SERAFIN ABUYEN, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
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Abuyen versus People of the Philippines
The Case
This is the case of Abuyen versus People of the Philippines, a petition for review on certiorari brought by Serafin Abuyen against the People of the Philippines. Abuyen was convicted of the crime of Direct Assault under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code for resisting and attacking a police officer who was trying to pacify him in the early morning of May 15, 1995. The case matters to the Bar candidate because it gathers in one decision several rules that examiners love: the deference given to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, and the rule that a motion to inhibit a judge must be raised seasonably and cannot be resurrected for the first time on appeal.
Procedural History
Abuyen was charged before the 9th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Giporlos-Quinapondan, Eastern Samar. Before arraignment he moved to inhibit the presiding judge, alleging that the private complainant, Police Officer Aquilino Fabillar, was the judge's nephew and a principal sponsor at his wedding. The judge denied the motion, ruling that his relationship to Fabillar fell under none of the grounds for mandatory inhibition under Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. After trial, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court found Abuyen guilty of Direct Assault and sentenced him to imprisonment of three years, six months and twenty-one days, and to pay a fine of five hundred pesos.
Abuyen appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Guiuan, Eastern Samar, which affirmed the conviction. He then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which likewise affirmed but modified the penalty, imposing an indeterminate sentence of four months and one day of arresto mayor as minimum, to three years, six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional as maximum. The Court of Appeals also denied his motion for reconsideration. Abuyen then filed this petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, which allowed him to litigate as a pauper and appointed a counsel de oficio to represent him.
Facts
At about one thirty in the morning of May 15, 1995, Police Officer Aquilino Fabillar was in his house in Poblacion, Giporlos, Eastern Samar, preparing for the departure of his children, when he heard Abuyen outside shouting and challenging anybody to a fight. Fabillar went out to pacify him. Abuyen refused to be pacified, resisted his police authority, and brandished a long sharp-pointed bolo. Fabillar commanded him to drop the weapon, and when Abuyen did not, fired warning shots. Abuyen ran toward Fabillar Street near the municipal police building.
The two met again at the corner of Fabillar and Del Remedio Streets, where Abuyen persisted in refusing to drop his bolo and attacked the policeman with it. Fabillar fired shots, one of which hit Abuyen on the right foot. Abuyen dropped his bolo, left behind his right rubber sandal, and ran toward the seashore. Fabillar recovered the bolo and the sandal, brought them to the police station, and sought support in arresting Abuyen. Two patrol officers accompanied him in searching for Abuyen, but they failed to find him. The bolo and the sandal were presented in court and marked as exhibits for the prosecution.
Abuyen gave a different account. He claimed that on the night of May 14, 1995, he had joined a drinking session with Fabillar and others, and that Fabillar harbored ill feeling against him because he had campaigned for Fabillar's political opponent in the 1995 local elections. He alleged that Fabillar confronted him, attempted to draw his gun, and later shot him on the right foot as he ran away in fear. The trial court gave credence to Fabillar's positive testimony and scant consideration to Abuyen's negative and self-serving denial.
Issues
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction despite the alleged paucity of evidence for the prosecution, in violation of the constitutional presumption of innocence.
- Whether or not the testimony of Police Officer Fabillar should be discredited as self-serving and inconsistent, and as tainted by a grudge against the petitioner.
- Whether or not the presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court should have inhibited himself on account of his alleged relationship to the private complainant.
Applicable Provisions
Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, under which Abuyen was charged and convicted, provides:
Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority.
This is the crime for which Abuyen was convicted, and its elements frame the entire review of the evidence.
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which the petitioner invoked for the inhibition of the judge, provides in its relevant portion:
No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or husband, or any relative within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
This provision defines the grounds for mandatory inhibition and bears directly on whether the judge was disqualified from sitting in the case.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the petition must fail. It reaffirmed the well-settled rule that the determination of the credibility of witnesses is properly within the domain of the trial court, which is in the best position to observe their demeanor and bodily movements. Findings of the trial court on credibility are entitled to great respect and even finality unless shown to be arbitrary, or unless facts and circumstances of weight and influence were overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied. These findings are binding on the Supreme Court especially when affirmed by the appellate court, as they were here by both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
On the second issue, the Court upheld the trial court's preference for the positive testimony of Fabillar over the negative and self-serving denial of Abuyen. The trial court had reasoned that positive assertions may not be overcome by mere denials, and that Fabillar, a police officer, is presumed to have been regularly performing his official duties, a presumption that must be overcome by strong and convincing evidence. The Court noted the trial court's observations that Abuyen failed to report the incident or seek protection from the police, and that the bolo and rubber sandal recovered at the scene made it believable that they came from his possession.
On the third issue, the Court held that it was too late for Abuyen to assail the failure of the presiding judge to inhibit himself. He should have seasonably filed a petition for certiorari or prohibition when his motion for inhibition was denied, and he did not even raise the issue when he appealed to the Regional Trial Court. In any case, he failed to substantiate his allegation of relationship within the sixth degree of consanguinity to warrant mandatory inhibition, and failed to show that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case. The judge is therefore presumed to have acted regularly and in a manner to preserve the ideal of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process.
Doctrine
First, the credibility of witnesses is a matter properly left to the trial court, whose findings are entitled to great respect and even finality, especially when affirmed by the appellate courts, absent a clear showing that material facts were overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied.
Second, positive testimony prevails over a mere negative denial, and a public officer is presumed to have regularly performed his official duties, a presumption that must be overcome by strong and convincing evidence.
Third, the grounds for mandatory inhibition under Rule 137 of the Rules of Court are limited to those enumerated, and a party who fails to seasonably challenge a denial of a motion to inhibit, by certiorari or prohibition, and who fails to raise the issue on appeal, is deemed to have waived it.
Disposition
The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, sustaining Abuyen's conviction for Direct Assault.
Remember This
Memorize this line: the trial court's findings on credibility are entitled to great respect and even finality, especially when affirmed by the appellate courts, and a motion to inhibit a judge must be raised seasonably or it is waived. Examiners use this case to test the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the procedural consequences of failing to timely challenge a denial of a motion for inhibition.