MANUEL L. FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ELOY B. BELLO, JUDGE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, RESPONDENT.

Petition for certiorari with injunction filed by Atty. Manuel L.
Fernandez to annul two orders dated June 16 and July 29, 1958, of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Hon. Eloy B. Bello, presiding.
The first order reprimands petitioner for his improper conduct as
counsel in Special Proceedings No. 3931, entitled “Guardianship of the
Minors Federico and Pedro both surnamed Perreyras, Timotea Perreyras,
petitioner-guardian,” orders him to return to the guardian within 15
days the sum of P200.00 collected by him, and causes a copy of the
order to be sent to the Supreme Court for corresponding disciplinary
action on the petitioner (Annex J). The second order denies
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and warns him not to use
improper terms in his pleadings. (Annex L.)

The circumstances leading to the issuance of the above orders may be
briefly stated as follows: Timotea Perreyras, through Atty. Manuel L.
Fernandez as her counsel, instituted Special Proceedings No. 3931, for
her appointment as guardian over the persons and properties of her
brothers, the minors Federico and Pedro Perreyras. Upon her appointment
and upon her qualifying as such, she petitioned the court for authority
to sell a nipa land owned in common with the wards for the purpose of
paying outstanding obligations to Maximiano Umangay. The request was
granted by Judge Villamor, and on August 24, 1951, a deed of sale,
prepared and notarized by Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, was executed by
the guardian in favor of Maximiano Umangay for the sum of P1,000. This
sale was approved by Judge Pasicolan on December 17, 1952 (Annex C).

The nipa land sold by the guardian had previously been sold with
right to repurchase to Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umangay by
Florentino Perreyras, father (now deceased) of the guardian and the
wards. The interest in the land of Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano
Umangay were, in turn, sold for P200.00 to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez.
Of the purchase price of P1,000, P200.00 was paid to Atty. Manuel L.
Fernandez, redemption price of the nipa land and as assignee of the
credit in favor of Maximiano Umangay and Ricardo Perreyras. The other
P200.00 was given to said attorney, in payment of his legal fees for
services rendered by him as counsel of the father of the wards in a
civil case. However, the record does not show that these payments were
authorized by the court.

On January 21, 1958, Judge Eloy Bello, who took over the court from
Judge Pasicolan, issued an order requiring Timotea Perreyras to show
cause why she should not be punished for contempt for failing to
account for the property and money of the wards. After hearing’ the
guardian Timotea Perreyras, the court issued another order dated
January 20, 1958, exonerating her of the contempt charges, disapproving
all payments made by her, including that made to Atty. Manuel L.
Fernandez, and requiring Attys. Manuel L. Fernandez and Braulio
Fernandez to show cause why they should not be suspended from the
practice of law and declared in contempt of court. In the same order,
the court charged said attorneys of having abused their relationship
with the guardian and having taken money from her without previous
approval of the court (Annex D). Atty. Braulio Fernandez submitted a
written explanation, and the court, considering it satisfactory,
exonerated him of the preferred charges. On January 30, 1958, the court
again issued another order directing Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez to
submit in ten days a written answer to the charges stated in the order
of January 27, 1958 (Annex G). On February 1, 1958, he submitted an
explanation (Annex H.), admitting receipt of the sum of P400.00 from
the guardian, but alleging that when he received the amount he was no
longer the attorney of the guardian as their relation had terminated
when the guardian secured the services of Atty. Braulio Fernandez; that
he acted in good faith and the guardianship proceedings were instituted
by him only to help the minors the action being less expensive than ah
intestate proceeding, and that he was paid only P50.00 for his services
to the guardian. So he asked that the charges be dismissed and that the
guardian be warned not to make unjustifiable complaints against him.

On February 10, 1953, Timotea Perreyras and Maximiano Umangay were
summoned to appear for further examination on the proceeds of the sale
of the nipa land. After hearing their testimonies, the court on June
16, 1958, found Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez guilty of contempt of court
because he had taken the amount of P100.00 from the proceeds of the
sale without previous approval from the court. The court also found the
conduct of counsel to be anomalous for the reason that he instituted
the guardianship proceedings only to enable him to collect unpaid
attorney’s fees due him from the father of the wards (Annex J). This is
the first order sought to be annulled in this appeal. The second order
is that denying the motion for reconsideration of respondent attorney.

It is claimed by petitioner in this appeal that the proceedings
conducted in the court below are irregular because no formal charge was
filed against him. There is no merit in this contention. The court motu proprio
preferred the charges in its order dated January 20, 1958, and in
another order dated January 27, 1958, the petitioner was duly advised
thereof and was given an opportunity to file a written answer thereto.
It has been held in the following case that there has been sufficient
compliance with the requirements of law:

“The institution of charges by the prosecuting
officer is not necessary to hold person guilty of civil or criminal
contempt amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the
law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court
and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or
counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by
a private person. The above requirements were complied with by the
filing of the order of September 30, and the giving of full opportunity
to the respondent to appear and defend himself. The contention that a
formal information filed by a prosecuting officer is necessary to begin
proceedings must be overruled.” (People vs. E. M. Venturanza, et al., Defendants, Jose Y. Torres, appellant, 98 Phil., 211; 52 Off. Gaz. [2] 769.)

The court below found petitioner guilty of contempt of court on two
grounds, the first is that he instituted the guardianship proceedings
for the sole purpose of facilitating payment to him of the debts of the
wards. The facts do not, however, bear out this finding. Before the
guardianship proceedings were instituted, the wards were indebted in
the sum of P200.00 to Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umangay, and as
the wards had no money with which to pay the debt, the only way to
settle it is by selling the nipa land. But the land could not have been
sold by the minors without intervention of a guardian. So the
petitioner must have believed that guardianship proceedings was the
proper remedy. The judges of the court below, from whom Judge Bello
took over, must have been satisfied that the procedure taken by the
petitioner was more beneficial to the wards when they appointed a
guardian and approved the sale of the land. As there is no evidence of
bad faith on the part of petitioner, the finding on this point of the
court below should be reversed.

However, the finding of the court that the purchase price of the land is P1,000 was in custodia legis
and could not be taken and used in payment of debts without its
previous authority is correct. As a lawyer the petitioner is charged
with the knowledge that the property and effects of the wards are under
the control and supervision, of the court, and that they could not be
taken and expended without the latter’s permission, more especially so
when the money taken was to pay the debt of the father of the wards.
The reprimand is, therefore, fully justified. But the order for the
refund of the P200.00 and the closing of the guardianship proceedings
after such return, would deprive petitioner of the fees that he was
entitled to receive from the father of the guardian and the wards, for
services rendered in a civil case, which services are admitted to have
been due from their father. While the reprimand is in order for
petitioner’s mistake, the mistake is no sufficient ground for the
non-payment of the fees he lawfully earned and which his client could
not pay before his death. The duty of courts is not alone to see that
lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is also their duty to see
that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Certainly the court
can not deny them that right; there is no law that authorizes them to
do so.

In his answer before this Court respondent judge justifies his order
for the return of the P200.00 on the ground that petitioner is “below
average standard of a lawyer.” The opinion of a judge as to the
capacity of a lawyer is not the basis of the right to a lawyer’s fee.
It is the contract between the lawyer and client and the nature of the
services rendered. Petitioner claims that he won a civil case for his
client, the deceased father of the guardian and the wards. That P200.00
is the amount of the fee of petitioner is admitted by the guardian. We
find that the court’s order directing petitioner to return the P200.00,
and in effect denying him the right to collect the same, is not
justified, to say the least. This portion of the final order is hereby
modified in the sense that the return of the P200.00 is without
prejudice to petitioner’s right to demand payment for the services
rendered the deceased out of the proceeds oi the property left by him
(deceased).

In this Court the judge below desires that portions of petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration be stricken out for employing strong
language. We believe the said strong language must have been impelled
by the same language used by the judge below in characterizing the act
of the petitioner as “anomalous and unbecoming” and in charging
petitioner of obtaining his fee “through maneuvers of documents from
the guardian-petitioner.” If any one is to blame for the language used
by the petitioner, it is the judge himself who has made insulting
remarks in his orders, which must have provoked petitioner, and the
judge below has nothing to blame but himself. If a judge desires not to
be insulted he should start using temperate language himself; he who
sows the wind will reap a storm.

Wherefore, the orders are modified as above indicated. Without costs.

Paras, C. J., Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., reserves his vote.