) and concurred in by Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis and Elvi
John S. Asuncion (members).
[2]
Id., p. 35.
[3]
CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 33.
[4]
RTC Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 26;
penned by Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez Jr.
[5]
CA Decision, pp. 1-3; rollo, pp.
28-30.
[6]
Id., pp. 4 & 31.
[7]
Id., pp. 5 & 32.
[8]
The case was deemed submitted for decision on April 2, 2001, upon the Court’s
receipt of petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Cristobal P. Fernandez.
Respondent’s Memorandum, filed on March 15, 2001, was signed by Atty. Felix B.
Lerio.
[9]
Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 5; rollo,
p. 102.
[10]
Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 6 & 103.
[11]
Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 18; rollo,
p. 89.
[12]
Bongato
v. Malvar, GR No. 141614, August
14, 2002.
[13]
Benitez v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA
242, January 16, 1997.
[14]
Gener
v. De Leon, GR No. 130730,
October 19, 2001.
[15]
§1, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
[16]
New Testament Church of God v. Court of
Appeals, 246 SCRA 266, July 14, 1995, per Quiason, J. citing Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 204 SCRA 160, November 21, 1991.
[17]
Jison
v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 495, February 24, 1998.
[18]
Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA
673, January 23, 1998.
[19]
Ibid.
[20]
Manzano
v. Perez, GR No. 112485, August
9, 2001.
[21]
Manila
Electric Co v. Court of Appeals, GR Nos. 108301
& 132539, July 11, 2001; Litonjua v. Court of Appeals, 286
SCRA 136, February 10, 1998; Gaw v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA 405, March 24, 1993.
[22]
Rosario
v. Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 464, July 19, 1999; Quebral v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, January 25, 1996; Somodio v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA
307, August 15, 1994; Cayabyab v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 232 SCRA 1, April 28, 1994.
[23]
First
Nationwide Assurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA 589,
November 19, 1999.
[24]
Carvajal v. Court of Appeals, 280
SCRA 351, October 9, 1997.
[25]
Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 268 SCRA 688, February 26, 1997.
[26]
Ong
v. Parel, 355 SCRA 691, March 28, 2001.
[27]
Gachon v. Devera Jr., 274 SCRA 540,
June 20, 1997.
[28]
Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 220, March 4, 1996.
[29]
Diu
v. Ibajan, 322 SCRA 452, January 19, 2000.
[30]
Exhibit “C”; records, p. 9.
[31]
Ramos v.
Heirs of Honorio Ramos Sr., GR No. 140848,
April 25, 2002.
[32]
Batong
Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. v. Dela Serna, 312 SCRA 22, August 6, 1999.
[33]
Exhibit “F”; records, p. 96.
[34]
Exhibit “G”; id., p. 97.
[35]
Exhibit “H”; id., p. 98.
[36]
Exhibit “I”; id., p. 99.
[37]
Exhibit “J”; id., pp. 100-101.
[38]
Exhibit “K”; id., p. 102.
[39]
§9 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure provides:
“SEC. 9. Submission
of affidavits and position papers. – Within ten (10) days from receipt of
the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the
affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined
in the order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the
facts relied upon by them.”
[40]
Odsigue v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA
626, July 4, 1994.
[41]
Javier v. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA
498, March 28, 1994 citing Sese v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 585, July 31, 1987.
[42]
Rollo, p. 56.
[43]
Records, p. 52.
[44]
See Cuaño v. Court of Appeals, 237
SCRA 122, September 26, 1994; Vda. de
Lapore v. Pascual, 107 Phil. 695,
April 27, 1960; Dizon v. Banues, 104
Phil. 407, August 29, 1958.
[45]
Records, pp. 1-6.
[46]
Id., p. 209.
[47]
Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA 663, June 19, 2000.
[48]
Tiongco
v. Deguma, 317 SCRA 527, October 26, 1999.
[49]
Records, p. 208.
[50]
Rollo, p. 109.
[51]
RTC Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 26.
[52]
This section provides:
“SECTION 1. Burden
of proof. – Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on
the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law.”
[53]
Villaflor v. Court of Appeals, 280
SCRA 297, October 9, 1997.
[54]
Odsigue v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[55]
Javier v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[56]
This article provides:
“ART. 539. Every possessor has a right to be
respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be
protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the
laws and the Rules of Court.
“A
possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may within ten days
from the filing of the complaint present a motion to secure from the competent
court, in the action for forcible entry, a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion
within thirty (30) days from filing thereof.”
[57]
MTC Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 19.