RHODA REGINA REYES-RARA AND JOSE EMMANUEL RARA, PETITIONERS, VS. BRENDA CHAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. MARCIANO BACALLA, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZO…

Reyes-Rara versus Chan

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by the spouses Rhoda Regina Reyes-Rara and Jose Emmanuel Rara against Brenda Chan, the People of the Philippines, and the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 216. The spouses were charged with estafa and sought to stop their arraignment and the proceedings below, claiming that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion in refusing to wait for the outcome of their motion for reconsideration before the prosecutor and their appeal to the Secretary of Justice. The case matters because it fixes the rule on when a trial court may, and when it must, suspend arraignment pending a petition for review of the prosecutor's finding of probable cause, and it draws the line between the discretionary regime before the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure and the mandatory sixty-day suspension that came after.

Procedural History

Brenda Chan filed an affidavit complaint for estafa against the spouses before the Office of the City Prosecutor. After the spouses repeatedly failed to submit their counter-affidavit, the Assistant City Prosecutor found probable cause and an Information for estafa was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 216, presided over by Judge Marciano Bacalla. The spouses moved to defer arraignment on the ground that their motion for reconsideration of the prosecutor's resolution was pending. The trial court initially granted a deferment, but after the prosecutor denied the motion for reconsideration, the trial court denied the motion to defer and ordered the arraignment, issuing warrants of arrest. The spouses then filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for injunction before the Court of Appeals. The trial court nonetheless proceeded, and the spouses were arrested and arraigned, entering pleas of not guilty. The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, which later lapsed. The Secretary of Justice dismissed the spouses' appeal, and the trial court set the case for trial on the merits. The Court of Appeals then denied the petition for prohibition, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. The spouses elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for review.

Facts

On November 23, 1998, Brenda Chan filed an affidavit complaint for estafa against the spouses Rhoda Regina Reyes-Rara and Jose Emmanuel Rara. At the scheduled hearing before the investigating prosecutor on December 8, 1998, the spouses did not appear. Their counsel manifested that they would submit a counter-affidavit on January 13, 1999, but on that date they again failed to submit one. The parties agreed to reset the hearing for the last time to January 22, 1999, after which the case would be submitted for resolution. The spouses later asked for another resetting because Rhoda had to leave for Tokyo, but the request was denied, and on January 22, 1999 they again failed to appear, so the case was submitted for resolution.

On February 1, 1999, the Assistant City Prosecutor found probable cause against the spouses. On March 23, 1999, an Information for estafa was filed against them. On the same date, Rhoda filed a motion to admit her counter-affidavit with the attached counter-affidavit, while Jose Emmanuel filed none. The spouses then moved for reconsideration of the prosecutor's finding of probable cause. The trial court set the arraignment for June 22, 1999, but on the spouses' motion it was moved to July 27, 1999. On July 2, 1999, the Prosecutor's Office denied the motion for reconsideration, although the spouses received the denial only on August 6, 1999. On July 19, 1999, they filed another motion to defer arraignment based on the pendency of that motion for reconsideration.

On July 27, 1999, the trial court denied the motion to defer and directed the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the spouses. The next day, the trial court lifted the warrants and reinstated the bond, setting the arraignment anew for August 10, 1999. The spouses then filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On August 9, 1999, they appealed the prosecutor's denial to the Department of Justice. On August 10, 1999, their counsel orally moved to defer the arraignment, invoking both the appeal and the petition, but the trial court denied the motion and ordered warrants of arrest. The spouses were arrested and arraigned on August 13, 1999, and entered pleas of not guilty. The Court of Appeals later issued a temporary restraining order, which suspended the proceedings, but the Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on January 3, 2000. With the restraining order lapsed and the appeal dismissed, the trial court set the trial on the merits, and the Court of Appeals denied the petition for prohibition.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial judge gravely abused his discretion in denying the motion to defer the arraignment and to suspend the proceedings.
• Whether or not the trial judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the orders denying the motion to defer arraignment and setting the case for trial on the merits.

Applicable Provisions

Section 11 of Rule 116 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 11. Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases: (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose; (b) There exists a prejudicial question; and (c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

This provision bears on the case because the Court held that it was not yet in effect when the trial judge denied the motion to defer arraignment in 1999, so the suspension of arraignment remained discretionary at that time.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that no grave abuse of discretion was committed. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty. The Court found none. The July 19, 1999 motion to defer was grounded on the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, but the trial court denied it only on July 27, 1999, after the Prosecutor's Office had already denied that motion on July 2, 1999. The trial judge therefore did not act arbitrarily or precipitately, and the arraignment had in fact been deferred until the motion for reconsideration was disposed of. As to the August 10, 1999 oral motion, grounded on the petition for prohibition and the appeal to the Secretary of Justice, the Court noted that the Court of Appeals did not issue a restraining order to suspend the arraignment, so the trial judge could not be faulted for proceeding on August 13, 1999.

The Court also explained that the mandatory suspension now found in Section 11 of Rule 116 was not yet in effect in 1999, when suspension remained discretionary. The cases of Roberts, Jr. versus Court of Appeals and Dimatulac versus Villon, which gave rise to that proviso, did not apply. In Roberts, the Department of Justice had expressly directed the prosecutor to move for suspension, and in Dimatulac the proceedings before the prosecutor were replete with procedural irregularities. Here, there was no directive from the Secretary of Justice, and the spouses were not denied due process because they had ample opportunity to file a counter-affidavit but failed to do so through their own fault. Their arguments were in any event passed upon and rejected in a separate petition, which had become final and executory.

On the second issue, the Court held that no grave abuse of discretion attended the order setting the trial on the merits. At the time it was issued, the restraining order had lapsed and the Secretary of Justice had dismissed the appeal, so no legal obstacle prevented the trial court from proceeding.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain that grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction, exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty. Under the regime before the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the suspension of arraignment pending a petition for review of the prosecutor's resolution was discretionary on the trial judge, depending on the circumstances. The mandatory sixty-day suspension now found in Section 11 of Rule 116 applies only after that provision took effect. A trial judge does not abuse his discretion in proceeding with arraignment where the prosecutor has already resolved the motion for reconsideration, where the appellate court has not issued a restraining order, and where no directive from the Secretary of Justice calls for suspension.

Disposition

The petition was denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed, so the spouses lost and the criminal proceedings were allowed to continue.

Remember This

The one line to memorize is that before the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the suspension of arraignment pending a petition for review of the prosecutor's finding of probable cause was discretionary, not mandatory. Examiners use this case to test grave abuse of discretion and the distinction between the discretionary regime and the sixty-day suspension under Section 11 of Rule 116.