MAURO PRIETO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ, AND CORFESO LICUDINE, RESPONDENTS.

This case arose from an unlawful detainer suit originally filed by
petitioner Mauro Prieto in the Municipal Court of Manila against the
respondent Corfeso Licudine.

The Municipal Court of Manila after due trial, entered judgment on
June 17, 1954, in favor of petitioner Prieto sentencing the respondent
Licudine to vacate the lot in question, to pay Prieto the sum of
P285.50, representing unpaid rentals, plus a monthly rental of P14.70
until Licudine vacated the premises, and costs. Licudine appealed the
case to the Court of First Instance of Manila. Pending hearing therein,
Prieto moved for the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Court
on the alleged failure of Licudine to file a supersedeas bond and
deposit the monthly payment of P14.70. There was, some dispute in the
Court of First Instance as to whether there was default in the payment
of these amounts, but finally, the court finding that no such payments
had really been made, granted the motion for execution. After the
issuance of the corresponding writ and its service on Licudine and upon
failure of the latter to remove his house from the land within the
period granted by the Sheriff, Prieto filed a motion for the issuance
of a demolition order conformably to Section 13, Rule 89, of the Rules
of Court. This petition, however, was denied by the Court of First
Instance of Manila Judge Hermogenes Concepcion presiding, in its order
of August 9, 1955 of the following tenor:

“ORDER

“The petition filed on August 4, 1955 for demolition
of house of defendant is hereby denied, this case not having been
terminated finally. There might be the possibility for defendant to
win, in which case restoration of the house once demolished would be
difficult if not impossible.

“SO ORDERED.

A motion for reconsideration of this order having been denied,
petitioner Prieto filed a petition for mandamus with this Court (G. R.
No. L-9673), praying that the lower court be ordered to issue the order
of demolition prayed for in accordance with the provisions of Section
13 of Rule 39. In his answer to this petition, Licudine alleged as
special defense that he “need not file a supersedeas bond as he is
depositing his current rentals regularly and without fail within the
first 10 days of each month with the Court of First Instance of Manila;
he is likewise depositing his back rentals regularly and without fail
within the first ten days of each month in accordance with the order of
the Municipal Court of Manila, Branch II, applying the pertinent
provisions of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1162 regarding payment of
arrears in rentals in 18 equal monthly installments”.

On August 21, 1956, this Court, finding the reason given for the denial by the court a quo
of the motion for demolition as stated in its order of August 9, 1955,
above-quoted, untenable, the same was set aside and the case remanded
to the lower court for hearing of the petition for demolition as
provided in Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

After the return of that case to the lower court, no hearing as
ordered was had for sometime because of the retirement of the then
respondent Judge Hermogenes Concepcion, and the delay in the
appointment of his successor.

On December 3, 1957, Prieto renewed his motion for the issuance of
an order of demolition on the same grounds set forth in his original
motion of August 1, 1955. On December 14, 1957, respondent Licudine
filed his opposition thereto alleging that there had been filed in the
meantime in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No.
33385) an expropriation proceeding by the Land Tenure Administration
against petitioner Mauro Prieto covering, among others, the lot in
question and that under the terms of Republic Act No. 1599 which took
effect on June 17, 1956, the ejectment suit against him would have to
be suspended until the final termination of the said expropriation
proceedings.

On December 27, 1957, the court, Judge Juan P. Enriquez presiding, issued the following order:

“ORDER

“Upon consideration of plaintiff’s motion for
demolition dated December 3, 1957 and defendant’s opposition thereto,
and it appearing that the defendant has not filed his supersedeas bond;
and even assuming that the allegation of the said defendant to the
effect that the land is the object of expropriation proceedings to be
true, although no evidence in support thereof has been presented or
offered, it appearing however that he has only deposited as monthly
rental of P14.70 from April 1954 the total sum of P455.70 instead of
P646.80 as required by the decision rendered in this case, the court
finds plaintiff’s motion to be well taken.

“Wherefore, and in
consonance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G R. No. L-9673,
promulgated August 21, 1956, defendant is ordered to remove his house
from the premises within ten (10) days from receipt hereof; otherwise
upon the expiration of the said period defendant’s house shall be
demolished at his expense.

“SO ORDERED.”

On January 8, 1958, respondent Licudine filed a motion for
reconsideration affirming that he had already deposited pursuant to the
decision of the Municipal Court all the rentals due and payable up to
said date except a balance of P215.00 which he asked he be given at
least 15 days within which to deposit, invoking Section 5 of Republic
Act 1599.

On January 27, 1958, the court reconsidered its order of December
27, and granted respondent Licudine time until February 10, 1958,
within which to deposit the said sum of P215.00. On February 6,
Licudine made the deposit.

In the meantime, or on February 1, Prieto in turn filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied on February 12 as follows:

“Considering that the defendant, pursuant to the
order of this Court issued on January 27, 1958, has deposited the sum
of P215.00 on February 6, 1958 under Official Receipt No. 179686 and is
up to date in the payment of the monthly rentals in the sum of P14.70
as adjudged by the lower court, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
dated February 1, 1958 is hereby denied. Defendant is admonished to
deposit with this Court the current rentals of P14.70 a month on or
before the due date, otherwise, the corresponding demolition order will
issue.

“SO ORDERED.”

On February 28, 1958, Prieto filed an urgent motion before this
Court in G. R. No. L-9673 praying that this Tribunal set aside the
order of the lower court of January 27, 1958, granting the respondent
extension of time within which to deposit the balance of P215.00, and
require the lower court to issue the order of demolition. Said urgent
motion was denied by this Court on March 3, 1958.

On March 11, 1958, Prieto again filed a motion for demolition with the trial court, which was denied on March 22, 1958.

On July 25, 1958, another motion for demolition was filed by Prieto
on the same grounds as before insisted by him, and once more the same
was denied by the trial court on August 6, 1958, “it appearing that
defendant is up to date in his payment of the monthly rentals”.
Undaunted, Prieto moved for reconsideration which was likewise denied
by the court on August 20, 1958 in the following reasoned

“ORDER

“The Court has before it a motion for
reconsideration dated August 11, 1958. Section 8 Rule 72, considered
alone would sustain the plaintiff’s stand. However, in allowing the
defendant to bring up-to-date the back rentals, the Court took into
account Republic Act 1162 as amended by Republic Act 1599 and the
pendency of Civil Case No. 33385 for expropriation before Branch XV of
this Court. Indeed if despite defendant’s being up-to-date in the
payment of rentals, his house be demolished, such procedure would
defeat the purpose of Republic Act 1599. While judgment, specially of
high court, should be generally executed, there are well-defined
exceptions to the rule as when such execution would be inequitable in
view of new element that has arisen in the meantime, as here.
Conformably with the above views, this Court as early as January 27,
1958 denied plaintiff’s motion for demolition and gave defendant until
February 10, 1958 to bring up-to-date his rental,—which order has long
become final without any appeal having been taken therefrom by
plaintiff.

“Wherefore, not finding the motion for reconsideration to be well taken, the same is hereby denied.

“SO ORDERED.”

Thereupon, Prieto filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the setting aside of (a)
the order of the lower court of January 27, 1958 giving
defendant-respondent time until February 10, 1958 to deposit the
balance of P215.00; (b) the order of March 22, 1958 denying the motion for the issuance of an order of demolition; (c)
the order dated August 6, 1958 likewise denying the subsequent petition
for a demolition order; and (c) the order of August 20, 1958 denying
his motion for reconsideration, all orders, according to petitioner,
being contrary to the provisions of Section 8, Rule 72, of the Rules of
Court and Section 5 of Republic Act 1162, as amended by Republic Act
1599, as well as to the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-9673 of
August 21, 1956. Petitioner further prays for an order commanding the
respondent Judge or any other judge who may act in his stead, to issue
the demolition order and to condemn the respondent to pay the sum of
P500.00 as attorney’s fees.

From the various pleadings filed by Prieto both in the lower court
and in this Court, it would appear that his theory is predicated on the
proposition that the act of the trial court in granting respondent
Licudine an extension up to February 10, 1958 within which to deposit
the sum of P215.00 representing the unpaid balance on account of the
arrears in rent, is contrary to the provisions of Section 8 of Rule 72
of the Rules of Court and the pertinent decisions to the effect that
such provisions are mandatory and the periods therein provided can not
be extended by the trial court.

Undoubtedly, if this case were an ordinary ejectment proceeding,
unaffected by Republic Act 1162, as amended by Republic Act 1599,
petitioner’s contention must be upheld. However, in view of the
specific provisions of Section 5 of Republic Act 1599, it seems clear
that in this case, as in all cases falling within the scope of this
Act, which both parties invoke, the actuations of the lower court are
duly justified. For a clear understanding of the issue, the law is
quoted hereunder:

“SEC. 5. From the approval of this Act, even before
the commencement of the expropriation herein provided, ejection
proceedings against any tenant or occupant of any landed estates or
haciendas or lands herein authorized to be expropriated, shall be
suspended for a period of two years, upon motion of the defendant, if
he pays his current rentals, and such suspension shall continue upon
the filing of expropriation proceedings until the final determination
of the latter: Provided, however, That if any tenant or
occupant is in arrears in the payment of rentals or any amounts due in
favor of the owners of said landed estates or haciendas or lands, the
amount legally due shall be liquidated and shall be payable in eighteen
equal monthly installments from the time of liquidation, but this
payment of rentals in arrears shall not be a condition precedent to the
suspension of ejectment proceedings: * * *”.

Under the above quoted provisions, from the approval of the Act on
June 17, 1956, and even before the commencement of the expropriation
therein provided, ejectment proceedings against any tenant or occupant
of any land authorized by the law to be expropriated, shall be
suspended for a period of 2 years upon motion of the defendant and such
suspension shall continue, if expropriation proceeding is instituted
within the two-year period, until the final determination thereof and
as long as the defendant pays the current rentals. If, in addition, the
defendant is in arrears in the payment of rentals or any amounts due in
favor of the owner, the same shall be liquidated and be payable in 18
equal monthly installments from the time of liquidation. It is further
provided that the payment of rentals in arrears (not the current
rentals) shall not be a condition precedent to the suspension of the
ejectment proceedings.

In the case before us, it appears that at the time the petition for
demolition was filed on December 3, 1957, after the institution of the
expropriation proceedings, the lower court found the defendant Licudine
in arrears of rent to the amount of P215.00 only. Pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act 1599, the court could, if it saw fit, have
required the defendant Licudine to pay such arrears in 18 equal monthly
installments, but instead of doing so, it ordered defendant to deposit
the total amount on or before February 10, 1958, which is well within
the 18 months authorized by law. It follows, therefore, that the lower
court, in issuing its order of January 27, 1958 giving the defendant
time until February 10, 1958 to deposit the arrears in rent in the
total sum of P215.00, acted within its jurisdiction and in the proper
use of its sound discretion.

The denial of the issuance of a demolition order under the
circumstances of the case, likewise, was legal and proper, in view of
the finding of the court that the defendant Licudine was up-to-date in
the payment of the current monthly rentals in the sum of P14.70 as
adjudged by the Municipal Court. This denial was in consonance with the
provisions of Section 5 of Republic Act 1599, which authorizes
suspension of “the ejectment proceedings, (in the present incident, the
execution of the judgment of the Municipal Court, pending the appeal)
if the defendant pays his current rentals.

Wherefore, there being no reversible error in the orders of the
trial court complained of, the same are hereby affirmed and the present
petition dismissed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Paras, C. J., reserves vote.
Bengzon and Padilla, JJ., took no part.