JOEY POTOT Y SURIO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LOLITO DAPULAG, RESPONDENTS.
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Potot versus People of the Philippines
The Case
This is the case of Potot versus People of the Philippines, a petition for review on certiorari brought by Joey Potot against the People of the Philippines and the private complainant Lolito Dapulag. Potot had pleaded guilty to homicide and was convicted by the trial court. He then formally manifested that he was not appealing and asked to serve his sentence. The private complainant, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, moved to set aside that final judgment and to remand the records for re-evaluation and the filing of a new charge. The case matters because it fixes the moment when a judgment of conviction becomes final and unalterable, and it marks the boundary between the accused's power to reopen a judgment and the prosecutor's discretion to control the prosecution.
Procedural History
Joey Potot was charged with homicide before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Catarman, Northern Samar. Upon arraignment, with the information read to him in his own dialect and assisted by counsel, he pleaded guilty. The trial court, satisfied that he understood the meaning and consequences of his plea, convicted him of homicide, appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender, and imposed an indeterminate sentence, an indemnity of 50,000 pesos, and the costs. Three days later, Potot filed a manifestation with motion stating that he was not appealing and praying for a commitment order so he could serve his sentence.
The private complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration and retrial, bearing the conformity of the public prosecutor, asking that the decision be set aside. The trial court granted the motion, set aside its decision as proceeding from a rigged, hence sham, hearing, and remanded the records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and the filing of the corresponding charge. Potot's motion for reconsideration was denied. Potot then filed this petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, assailing the orders that set aside the judgment and denied reconsideration. The Solicitor General agreed with Potot that the challenged orders should be set aside and the judgment of conviction reinstated.
Facts
On the early morning of the second of November, 1999, in the public cemetery of Mondragon, Northern Samar, Rodolfo Dapulag, also known as Pili, was stabbed with a knife locally called a dipang. An information for homicide was filed against Joey Potot on the twelfth of December, 1999.
At his arraignment on the first of February, 2000, Potot, assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty. He invoked the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender, and the public prosecutor interposed no objection, manifesting that no aggravating circumstance attended the crime. The trial court convicted him and promulgated its decision in open court that same day.
On the third of February, 2000, Potot filed a manifestation with motion informing the court that he was not appealing and praying for a commitment order so he could immediately serve his sentence. On the eleventh of February, 2000, however, the victim's wife filed a motion for reconsideration and retrial, alleging that two eyewitnesses had revealed that two other persons held the victim's arms during the killing, and that this information had been deliberately withheld during the police investigation and the preliminary investigation. The trial court granted the motion and remanded the records to the Provincial Prosecutor, and denied Potot's motion for reconsideration.
Issues
- Whether or not the trial court may set aside a judgment of conviction that has already become final upon the motion of the private complainant with the conformity of the public prosecutor.
- Whether or not the trial court may grant a motion for reconsideration of a judgment of conviction that was not initiated by the accused or by the court with his consent.
- Whether or not the assailed orders would violate the accused's constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Applicable Provisions
Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 7. Modification of judgment. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
This provision confines the power to reopen a judgment of conviction to the accused, and only before the judgment becomes final, which is decisive here because Potot had waived his right to appeal in writing.
Section 1, Rule 121 of the same Rules provides:
Section 1. New trial or reconsideration. At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.
This provision bars the trial court from granting the private complainant's motion, since the motion was not initiated by the accused nor by the court with his consent.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the petition is meritorious. Only the accused may ask for a modification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction, and only before it becomes final or before he perfects his appeal. A judgment becomes final when no appeal is seasonably filed, when the sentence has been partially or totally served, when the accused expressly waives his right to appeal, or when he applies for probation. When any of these is present, the trial court loses jurisdiction to alter, modify, or revoke the judgment. Potot's written waiver, filed three days after promulgation, caused the judgment to become final and unalterable, so the trial court acted beyond its authority in setting it aside. A judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable, and any error will not justify its amendment except to correct clerical errors or mistakes.
On the second issue, the Court held that it was procedurally impermissible to grant the private complainant's motion for reconsideration. Since the motion was not initiated by the accused nor by the court with his consent, it should have been denied outright as violative of Section 1, Rule 121. The Court added that the records show no irregularity in the preliminary investigation, since the information implicating two other persons had been deliberately withheld from the prosecutor, who could not have appreciated it. The public prosecutor has the quasi-judicial prerogative to determine what crime should be filed and who should be charged, and retains full discretion and control of the prosecution.
On the third issue, the Court held that the assailed orders would violate the constitutional right against double jeopardy. The requisites are present: a valid complaint or information, a court with jurisdiction, a plea to the charge, and a conviction. Having been placed in jeopardy for homicide, Potot cannot be prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense charged.
Doctrine
A judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside only upon motion of the accused, and only before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. It becomes final upon the lapse of the period to appeal, upon partial or total service of the sentence, upon the accused's written waiver of his right to appeal, or upon his application for probation. Once final, the judgment is immutable and the trial court loses jurisdiction to alter, modify, or revoke it, except to correct clerical errors. A new trial or reconsideration may be granted only on motion of the accused or at the court's own instance with his consent. The public prosecutor retains full direction and control of the prosecution and the quasi-judicial discretion to determine what crime to file and whom to charge. Finally, the constitutional right against double jeopardy bars a subsequent prosecution for the same offense after a valid conviction.
Disposition
The petition was granted. The assailed orders of the trial court were set aside, and its decision of the first of February, 2000 convicting Potot of homicide was reinstated.
Remember This
The single line worth memorizing is that only the accused may move to set aside a judgment of conviction, and only before it becomes final, for once final it is immutable. Examiners use this case to test the finality of judgments under Rule 120, the limits of a new trial or reconsideration under Rule 121, and the requisites of double jeopardy.