OSCAR VENTANILLA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT VS. GREGORIO CENTENO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is an action to recover damages claimed to have been suffered by
the plaintiff due to the defendant’s neglect in perfecting within the
reglementary period his appeal from an adverse judgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case No. 18833, attorney’s
fees and costs (civil No. 2063, Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija). After trial, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter to pay the
former the sum of P200 as nominal damages and the costs. The plaintiff
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to this
Court on the ground that only questions of law are raised. The
defendant did not appeal.

The facts, as found by the trial court, are:

In civil case No. 18833 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Oscar Ventanilla vs.
Edilberto Alejandrino and Aida G. Alejandrino, plaintiff retained the
service of Atty. Gregorio Centeno to represent him and prosecute the
case. Civil Case No. 18833 was an action for the recovery of P4,000.00
together with damages. Decision unfavorable to the plaintiff was
received by Atty. Gregorio Centeno on July 21, 1955, and a notice of
appeal was filed by Atty. Centeno on July 25, 1955. On July 30, 1955,
Atty. Centeno wrote to the plaintiff the letter, Exhibit A, enclosing
copies of the decision and that notice of appeal, and stating that he
was not conformable to the decision and had not hesitated to file the
notice of appeal; Plaintiff Oscar Ventanilla after receiving the letter
and copy of the decision went to see Atty. Centeno in his Office in
Manila about August 5, 1955; Atty. Centeno informed him that he
intended to appeal and plaintiff agreed. Plaintiff however, did not
have with Atty. Centeno at that time the amount for the appeal bond.
About the middle of August 1955, Atty. Centeno wrote a letter to the
plaintiff enclosing therein forms for an appeal bond. The plaintiff
Ventanilla, however, instead of executing an appeal bond, and because
of his reluctance to pay the premium on the appeal bond, decided to
file a cash appeal bond of P60.00. He went to the office of Atty.
Centeno at about 4 o’clock on August 18, 1955, but was informed by the
clerk, Leonardo Sanchez, that Atty. Centeno was in Laguna campaigning
for his candidacy as member of the Provincial Board. Plaintiff then
issued the check Exhibit 1, for P60.00 as appeal bond, and delivered
the same to Leonardo Sanchez with instruction to give the same to Atty.
Centeno upon his arrival. The Court does not believe plaintiffs
testimony that Sanchez had contacted Atty. Centeno by telephone and
that he issued the check upon instruction of Atty. Centeno. Leonardo
Sanchez had informed the plaintiff that Atty. Centeno was in Laguna,
and if he were in Manila, Sanchez could not have known the whereabouts
of Atty. Centeno. It was, therefore improbable that he could contact
Atty. Centeno that afternoon. On August 17, Atty. Centeno prepared the
motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal, Exhibit D,
which was filed only on August 20, 1955. Atty. Centeno returned to
Manila and went to his office at about 10 o’clock in the morning of
August 22. He cashed the check, Exhibit 1, with the Marvel Building
Corporation, and then went to the office of the Clerk of Court to file
the appeal bond. According to Atty. Centeno it was not accepted because
the period of appeal had already expired, and that it was only at that
time he came to know that the period of appeal had expired. The Court
does not likewise believe the testimony of Atty. Centeno. Neither the
Clerk of Court, or any of the employees had the right to refuse an
appeal bond that is being filed, for it is not in his power to
determine whether or not the appeal bond has been filed within the time
prescribed by law. In fact the record on appeal was accepted and filed
on September 5, 1955, but no appeal bond has been filed by Atty.
Centeno. The fact that the record on appeal was admitted for filing is
the best evidence that Atty. Centeno had not in fact filed any appeal
bond. The record on appeal was disapproved because it was filed out of
time and no appeal bond had been filed by the plaintiff, (pp. 33-36,
rec. on app.)

The appellant claims that the
trial court erred in not ordering the appellee to pay him actual or
compensatory, moral, temperate or moderate, and exemplary or corrective
damages; in ordering the appellee to pay the appellant only the sum of
P200, and not P2,000 as nominal damages; and in not ordering the
appellee to pay the appellant the sum of P500 as attorney’s fee.

Article 2199 of the new Civil Code provides:

Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as
he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.

He who claims actual or compensatory damages must establish and prove by competent evidence actual pecuniary loss.^[1]
The appellant’s bare allegation that by reason of the appellee’s
indifference, negligence and failure to perfect within the reglementary
period his appeal from an adverse judgment rendered in civil case No.
18833, by not paying the appeal bond of P60, he lost his chance to
recover from the defendants therein the sum of P40,000 and moral and
actual damages, which he could have recovered if the appeal had duly
been perfected, indicates that his claim for actual or compensatory
damages is highly speculative. Hence he is not entitled to such damages.

The appellant claims that he suffered mental anguish upon learning that
his appeal had not been perfected within the reglementary period due to
the appellee’s negligence; serious anxiety upon learning that his
adversary had won by a mere technicality; besmirched reputation for
losing the opportunity to substantiate his claim made while testifying
in open court that he was entitled to collect the sum of P4,000 and
damages from the defendants in civil case No. 18833; and wounded
feelings for the appellee’s failure to remain faithful to his client
and worthy of his trust and confidence. The provisions of the new Civil
Code on moral damages state:

ART. 2217.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred
to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring
the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.

Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.

Moral damages are recoverable only
when physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury are the proximate result of a criminal
offence resulting in physical injuries, quasi-delicts causing physical
injuries, seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts,
adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest,
illegal search, libel, slander or any other form of defamation,
malicious prosecution, disrespect for the dead or wrongful interference
with funerals, violation of specific provisions of the Civil Code on
human relations, and willful injury to property. To this we may add
that where a mishap occurs resulting in the death of a passenger being
transported by a common carrier, the spouse, descendants and ascendants
of the deceased passenger are entitled to demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the passenger’s death.^[2] In Malonzo vs. Galang, supra, this Court categorically stated that—

* * * Art. 2219 specifically mentions “quasi-delicts causing physical
injuries,” as an instance when moral damages may be allowed thereby
implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical
injuries are excluded (Strebel vs. Figueras, 96 Phil., 321)
excepting of course, the special torts referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9,
Art, 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the
chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).^[3]

Since the appellant’s cause of action for recovery of moral damages is
not predicated upon any of those specifically enumerated, the trial
court did not err in declining to award moral damages to him.

Concerning temperate or moderate damages claimed by the appellant,
considering that he is not entitled to actual or compensatory damages
but has been awarded nominal damages by the trial court, such award
precludes the recovery of temperate or moderate damages,^[4] and so the trial court did not err in refusing to award temperate or moderate damages to the appellant.

As regards exemplary or corrective damages also claimed by the
appellant, since it cannot be recovered as a matter of right and the
court will decide whether or not they be adjudicated,^[5] if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner,^[6]
the trial court has judiciously, wisely and correctly exercised its
discretion in not awarding them to the appellant. Relative to the
sufficiency of the sum of P200 as nominal damages awarded by the trial
court to the appellant, article 2221 of the new Civil Code provides:

Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated
or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him.

The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of the case.^[7]
Considering the circumstances, as found by the trial court, and the
degree of negligence committed by the appellee, a lawyer, in not
depositing on time the appeal bond and filing the record on appeal
within the extension period granted by the court, which brought about
the refusal by the trial court to allow the record on appeal, the
amount of P200 awarded by the trial court to the appellant as nominal
damages may seem exiguous. Nevertheless, considering that nominal
damages are not for indemnification of loss suffered but for the
vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded; and that
even if the appeal in civil case No. 18833 had been duly perfected, it
was not an assurance that the appellant would succeed in recovering the
amount he had claimed in his complaint, the amount of P2,000 the
appellant seeks to recover as nominal damages is excessive. After
weighing carefully all the considerations, the amount awarded to the
appellant for nominal damages should not be disturbed.

As
regards attorney’s fees, since the appellant’s claim does not fall
under any of those enumerated in article 2208, new Civil Code, the
appellee may not be compelled to satisfy it.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Malonzo vs. Galang, 109 Phil., 16.

^[2] Necesito vs. Paras, (104 Phil., 75; 56 Off. Gaz., [23] 4023), resolution on motion for reconsideration, 11 September 1958; Fores vs. Miranda, (105 Phil, 266; 57 Off. Gaz., [44] 7938); Rex Taxicab vs. Bautista, 109 Phil., 714.

^[3] See also Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, 108 Phil., 414.

^[4]
In view of the provision of article 2224, new Civil Code, which
provides that “Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than
nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.”

^[5] Article 2233, new Civil Code.

^[6] Article 2232, same Code.

^[7] Article 2216, same Code; Del Castillo vs. Guerrero, 108 Phil., 985.