NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. JUAN ARALAR, ET AL. AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

The National Development Company, later referred to as the Company,
through certiorari, is appealing the decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR), dated June 28, 1958, granting the petition
of Juan Aralar and 69 others, dated April 22, 1957, in Case No. 1059-V,
asking for the execution of the decision of the CIR in Case No. 129-V,
dated November 5, 1948, the dispositive part of the latter decision
reading as follows:

“In view of the
foregoing consideration respondent is hereby ordered to grant a minimum
wage of P5.00 a day to its male laborer and P4.00 a day to its female
laborer and P4.50 a day to male apprentice and helper and P3.50 a day
for female apprentice or helper. However, in case a female laborer
performs the same work done by a male laborer, the former should be
accorded the rate of wage of the latter. Apprentices should not exceed
20% of the total number of employees and laborers in the establishment.
All employees receiving a monthly salary not more than P300.00 and
laborers receiving P5.00 a day and above are granted 10% increase each.
Consequently, respondent’s petition to reduce its operators and
employees is hereby denied. The increase granted shall take effect from
March 15, 1958.” (Annex A).

Juan Aralar and
69 others through counsel, filed a petition with the CIR on April 22,
1957, alleging that under the decision of November 5, 1948 in Case No.
129-V the dispositive part of which has been reproduced, they were
entitled to be paid the equivalent of 10% of their salary as increase.
The National Development Company (NDC), now appellant-petitioner, filed
a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the subject matter
thereof was the recovery of a sum of money and, therefore, not
cognizable by the CIR under the provisions of Republic Act No. 875. On
May 29, 1957, the NDC filed a supplement to the motions to dismiss,
claiming that the petition stated no cause of action and that the CIR
had not acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner NDC because under
Section 4, Commonwealth Act 103, there should at least be 31 signing
the petition; furthermore, conformably to Section 17 of said
Commonwealth Act 103, a notice to terminate the award or decision
relied upon in said Case No. 129-V had already been filed.
Consequently, it is said the award may no longer be enforced in the
present case. Respondents herein answered the motion, alleging that the
CIR had jurisdiction for the reason that the petition was merely for
the execution of the decision of the CIR. The motion to dismiss was
denied and the NDC was required to file its answer. So it did.

Among the allegations contained in the answer is one to the effect that
the petition stated no cause of action because the award or decision
had ceased to be effective, a notice to terminate the same having been
filed on May 27, 1957; also that there was no showing that petitioners,
respondents herein, were members of the National Textile Workers Union
and were employed at the textile mills of the NDC, and it was not shown
that the claimants were within the purview of the award, it being a
fact that some of them were not yet or were no longer in the service of
the NDC on November 5, 1948 when the said award was made. After
hearing, a decision was rendered granting the petition, as follows:

“With these dissertations made, this Court hereby grants the petition as prayed for.

“In
order to determine the proper amount due the petitioners herein, the
Court Examiner or his representative is directed to render a report
covering the 10% increase with respect to those employees who are
earning not more than P300.00 and for laborers who are receiving P5.00
a day or more, who are employed by the respondent Company in the whole
employer unit. With respect to those petitioners who died, laid-off, or
dismissed after March 15, 1948, proper computation should also be
included for the final disposition of this case.

“Wherefore,
subject to the report of the Court Examiner aforementioned and the
approval of this Court, the final disposition of this case is held in
abeyance. Meanwhile, the Court Examiner is required to prepare his
report within sixty (60) days from receipt of this order.”

The motion by the Company for reconsideration was denied by the CIR en banc.

We agree with the CIR that the present petition is not an action
independent of Case No. 129-V; it merely asks for the execution of the
award given in that case. That being the case, it is not necessary to
establish the elements required to confer jurisdiction on the CIR, such
as, that the petition involves a labor dispute causing or likely to
cause a strike and that the petition should be signed by at least 31
claimants instead of being signed and verified by Atty. Guevarra alone.

We also agree with the CIR that a mere notice filed by the company to
terminate the effectivity of the award made in 1948 is not sufficient
to stop or bar said effectivity. Something more than a mere notice to
terminate is necessary. A hearing should be held before the CIR which
may then decide whether or not the terms of the award may continue to
be enforced, on the basis of conditions now prevailing. For instance,
if at the time of the award the company was making sufficient profits
so as to justify the award, say, in the form of increase in salaries
and wages, etc., but now or at the time of the notice of termination,
the company was no longer making profits but on the contrary was
suffering losses, then the CIR may order that the increase in the wages
should be stopped.

In the case of National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, 107 Phil., 79; 57 Off. Gaz. (19)3517,
through Mr. Justice Felix Bautista Angelo, we said that although under
Section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 as amended, a notice to
terminate the effectivity of an award is allowed still when the award
was made as a result of a controversy between the management and labor,
it is naturally binding upon both parties and it is but logical that
its effectivity may not be terminated ex parte unless the
period of its duration is specified in the award; that when the award
is made in favor of the employee, it is but fair and just that he be
heard before his right thereto is terminated. That is why the law
requires that notice to terminate be given to the court (CIR) so as to
give the latter the right to intervene. We therefore hold that notice
to terminate the effectivity of an award which does not fix the period
of duration is not sufficient but that it is necessary that a hearing
be held so that the CIR may act upon said notice favorably or otherwise.

As already stated, respondent company claims that of the 70
petitioners, only about 21 are still in its service, the others having
long ago died, resigned, laid off or been separated from the service of
the company. Let us assume this to be correct. Would the CIR have
jurisdiction over the claims filed by or on behalf of those 49
employees and laborers who no longer are in the company’s service,
although they may be or would have been benefited by the award?

If the petition for enforcement of the award made in 1948 is in fact
but a mere money claim, as contended and urged by respondent company,
then the CIR would have no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the
same. The reason is that treating of claims for overtime, underpayment,
wage differential, etc. which were considered money claim, we have in
the past uniformly held that for those employees and laborers who are
still in the employ of the company or who have been illegally dismissed
but seek reinstatement, they may prosecute these claims before the CIR,
the reason being that their claim for payment or reinstatement may be
considered a labor dispute and may lead to a strike or disturbance in
industrial peace. However, when a money claim is filed by or on behalf
of laborers and employees no longer in the service of the company, and
neither seeking reinstatement, then said claim should be prosecuted
before the competent courts and not before the CIR. In the case of
Price Stabilization Corporation (PRISCO) vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra, p. 134, through Mr. Justice Barrera, we held that in a number of cases, such as, PAFLU vs. Tan, 99 Phil., 854; 52 Off. Gaz., 5845; Aguilar vs. Salumbides, L-10124, December 28, 1957; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Quiamson, L-12341, and Elizalde & Co. vs. Quiamson, L-12345, jointly decided on April 30, 1958, Chua Workers Union vs.
City Automotive, L-11625, April 29, 1959, that claims for overtime,
underpayment, wage differential, separation pay, etc., which constitute
money claims filed by ex-employees of the company, fall under the
jurisdiction of competent courts and not under the CIR for the reason
that the relation of employer and employee has already ceased; that
only when an ex-employee making such a money claim seeks reinstatement
may the CIR exercise jurisdiction, for the reason that the claim for
reinstatement may involve unfair labor practice.

However, we
believe that the petition for enforcement of an award is not a mere
money claim, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, as heretofore
discussed. For jurisdictional purposes, we consider a money claim by a
worker or laborer, whether still in or already outside the service of
the company, to be a demand for payment of a sum of money in the form
of overtime, underpayment, work on Sundays and holidays, etc., which
still has to be prosecuted before a court and established by competent
evidence, which would still necessitate a decision or award. But in the
present case, however, the petition is merely for an enforcement or
implementation of a decision or award already rendered, final and
executory. Consequently, we hold that the CIR has jurisdiction over the
said issue, one of the reasons being that there is no better court or
judicial entity to enforce and implement a decision or award than the
court that as a result of a hearing and other proceedings, rendered it.^[1]

Another point involved in this case is the scope of or the extension of
the benefits of the award. The industrial Court in its decision now
under review holds that under the theory of interdepartmental
functions, the award is extensive and applicable to all departments of
the respondent company. In reviewing the decision in Case No. 129-V
under which the award in question was made, we notice that the demands
therein made were for increase of salary for employees and laborers in
the textile mills of the company. As a matter of fact, the CIR made an
ocular inspection of said textile mills for the purpose of determining
the work of the employees and laborers in said textile mills, the
importance, difficulty, etc., of said work. As a matter of fact, the
decision refers to mill operation, price of textiles produced from its
operation of the said mills, the gin section, the ticker section, the
drawing section, the living room section, the spinning department,
etc., giving one to understand that the petition or demand for increase
in wages as well as the issue involved in that case was confined to the
textile mill workers. The respondent company is engaged in various
enterprises besides the production of textiles. The decision in that
case No. 129-V granting the award now on appeal, on page 16 thereof in
referring to the respondent company, says that this corporation was
created by Commonwealth Act No. 122 among other things, to engage in
commercial, mining, industrial and agricultural and other enterprises
which may be necessary or contributory to the economic development of
the country or important to the public interest. Surely, an award which
is based on a petition for the increase of the wages of the employees
and laborers working in the textile mills where the evidence was
confined to said textile mills, cannot be made extensive and applicable
indiscriminately to laborers and employees working in other departments
such as mining, commercial, agricultural, assuming that the Company is
actually engaged in the same, where conditions of work are or may be
radically different. However, taking a liberal view of the question and
considering the same from the standpoint of labor, we are willing to
relax the rule and we hold that the benefits of the award may be
extended to the workers and laborers in other departments of the
Company where the conditions are similar or more or less the same and
where the employees and laborers deserve the benefits. This is a
complement of our ruling in other labor cases to the effect that the
CIR is authorized to extend the benefits of an award even to workers
and employees who were not parties to the case, and who were not
members of the labor union that prosecuted the case and won the award,
because it is to be presumed that other workers are also interested in
any increase in salary and other benefits, for otherwise, failure or
refusal to do so would constitute unjust and unwarranted discrimination
which is not permitted by the law (Price Stabilization Corporation vs. PRISCO Workers Union, G. R. No. L-9288, December 29, 1958; Land Settlement and Development Corporation vs.
Caledonia Pile Workers Union, 90 Phil., 817); but that the extension of
the benefits of an award may be extended only to laborers and employees
who are similarly situated and more or less of the same category.

But there is a more important question to be determined in the present
case, namely, whether or not the award made in 1948 may still be
enforced today or even on the date the petition for its enforcement was
filed, namely, April 22, 1957. It will be recalled that the award was
made on November 5, 1948. More than five years have passed since then.
May said award still be enforced despite that more than five years had
elapsed, under the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court?

Section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, creating the
Court of Industrial Relations, defining its jurisdiction and outlining
its work, provides as follows:

“Sec. 23.
Civil liability.—Noncompliance with any of the terms of the agreement
of the parties as provided for in this Act, or of the award, order or
decision, after it has become final, conclusive and executory, may
subject the offending party to liability for damages to be recovered in
an ordinary civil action.”

This was amended by Section 6, Commonwealth Act No. 559, so as to read thus:

“Sec. 23. Civil liability.—In
case of noncompliance with any award, order, or decision of the Court
of Industrial Relations after it has become final, conclusive, and
executory, the judgment may be enforced by a writ of execution or any
other remedy provided by law in respect to enforcement and execution of
orders, decisions, or judgments of the Courts of First Instance.”

Under the amendment, if a final judgment or award of the CIR is to be
enforced by writ of execution or any other remedy provided by law in
the same way that orders and judgments of Courts of First Instance are
enforced, then the legal provisions to the effect that decisions may be
enforced only within five years from the date, of entry, are applicable
to decisions or awards of the Industrial Court. Consequently, it is
necessary to make distinctions. If the award made in 1948 has never
been executed as regards all the petitioners, then the present petition
should and must be denied. A new action or proceeding would be
necessary to enforce the award. However, if the 1948 award has
heretofore been executed or enforced as to some or all of the
petitioners and from the date of the last enforcement up to the date of
the present petition, not more than five years have elapsed, then the
present petition may be granted as to those petitioners not covered by
the prohibition of Section 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court.

If in
spite of this holding and ruling, we have made some observations or
comments on other points involved in the present appeal, the same are
intended as an attempt at explaining and clarifying the jurisdiction of
the CIR, for its guidance and that of the management and the laborers
and employees when occasion arises to enforce their right’s or seek
redress before the Court of Industrial Relations.

In view of
the foregoing, the appealed decision in so far as it grants the
petition dated April 22, 1957, which petition asks that the Company be
directed to pay petitioners the equivalent of 10% increase in their
salary as of November 5, 1948, is affirmed. It should be understood,
however, that as already stated, the award by the Court of Industrial
Relations in Case No. 129-V, dated November 5, 1948 was in favor of the
laborers and employees in the textile mills of the Company. The
benefits of this award may be extended only to laborers and employees
of other departments of the Company who are similarly situated and of
the same category. Further, that our confirmation of the appealed
decision is with the understanding and under the condition that the
award sought to be implemented is still enforceable as to any or all of
the petitioners, that is to say, that not more than five years have
elapsed since the last execution of the award and the date of the
present petition. The case is hereby remanded to the Court of
Industrial Relations for further proceedings as to the determination of
the amounts of increase involved in the implementation of its decision
and, of course, in accordance with the ruling and condition set in our
decision. No costs.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Court of Industrial Relations and Francisco Zamora, G. R. No. L-13447. February 17, 1958.