INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW, ENRICO GONZALES AND MA. THERESA MONTEJO, PETITIONERS, VS. INTERPHIL LABORATORIES, INC., AND HONORABLE LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, SECRETA…
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Interphil Laboratories Employees Union versus Interphil Laboratories
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the Interphil Laboratories Employees Union, together with two of its officers, Enrico Gonzales and Ma. Theresa Montejo, against Interphil Laboratories, Incorporated and then Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing. The union asks the Supreme Court to reverse the Court of Appeals, which had dismissed its certiorari petition and sustained the Secretary of Labor's order declaring the union's overtime boycott and work slowdown an illegal strike, dropping seven union officers from the rolls, and finding the union guilty of unfair labor practice. The case matters because it settles two questions every labor lawyer must know: whether the Secretary of Labor may decide an illegal strike case already pending before a labor arbiter, and whether the technical rules of evidence, including the parol evidence rule, bind labor tribunals.
Procedural History
The company first filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Commission to declare the union's overtime boycott and work slowdown an illegal strike. The case was assigned to Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday. Meanwhile, the company sought preventive mediation before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, then asked the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction. The union later filed a notice of strike and staged a strike, and the Secretary issued an assumption order over the dispute. Acting Labor Secretary Jose S. Brillantes then directed Labor Arbiter Caday to continue hearing the illegal strike case and to submit his report and recommendation to the Secretary's office. Labor Arbiter Caday submitted his recommendation, which then Secretary Quisumbing approved and adopted in his order of 13 August 1997. The union's motion for reconsideration was denied. The union went up to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, but the appellate court dismissed the petition in its decision promulgated on 29 December 1999, and denied reconsideration. Hence this petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Facts
The union was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the company's rank-and-file employees. Their collective bargaining agreement ran from 01 August 1990 to 31 July 1993. Beginning in February 1993, union officers repeatedly asked the company's vice president for human resources about the duration of the new agreement. They were told each time that the matter was best discussed during the formal negotiations. On 15 April 1993, at a meeting the union itself requested, its officers asked whether the company would agree to a two-year agreement effective 01 August 1993. The company replied that it was premature to decide.
The very next day, 16 April 1993, all rank-and-file employees refused to follow their regular two-shift schedule of 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. They stopped working at 2:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m., leaving without sealing containers or securing raw materials. When asked why, they said to ask the union officers. At a meeting, union director Enrico Gonzales told management that the employees would return to their normal schedule only if the company agreed to their demands on the effectivity and duration of the new agreement. The boycott continued, and the employees also began a work slowdown that substantially delayed production.
The union submitted its proposal on 14 May 1993. The company filed its illegal strike petition on 03 September 1993. The union filed a notice of strike on 24 January 1994 and staged a strike on 12 February 1994. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and ordered the acceptance of striking workers back to work and the payment of accrued year-end benefits, and declared that all pending cases that were direct offshoots of the dispute were subsumed. The illegal strike case nonetheless continued, and the labor arbiter's recommendation, adopted by the Secretary, declared the boycott and slowdown an illegal strike, dropped the named union officers from employment, and found the union guilty of unfair labor practice for violating the no-strike clause of the existing agreement.
Issues
- Whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment had jurisdiction to rule on the illegal strike case that had long been filed and was pending before the labor arbiter.
- Whether or not the labor arbiter and the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the parol evidence rule when they upheld the company's two-shift work schedule despite the working hours stated in the collective bargaining agreement.
- Whether or not the overtime boycott and work slowdown from 16 April 1993 to 07 March 1994 amounted to an illegal strike.
Applicable Provisions
Article 263, paragraph g, of the Labor Code, as quoted in the decision, provides:
In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly.
This is the source of the Secretary's power to take over the dispute and, as the Court held, to decide all questions arising from it, including the illegal strike case pending before the labor arbiter.
Article 217 of the Labor Code, as quoted in the decision, provides:
Moreover, Article 217 of the Labor Code is not without, but contemplates, exceptions thereto. This is evident from the opening proviso therein reading "(e)xcept as otherwise provided under this Code x x x."
This proviso is the textual basis for reading the labor arbiter's jurisdiction as shared with, and subject to, the Secretary's assumption power.
Section 1 of the collective bargaining agreement on working hours, as quoted in the decision, provides:
Section 1. Regular Working Hours - A normal workday shall consist of not more than eight (8) hours. The regular working hours for the Company shall be from 7:30 A.M. to 4:30 P.M. The schedule of shift work shall be maintained; however the company may change the prevailing work time at its discretion, should such change be necessary in the operations of the Company. All employees shall observe such rules as have been laid down by the company for the purpose of effecting control over working hours.
This clause defeats the union's claim that the eight-hour schedule was immutable, because it expressly allows the company to change working time when operations require it.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court sustained the Secretary's jurisdiction. Although the illegal strike petition was filed long before the assumption order, the issues of overtime boycott and work slowdown were intertwined with the labor dispute before the Secretary. The union itself had asked the labor arbiter to suspend proceedings and consolidate the case with the Secretary's, and when Acting Secretary Brillantes directed the arbiter to continue hearing and then report to the Secretary, the parties participated, thereby affirming the Secretary's jurisdiction. The Court applied its earlier ruling that the authority to assume jurisdiction necessarily extends to all questions and controversies arising from the dispute, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction, and warned that a contrary reading could produce diametrically opposed rulings.
On the second issue, the Court held that the reliance on the parol evidence rule was misplaced. In labor cases, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling, and procedure is not applied in a rigid and technical sense. The labor arbiter was therefore not precluded from accepting evidence other than, and even contrary to, what was stated in the agreement. In any event, the working hours clause itself allowed the company to change the prevailing work time at its discretion when operations required it. The employees had followed the two-shift schedule since 1988 without complaint, and by practice they assented to the arrangement and are deemed to have waived the eight-hour schedule.
On the third issue, the Court held that the boycott and slowdown amounted to an illegal strike. The union admitted that its members, on their own volition, decided not to render overtime. The concerted activity violated the no-strike clause of the existing agreement, and the Court quoted its earlier ruling that such a concerted refusal is illicit because it is contrary to the workers' explicit contractual commitment. The Court described the slowdown as a strike on an installment basis, a willful reduction in the rate of work by concerted action to restrict output in relation to a labor dispute. The factual findings of the labor arbiter, supported by substantial evidence and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, were accorded due respect.
Doctrine
First, when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute under Article 263, paragraph g, of the Labor Code, that authority extends to all questions and controversies arising from the dispute, including an illegal strike case already pending before a labor arbiter. Article 217 opens with the proviso "except as otherwise provided under this Code," which makes the arbiter's jurisdiction shared with the Secretary rather than exclusive.
Second, the technical rules of evidence, including the parol evidence rule, do not strictly bind labor tribunals. A labor arbiter may receive and evaluate evidence other than, and even contrary to, the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
Third, a concerted refusal to render overtime, coupled with a work slowdown, is an illegal strike, a strike on the installment basis, especially where it violates an express no-strike clause in a subsisting collective bargaining agreement. Employees who follow a changed shift schedule without objection are deemed to have waived the original schedule, particularly where the agreement itself authorizes the company to change working time as operations require.
Disposition
The Supreme Court denied the petition and sustained the decision of the Court of Appeals, upholding the Secretary of Labor's order declaring the overtime boycott and work slowdown an illegal strike, dropping the named union officers from employment, and finding the union guilty of unfair labor practice.
Remember This
Memorize this line: the Secretary's power to assume jurisdiction carries with it the power to decide every question arising from the dispute, and the parol evidence rule does not strictly apply in labor cases. Examiners use this case to test the scope of the Secretary's assumption jurisdiction under Article 263, paragraph g, and the treatment of slowdowns and overtime boycotts as illegal strikes.