RIMBERTO T. SALVANERA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LUCITA PARANE, RESPONDENTS.

Salvanera versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is a petition brought by Rimberto Salvanera against the People of the Philippines and Lucita Parane, the widow of the victim Ruben Parane. Salvanera was charged, together with three others, with the murder of Ruben Parane, and the prosecution moved to discharge two of his co-accused, Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix, so that they could testify as state witnesses against him. The case matters because it settles two questions every criminal practitioner must know: how the requirement of substantial corroboration for a proposed state witness is satisfied, and when an accused charged with a capital offense may be granted bail.

Procedural History

Salvanera applied for bail before the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City. The prosecution moved to discharge Abutin and Tampelix as state witnesses. In an Omnibus Order dated September 5, 1997, the trial court granted Salvanera's application for bail and denied the prosecution's motion for discharge. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied, so the prosecution elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, arguing grave abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals sustained the prosecution: it discharged Abutin and Tampelix from the Information to become state witnesses and cancelled Salvanera's bail bond. It denied his motion for reconsideration on September 22, 1999, and likewise denied his motion for clarification on May 11, 2000. Salvanera then brought this appeal to the Supreme Court, which upheld the appellate court.

Facts

On October 23, 1995, in General Trias, Cavite, Ruben Parane was shot and killed. The Information charged Rimberto Salvanera, Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay, and Domingo Tampelix with murder, committed with treachery and evident premeditation, allegedly by conspiring and helping one another while armed with a firearm.

According to the prosecution, Salvanera was the mastermind, Lungcay was the hired hitman, Abutin drove the motorcycle that carried Lungcay to the scene, and Tampelix delivered the blood money. All the accused were arrested and detained except Lungcay, who remained at large. Lucita Parane is the widow of the victim.

On January 22, 1997, Salvanera applied for bail. On March 4, 1997, the prosecution moved to discharge Abutin and Tampelix so they could serve as state witnesses. The trial court granted bail and denied the discharge. The Court of Appeals reversed both rulings, discharging the two accused as state witnesses and cancelling Salvanera's bail bond.

Issues

• Whether or not the requirement of substantial corroboration for the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged as a state witness may be satisfied by the testimony of a co-accused likewise sought to be discharged, and by other prosecution witnesses who are not eyewitnesses to the crime.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in cancelling the bail bond of Salvanera on the ground that the grant of bail was premature.

Applicable Provisions

Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as quoted in the decision, lists the conditions for discharge:

(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense; (2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case; (3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge; (4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and (5) The trial court is satisfied that: a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and, e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

These conditions frame the entire dispute, because Salvanera's appeal turns on how the corroboration requirement in subparagraph c is to be read.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals and rejected Salvanera's theory that the corroboration must come only from prosecution witnesses who are not themselves accused. The Court held that to require the two non-accused witnesses, Parane and Salazar, to corroborate Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same points would render nugatory the other requisite that there be no other direct evidence available except the testimony of the state witness. The corroborative evidence need not consist of the very same evidence to be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. The Court quoted its own doctrine:

a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other respects.

It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or evidence. Here, the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix were corroborated on important points by each other's testimonies and by the circumstances disclosed through the other prosecution witnesses, to such an extent that their trustworthiness became manifest. As part of the conspiracy, they could testify on the criminal plan, and where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because only they have knowledge of the crime. The Court also stressed that the trial court must rely on the information offered by the public prosecutor as to who would best qualify as a state witness, since the decision to grant immunity forms a constituent part of the prosecution process and is addressed to the sound judgment of the prosecution.

On the second issue, the Court affirmed the cancellation of the bail bond. The grant of Salvanera's application for bail was premature. It had to await the testimony of state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix, whose testimonies must be given their proper weight in determining whether Salvanera is entitled to bail.

Doctrine

First, the substantial corroboration required for the discharge of an accused as a state witness need not come from the very same evidence or from non-accused witnesses alone. It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated on material points by some other witness or evidence, including the testimony of a co-accused likewise proposed for discharge. Second, the decision to discharge an accused to become a state witness is essentially a tactical decision lodged in the sound judgment of the prosecution, and the trial court relies on the prosecutor's information as to who would best qualify. Third, in a capital offense, the grant of bail must await the presentation of the evidence of the state witnesses, whose testimonies must be weighed in determining entitlement to bail.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the Decision and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals were affirmed in toto, leaving Abutin and Tampelix discharged as state witnesses and Salvanera's bail bond cancelled.

Remember This

Memorize this line: corroboration of a proposed state witness need only be on material points and may come from a fellow conspirator, for a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of discharge under Section 17 of Rule 119 and the rule that bail in a capital offense must await the testimony of state witnesses.