G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002
LENI O. CHOA, PETITIONER, VS. ALFONSO C. CHOA, RESPONDENT.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to
evidence may be the subject of a certiorari proceeding, provided the petitioner
can show that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion; and that appeal in
due course is not plain, adequate or speedy under the circumstances. Indeed,
when the plaintiff’s evidence is utterly and patently insufficient to prove the
complaint, it would be capricious for a
trial judge to deny the demurrer and to require the defendant to present
evidence to controvert a nonexisting case. Verily, the denial constitutes an unwelcome imposition on the court’s
docket and an assault on the defendant’s resources and peace of mind. In short, such denial needlessly delays and,
thus, effectively denies justice.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the March 16, 2000 Decision[1] and
the May 22, 2000 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53100. The decretal portion of the
Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.”[3]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.[4]
The Facts
Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of
this union, two children were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 51, a Complaint[5]
for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-8098. Afterwards he filed an Amended Complaint[6]
dated November 8, 1993 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
petitioner based on her alleged psychological incapacity.
The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in
chief. After his last witness testified, he submitted his Formal Offer of
Exhibits[7]
dated February 20, 1998. Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence)[8]
dated May 11, 1998. The lower court then allowed a number
of pleadings to be filed thereafter.
Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order[9]
denying petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence. It held that “[respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the
[petitioner] must controvert.”[10]
After her Motion for Reconsideration[11] was
denied in the March 22, 1999 Order,[12] petitioner
elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari,[13]
docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely
interlocutory; hence, certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not
available. The proper remedy was for
the defense to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision was handed down
later, to take an appeal therefrom.[14] In any event, no grave abuse of discretion
was committed by respondent judge in issuing the assailed Orders.[15]
The CA also ruled that “the propriety of granting or denying a
demurrer to evidence rests on the sound exercise of the [trial] court’s
discretion.”[16]
Further, the “[p]etitioner failed to show that the issues in the court below
[had] been resolved arbitrarily or without basis.”[17]
Hence, this Petition.[18]
The Issues
In her Memorandum,[19]
petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
“1) Upon the denial of
petitioner’s demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, is she under obligation, as a matter of inflexible rule, as what the
Court of Appeals required of her, to present her evidence, and when an
unfavorable [verdict] is handed down, appeal therefrom in the manner authorized
by law, despite the palpably and patently weak and grossly insufficient or so
inadequate evidence of the private respondent as plaintiff in the annulment of
marriage case, grounded on psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of The Family
Code? Or under such circumstances, can the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
be directly and immediately resorted to by the petitioner; and
“2) In upholding the
lower court’s denial of petitioner’s demurrer to evidence, did the Court of
Appeals wantonly violate, ignore or disregard in a whimsical manner the
doctrinal pronouncements of this Court in Molina (G.R. No. 108763, February 13,
1997, 268 SCRA 198) and Santos (G.R. No. 112019, January 14, 1995, 58 SCRA
17)?”[20]
Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to
evidence? and (2) in its denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
by violating or ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence?
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First
Issue:
Resort to Certiorari
Petitioner argues that the RTC denied her Demurrer to Evidence
despite the patent weakness and gross insufficiency of respondent’s
evidence. Thus, she was entitled to the
immediate recourse of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Echoing the CA, respondent counters that
appeal in due course, not certiorari, is the proper remedy.
We clarify. In general,
interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari
proceedings.
However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People,[21] this Court declared that appeal — not
certiorari — in due time was indeed the proper remedy, provided there was no grave abuse of discretion or excess of
jurisdiction or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court expressly
recognize this exception and allow certiorari when the lower court acts with
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of an interlocutory order. Rule 41 provides:
“No appeal may be taken from:
x x x x x x x x
x
(c) An interlocutory order;
x x x x x x x x
x
“In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is
not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65.” [22]
In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 reads as follows:
“SEC. 1. Petition
for certiorari — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.”[23]
Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may be assailed through
a petition for certiorari.[24] In Cruz v. People, this exception was
stressed by the Court in this wise:
“Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of
certiorari is not available to challenge interlocutory orders of the trial
court may be subject to exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory orders are
patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of
certiorari lies.”[25]
Second
Issue:
Denial of Demurrer to Evidence
Having established that a writ of certiorari may be issued in
exceptional circumstances, this Court is now tasked to determine whether the
present case falls under the exception; that is, whether the RTC indeed
committed a “patent error” or grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
Demurrer to Evidence.
A demurrer to evidence
is defined as “an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at
law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or
sustain the issue.”[26] The
demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to sustain a
verdict.[27]
In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court
is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof
to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.[28]
We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and
we are convinced that the evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is
grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that
would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.
First. Respondent claims that the filing by
petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latter’s
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. These charges included
Complaints for perjury,[29]
false testimony,[30]
concubinage[31]
and deportation.[32]
According to him, the filing and the prosecution of these cases clearly showed
that his wife (herein petitioner) wanted not only to put him behind bars, but
also to banish him from the country. He
contends that this “is very abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the
name and integrity of her husband as the father of her children, had acted to
the contrary.”[33]
We do not agree. The
documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed
cases against him. The evidence
presented, even if taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the
cases against him. To rule that the
filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only
totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.
Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent,
taken by itself or in conjunction with his documentary offerings, sufficient to
prove petitioner’s alleged psychological incapacity. He testified in these words:
“Q Will you please tell us
or explain to the Court what do you mean by ‘psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.’ What do you mean by that?
A Because before our
marriage she was already on the family way, so at that time she even want it
aborted by taking pills. She was even immature, carefree, and she lacked the
intention of procreative sexuality.[34]
x x x x
x x x
x x
ATTY. CHUA:
And you consider her that she was carefree,
she is psychologically incapacitated? Will you please elaborate on this what
you mean by ‘carefree’ approximating psychologically incapacitated?
ATTY. MIRANO:
I think we better ask the witness what he
means by ‘carefree.’
ATTY. CHUA:
Okay.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
She does not help in the household chores,
she does not take care of the child, she wants me to hire an attendant in order
to take care of the child. Even when the children were sick she does not bother
to let the children see a doctor.[35]
x x x x
x x x
x x
“STENOGRAPHER (reads back the question of Atty. Chua):
‘ATTY. CHUA:
Now. From the time of courtship up to the
time of your marriage to the defendant, did you notice any characteristic or
traits which you consider as psychological incapacity?’
WITNESS:
Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house
she gets mad at me, and she won’t talk to me when I call her up by telephone.
So, all she wanted for me to visit her everytime and even at the time when I am
busy with some other things. So, I think that is all.”[36]
Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically
complains about three aspects of petitioner’s personality; namely, her alleged
(1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an
“intention of procreative sexuality.” None of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes “psychological
incapacity.” Far from it.
In Santos v. CA,[37]
this Court clearly explained that “psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.”[38]
Said the Court:
“It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase ‘psychological incapacity’ under
Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases
of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr.
Artemio Baluma’s ‘Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law,’ quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson’s
‘Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases’). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot
be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, ‘psychological
incapacity’ should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.”[39]
Furthermore, in Republic v.
Molina,[40]
we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than just a
“difficulty,” a “refusal” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations. We stressed that a mere showing
of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely
shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the
gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting
their marital union.
Sorely lacking in respondent’s evidence is proof that the
psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about the disability of a
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that “mild characterological peculiarities,
mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological
incapacity. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words,
there should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.”[41]
Respondent’s pious peroration that petitioner “lacked the
intention of procreative sexuality” is easily belied by the fact that two children
were born during their union. Moreover,
there is absolutely no showing that the alleged “defect” was already existing
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not
incompetency, of the supposed expert testimony presented by respondent. His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly
failed to identify and prove the root
cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true,
was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The pertinent portions of his testimony are
quoted thus:
“ATTY. CHUA:
And then finally and ultimately you reached
the conclusion that both parties, meaning the husband and the wife in the
present case have a personality which is normal. That is your conclusion?
WITNESS:
They are normal, but they cannot mix together.
Q. So as a general
proposition, both of them are of normal personality, only that they are not
compatible with each other?
A. Yes.
Q. And by normal
personality, you mean that neither of them suffer from any personality disorder,
bordering on abnormality?
A. Yes.
Q. But Doctor, is not a
fact or a fact of life, that no couple could be or are perfectly match?
A. Precisely, if there is a
problem, marital problem, there should be somebody who knows how to handle
marriage, that should try to intervene.
Q. You mean expert advise
or services should be needed by the couple?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if the couple are
mature enough and each of them practises what we call maximum tolerance and
give and take, will that serve the purpose?
A. That would served the
purpose of getting well.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Meaning to say that the
incompatibility could be harmonized?
A. Yes, because they are
supposedly normal, but both of them are personally disordered. It cannot be harmonized. So this case, if only they have tried
professional help to take care of their marital problem, it could have been
solved.
Q. Or the situation could
have been remedied?
A. Yes. But I would like to say that it must be
somebody who is an expert. Not just any
from Tom, Dick and Harry could handle this. That means from the very beginning they have personalities which they
were incompatible. So if anybody would handle that, they will not mix, they
will be always quarreling with each other. They should not have got married.[42]
x x x x
x x x
x x
Q. Yes. So in this present case, your expert opinion
was sought by the plaintiff, and you found out that both are normal?
A. With different
personalities. So that they were
incompatible.
Q. Normal, simply
incompatible.
A. Yes, with personalities
different from each other, which I mentioned there in my last page. That they are like oil and water,
immiscible. Like oil and water, they
will not mix.
Q. You also mentioned that
the plaintiff. Meaning to say the
husband told you about the frequent quarrels had with the wife. Did he ever tell you that was a serious or
major quarrel?
A. Actually there was no
major quarrel. It was all petty
quarrels.[43]
x x x x
x x x
x x
Q. So the problem of this
couple is fundamentally a conflicting personalities?
A. Yes.[44]
x x x x
x x
x x x
Q. Now, you mentioned that
you maybe able to make them reconcile?
A. Yes.
Q. You mean that given the
time and opportunity, things could be worked out?
A. Yes.
Q. You mean reconciliation at
this stage with expert services, and the advise of those who possess the
necessary [expertise] could be worked out?
A. Yes, as I said it can be
done by therapy. Family therapy.[45]
x x x x
x x x
x x
Q. Doctor, you draw your
conclusion that there is psychological inc[a]pacity existing in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. Because of the …
A. The incompatibility.
Q. Incompatibility.
A. Yes.[46]
His testimony established merely that the spouses had an
“incompatibility,” a “defect” that could possibly be treated or alleviated
through psychotherapy. We need not
expound further on the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony to
establish the psychological incapacity of petitioner.
Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based
merely on descriptions communicated to him by respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological
examination of her. Neither did he ever
claim to have done so. In fact, his
Professional Opinion[47]
began with the statement “[I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is
true, x x x.”[48] The expert witness testified thus:
“ATTY. CHUA
Q Doctor, in this
professional opinion of yours, you gathered most of your material data from the
plaintiff who is the husband?
WITNESS
A Yes. By the way, I
requested the husband Alfonso, if it was possible for me to interview Leni, and
he said, he doesn’t know.
ATTY. CHUA
Q He doesn’t know. Now,
Doctor if we were to request you to conduct the same personal interview and
written psychological examination on the part of the wife, [w]ould you be willing
to do that?
WITNESS
A Sure for a fee. I maybe
able to make them reconcile.”[49]
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he
testified to, as these had merely been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions
and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and
unreliable.
Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was
able to assess petitioner’s character, not only through the descriptions given
by respondent, but also through the former’s at least fifteen hours[50]
of study of the voluminous transcript of records of this case. Even if it took
the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to examine the records of this
case, we still find his assessment of petitioner’s psychological state sorely
insufficient and methodologically flawed.
As to respondent’s argument — that because Dr. Gauzon’s
testimony had never been objected to, the objection raised thereafter was
deemed waived — the Supreme Court has already ruled on the matter. It held that although the question of
admissibility of evidence could not be raised for the first time on appeal,
hearsay or unreliable evidence should be disregarded whether objected to or
not, because it has no probative value.[51]
We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical
examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is
enough to establish the incapacity adequately.[52]
Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely
insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity — more so
without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.
The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the
evidence presented by respondent and taken into account the prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter. It could
then have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it was useless to proceed
further with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof. His evidence was obviously, grossly and
clearly insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Withal, it
was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to deny the Demurrer and to violate
or ignore this Court’s rulings in point. Indeed, continuing the process of litigation would have been a total
waste of time and money for the parties and an unwelcome imposition on the
trial court’s docket.
We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise
when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the
law or existing jurisprudence.[53] Any
decision, order or resolution of a lower court tantamount to overruling a
judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably a very grave abuse
of discretion.[54]
There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to be a
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the case at bar. An appeal would not
promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken
Orders maintaining the baseless action of respondent. It would only compel her to go needlessly through a protracted
trial, which would further clog the court dockets with another futile case.[55]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on the alleged psychological incapacity of petitioner
is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and
Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J.,
abroad on official leave.
[1]
Annex “A” of the Petition; rollo, pp.
25-28; penned by Justice Romeo A. Brawner and concurred in by Justices Fermin
A. Martin Jr. (Division chairman) and Andres B. Reyes Jr. (member).
[2]
Annex “C” of the Petition; rollo, p.
39.
[3]
CA Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 27-A.
[4]
Annex “B” of the Petition; rollo, pp.
29-38.
[5]
Complaint dated October 27, 1993; records, pp. 13-21.
[6]
Records, pp. 25-33.
[7]
Id., pp. 239-261.
[8]
Id., pp. 377-389.
[9]
Id., pp. 442-445.
[10]
Order dated December 2, 1998; records, pp. 444-445.
[11]
Records, pp. 446-449.
[12]
Id., p. 461.
[13]
Petition dated June 3, 1999; CA rollo,
pp. 2-22.
[14]
CA Decision, p. 3; rollo, p. 27.
[15]
Ibid.
[16]
Id., pp. 4 & 27-A.
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
The case was deemed submitted for decision on February 12, 2001, upon this
Court’s receipt of the Memorandum for respondent signed by Attys. William N.
Mirano and Gina H. Mirano of Mirano, Mirano & Mirano. Petitioner’s
Memorandum, received on December 29, 2000, was signed by Atty. Joselito T.
Bayatan.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 108-127.
[20]
Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 9; rollo,
p. 116.
[21]
300 SCRA 744, December 29, 1998.
[22]
§1, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[23]
§1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[24]
Ong v. People, 342 SCRA 372, October
9, 2000; Gutib v. CA, 312 SCRA 365,
August 13, 1999.
[25]
303 SCRA 533, 538, February 23, 1999, per Pardo, J.
[26]
Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th
ed. (1990), p. 433.
[27]
Ong v. People, supra; Gutib v. CA, supra.
[28]
Ibid.
[29]
As evidenced by Exhibits “D” to “M” and “FF” to “GG.”
[30]
As evidenced by Exhibits “O” to “P.”
[31]
As evidenced by Exhibits “Q” to “R.”
[32]
As evidenced by Exhibits “HH” to “JJ.”
[33]
Formal Offer of Exhibits, p. 3; records, p. 241.
[34]
TSN, February 28, 1996, p. 10.
[35]
Id., p. 15.
[36]
Id., p. 19.
[37]
240 SCRA 20, January 4, 1995.
[38]
Id., p. 33, per Vitug, J.
[39]
Id., p. 34.
[40]
268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
[41]
Id., pp. 211-212.
[42]
TSN, February 11, 1998, pp. 23-27.
[43]
Id., pp. 41-42.
[44]
Id., p. 46.
[45]
Id., pp. 49-50.
[46]
Id., pp. 62-63.
[47]
Exhibit “MM”; records, pp. 367-370.
[48]
Professional Opinion, p. 4; Exhibit “MM,” records, p. 370.
[49]
TSN, February 11, 1998, pp. 48-49.
[50]
Id., pp. 14-15.
[51]
City Government of Davao v.
Monteverde-Consunji, GR No. 136825, May 21, 2001; People v. Williams, 357 SCRA 124, April 20, 2001; Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. CA, 351
SCRA 445, February 9, 2001.
[52]
Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755,
October 19, 2000.
[53]
Republic v. COCOFED, GR Nos.
147062-64, December 14, 2001; Cuison v.
CA, 289 SCRA 161, April 15, 1998.
[54]
Ibid.
[55]
Emergency Loan Pawnshop, Inc. v. CA,
353 SCRA 89, February 28, 2001; Far East
Bank and Trust Co. v. CA, 341 SCRA 485, September 29, 2000; MB Finance Corp. v. Abesamis, 195 SCRA
592, March 22, 1991.