G.R. No. 142244. November 18, 2002
ATLAS FARMS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JAIME O. DELA PEÑA AND MARCIAL I. ABION, RESPONDENTS.
QUISUMBING, J.:
January 10, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52780, dismissing
its petition for certiorari against the NLRC, as well as the resolution[2]
dated February 24, 2000, denying its motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case, as found by the Court of
Appeals,[3]
are as follows:
Private respondent Jaime O. dela Peña was employed as a
veterinary aide by petitioner in December 1975. He was among several employees terminated in July 1989. On July 8, 1989, he was re-hired by
petitioner and given the additional job of feedmill operator. He was instructed to train selected workers
to operate the feedmill.
On March 13, 1993,[4] Peña
was allegedly caught urinating and defecating on company premises not intended
for the purpose. The farm manager of
petitioner issued a formal notice directing him to explain within 24 hours why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for violating company rules
and regulations. Peña refused, however,
to receive the formal notice. He never
bothered to explain, either verbally or in writing, according to
petitioner. Thus, on March 20, 1993, a
notice of termination with payment of his monetary benefits was sent to
him. He duly acknowledged receipt of
his separation pay of P13,918.67.
From the start of his employment on July 8, 1989, until his
termination on March 20, 1993, Peña had worked for seven days a week, including
holidays, without overtime, holiday, rest day pay and service incentive
leave. At the time of his dismissal
from employment, he was receiving P180 pesos daily wage, or an average
monthly salary of P5,402.
Co-respondent Marcial I. Abion[5] was a
carpenter/mason and a maintenance man whose employment by petitioner commenced
on October 8, 1990. Allegedly, he
caused the clogging of the fishpond drainage resulting in damages worth several
hundred thousand pesos when he improperly disposed of the cut grass and other
waste materials into the pond’s drainage system. Petitioner sent a written notice to Abion, requiring him to
explain what happened, otherwise, disciplinary action would be taken against
him. He refused to receive the notice
and give an explanation, according to petitioner. Consequently, the company terminated his services on October 27,
1992. He acknowledged receipt of a
written notice of dismissal, with his separation pay.
Like Peña, Abion worked seven days a week, including holidays,
without holiday pay, rest day pay, service incentive leave pay and night shift
differential pay. When terminated on
October 27, 1992, Abion was receiving a monthly salary of P4,500.
Peña and Abion filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal
that were later consolidated. Both
claimed that their termination from service was due to petitioner’s suspicion
that they were the leaders in a plan to form a union to compete and replace the
existing management-dominated union.
On November 9, 1993, the labor arbiter dismissed their complaints
on the ground that the grievance machinery in the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) had not yet been exhausted. Private respondents availed of the grievance process, but later on
refiled the case before the NLRC in Region IV. They alleged “lack of sympathy” on petitioner’s part to engage in
conciliation proceedings.
Their cases were consolidated in the NLRC. At the initial mandatory conference,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
alleging private respondents themselves admitted that they were members of the
employees’ union with which petitioner had an existing CBA. This being the case, according to
petitioner, jurisdiction over the case belonged to the grievance machinery and
thereafter the voluntary arbitrator, as provided in the CBA.
In a decision dated January 30, 1996, the labor arbiter dismissed
the complaint for lack of merit, finding that the case was one of illegal
dismissal and did not involve the interpretation or implementation of any CBA
provision. He stated that Article 217
(c) of the Labor Code[6] was
inapplicable to the case. Further, the labor arbiter found that although both
complainants did not substantiate their claims of illegal dismissal, there was
proof that private respondents voluntarily accepted their separation pay and
petitioner’s financial assistance.
Thus, private respondents brought the case to the NLRC, which
reversed the labor arbiter’s decision. Dissatisfied with the NLRC ruling, petitioner went to the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65, seeking
reinstatement of the labor arbiter’s decision. The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC resolution
with some modifications, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The resolution in NLRC CA No. 010520-96 is AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:1) The private respondents can not be reinstated, due to their
acceptance of the separation pay offered by the petitioner;2) The private respondents are entitled to their full back wages;
and,3) The amount of the separation pay received by private respondents
from petitioner shall not be deducted from their full back wages.Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioner forthwith filed its motion for reconsideration, which
was denied in a resolution dated February 24, 2000, which reads:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner[s]
which drew an opposition from private respondents, the Court resolved to DENY
the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, as the issues raised therein have
been passed upon by the Court in its questioned decision and no substantial
arguments were presented to warrant its reversal, let alone modification.SO ORDERED.[8]
In this petition now before us, petitioner alleges that the
appellate court erred in:
I. … DENYING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND IN EFFECT AFFIRMING THE
RULINGS OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE
ILLEGALLY DISMISSED;
II. … RULING THAT THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAY AND FULL BACKWAGES;
III. … RULING THAT
PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR COSTS OF SUIT.[9]
Petitioner contends that the dismissal of private respondents was
for a just and valid cause, pursuant to the provisions of the company’s rules
and regulations. It also alleges lack of jurisdiction on the part of the labor
arbiter, claiming that the cases should have been resolved through the
grievance machinery, and eventually referred to voluntary arbitration, as
prescribed in the CBA.
For their part, private respondents contend that they were
illegally dismissed from employment because management discovered that they
intended to form another union, and because they were vocal in asserting their
rights. In any case, according to
private respondents, the petition involves factual issues that cannot be
properly raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court.[10]
In fine, there are three issues to be resolved: 1) whether private
respondents were legally and validly dismissed; 2) whether the labor arbiter
and the NLRC had jurisdiction to decide complaints for illegal dismissal; and
3) whether petitioner is liable for costs of the suit.
The first issue primarily involves questions of fact, which can
serve as basis for the conclusion that private respondents were legally and
validly dismissed. The burden of
proving that the dismissal of private respondents was legal and valid falls
upon petitioner. The NLRC found that
petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that both private respondents
committed certain acts that violated company rules and regulations,[11]
hence we find no factual basis to say that private respondents’ dismissal was
in order. We see no compelling reason
to deviate from the NLRC ruling that their dismissal was illegal, absent a
showing that it reached its conclusion arbitrarily.[12]
Moreover, factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are
accorded not only respect but even finality, aside from the consideration here
that this Court is not a trier of facts.[13]
Anent the second issue, Article 217 of the Labor Code provides
that labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination
disputes. A possible exception is
provided in Article 261 of the Labor Code, which provides that-
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement
of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding
article. Accordingly, violations of a
Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character,
shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as
grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and or malicious refusal to comply
with the economic provisions of such agreement.The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of
the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances
or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and
refer the same to the grievance Machinery or Arbitration provided in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
But as held in Vivero vs. CA,[14]
“petitioner cannot arrogate into the powers of Voluntary Arbitrators the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters over unfair labor
practices, termination disputes, and claims for damages, in the absence of
an express agreement between the parties in order for Article 262 of the
Labor Code [Jurisdiction over other labor disputes] to apply in the case at
bar.”
Moreover, per Justice Bellosillo:
It may be observed that under Policy Instruction No. 56 of the
Secretary of Labor, dated 6 April 1993, “Clarifying the Jurisdiction Between
Voluntary Arbitrators and Labor Arbiters Over Termination Cases and Providing
Guidelines for the Referral of Said Cases Originally Filed with the NLRC to the
NCMB,” termination cases arising in or resulting from the interpretation and
implementation of collective bargaining agreements and interpretation and
enforcement of company personnel policies which were initially processed at the
various steps of the plant-level Grievance Procedures under the parties’
collective bargaining agreements fall within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator pursuant to Art. 217 (c) and Art. 261
of the Labor Code; and, if filed before the Labor Arbiter, these cases shall be
dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for lack of jurisdiction and referred to the
concerned NCMB Regional Branch for appropriate action towards an expeditious
selection by the parties of a Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Arbitrators based
on the procedures agreed upon in the CBA.As earlier stated, the instant case is a termination dispute
falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, and
does not specifically involve the application, implementation or enforcement of
company personnel policies contemplated in Policy Instruction No. 56. Consequently, Policy Instruction No. 56 does
not apply in the case at bar.[15] x x
x
Records show, however, that private respondents sought without
success to avail of the grievance procedure in their CBA.[16]
On this point, petitioner maintains that by so doing, private respondents
recognized that their cases still fell under the grievance machinery. According
to petitioner, without having exhausted said machinery, the private respondents
filed their action before the NLRC, in a clear act of forum-shopping.[17]
However, it is worth pointing out that private respondents went to the NLRC
only after the labor arbiter dismissed their original complaint for illegal
dismissal. Under these circumstances
private respondents had to find another avenue for redress. We agree with the NLRC that it was
petitioner who failed to show proof that it took steps to convene the grievance
machinery after the labor arbiter first dismissed the complaints for illegal
dismissal and directed the parties to avail of the grievance procedure under
Article VII of the existing CBA. They
could not now be faulted for attempting to find an impartial forum, after
petitioner failed to listen to them and after the intercession of the labor
arbiter proved futile. The NLRC had
aptly concluded in part that private respondents had already exhausted the
remedies under the grievance procedure.[18] It
erred only in finding that their cause of action was ripe for arbitration.
In the case of Maneja vs. NLRC,[19]
we held that the dismissal case does not fall within the phrase “grievances
arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining
agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies.” In Maneja,
the hotel employee was dismissed without hearing. We ruled that her dismissal was unjustified, and her right to due
process was violated, absent the twin requirements of notice and hearing. We also held that the labor arbiter had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the termination case, and that it was
error to give the voluntary arbitrator jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal
case.
In Vivero vs. CA,[20] private respondents attempted to
justify the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator over a termination dispute
alleging that the issue involved the interpretation and implementation of the
grievance procedure in the CBA. There,
we held that since what was challenged was the legality of the employee’s
dismissal for lack of cause and lack of due process, the case was primarily a
termination dispute. The issue of whether there was proper interpretation and
implementation of the CBA provisions came into play only because the grievance
procedure in the CBA was not observed, after he sought his union’s
assistance. Since the real issue then
was whether there was a valid termination, there was no reason to invoke the need
to interpret nor question an implementation of any CBA provision.
One significant fact in the present petition also needs
stressing. Pursuant to Article 260[21]
of the Labor Code, the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their
respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is
unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to the voluntary
arbitrators designated in advance by the parties to a CBA. Consequently only disputes involving the
union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary
arbitrators. In these termination cases of private respondents, the union had
no participation, it having failed to object to the dismissal of the employees
concerned by the petitioner. It is
obvious that arbitration without the union’s active participation on behalf of
the dismissed employees would be pointless, or even prejudicial to their cause.
Coming to the merits of the petition, the NLRC found that
petitioner did not comply with the requirements of a valid dismissal. For a
dismissal to be valid, the employer must show that: (1) the employee was
accorded due process, and (2) the dismissal must be for any of the valid causes
provided for by law.[22] No
evidence was shown that private respondents refused, as alleged, to receive the
notices requiring them to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them. Without proof of notice,
private respondents who were subsequently dismissed without hearing were also
deprived of a chance to air their side at the level of the grievance
machinery. Given the fact of dismissal,
it can be said that the cases were effectively removed from the jurisdiction of
the voluntary arbitrator, thus placing them within the jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter. Where the dispute is
just in the interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage, it may be
referred to the grievance machinery set up in the CBA, or brought to voluntary
arbitration. But, where there was
already actual termination, with alleged violation of the employee’s rights, it
is already cognizable by the labor arbiter.[23]
In sum, we conclude that the labor arbiter and then the NLRC had
jurisdiction over the cases involving private respondents’ dismissal, and no error
was committed by the appellate court in upholding their assumption of
jurisdiction.
However, we find that a modification of the monetary awards is in
order. As a consequence of their
illegal dismissal, private respondents are entitled to reinstatement to their
former positions. But since reinstatement is no longer feasible because
petitioner had already closed its shop, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
shall be awarded.[24] A
terminated employee’s receipt of his separation pay and other monetary benefits
does not preclude reinstatement or full benefits under the law, should
reinstatement be no longer possible.[25] As
held in Cariño vs. ACCFA:[26]
Acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel. The
reason is plain. Employer and employee, obviously, do not stand on the same
footing. The employer drove the
employee to the wall. The latter must
have to get hold of the money. Because
out of job, he had to face the harsh necessities of life. He thus found himself in no position to
resist money proffered. His, then, is a case of adherence, not of choice. One thing sure, however, is that petitioners
did not relent their claim. They pressed it. They are deemed not to have waived their rights. Renuntiato non praesumitur.
Conformably, private respondents are entitled to separation pay
equivalent to one month’s salary for every year of service, in lieu of
reinstatement.[27]
As regards the award of damages, in order not to further delay the disposition
of this case, we find it necessary to expressly set forth the extent of the
backwages as awarded by the appellate court. Pursuant to R.A. 6715, as amended, private respondents shall be entitled
to full backwages computed from the time of their illegal dismissal up to the
date of promulgation of this decision without qualification, considering that
reinstatement is no longer practicable under the circumstances.[28]
Having found private respondents’ dismissal to be illegal, and
the labor arbiter and the NLRC duly vested with jurisdiction to hear and decide
their cases, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner should pay the
costs of suit.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52780 is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is ordered to pay private
respondents (a) separation pay, in lieu of
their reinstatement, equivalent to one month’s salary for every year of
service, (b) full backwages from the date of their dismissal up to the date of
the promulgation of this decision, together with (c) the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 32-45.
[2] Id. at 47.
[3] Id. at 33-35.
[4]
Erroneously stated as March 13, 1995 in NLRC Resolution and CA Decision.
[5]
Referred also as Marcial L. Abion in NLRC Resolution and CA Decision.
[6]
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.–
x x x x x x x x x
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation
of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation
or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor
Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[8] Id. at 47.
[9] Id. at 13.
[10] Id. at 9-10.
[11]
CA Rollo, pp. 101-103.
[12] See Sanyo Travel Corporation vs. NLRC, 280 SCRA 129, 139 (1997).
[13] Bataan
Shipyard and Engineering Corporation vs.
NLRC, 269 SCRA 199, 209-210 (1997); Aurora
Land Projects Corporation vs. NLRC,
266 SCRA 48, 58-59 (1997).
[14]
344 SCRA 268, 281 (2000). Italics
supplied.
[15]
Id. at 282.
[16]
CA Rollo, pp. 61-62.
[17] Id. at 14.
[18] Id. at 23.
[19]
290 SCRA 603, 616 (1998).
[20]
344 SCRA 268 (2000).
[21]
ART. 260. Grievance Machinery and Voluntary
Arbitration.—The parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include
therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and
conditions. They shall establish a
machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies. See also Maneja vs. NLRC,
supra.
All grievances submitted to the grievance machinery which
are not settled within seven (7) calendar days from the date of its submission
shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration prescribed in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
For this purpose, parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement
shall name and designate in advance a Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators, or include in the agreement a procedure for the
selection of such Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators,
preferably from the listing of qualified Voluntary Arbitrators duly accredited
by the Board. In case the parties fail
to select a Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, the Board
shall designate the Voluntary Arbitrators, as may be necessary, pursuant to the
selection procedure agreed upon in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, which
shall act with the same force and effect as if the Arbitrator or panel of
Arbitrators has been selected by the parties as prescribed.
[22]
Magcalas vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 453, 470 (1997); Pepsi-Cola Distributors of the
Philippines, Inc. vs. NLRC, 272
SCRA 267, 274-275 (1997).
[23] Maneja vs. NLRC, 290 SCRA 603, 616 (1998), citing Sanyo Philippines
Workers Union-PSSLU vs. Cañizares,
211 SCRA 361, 368 (1992).
[24] Aurora
Land Projects Corp. vs. NLRC, 266
SCRA 48, 66 (1997); De la Cruz vs. NLRC, 268 SCRA 458, 471 (1997); Hinatuan Mining Corporation vs. NLRC, 268 SCRA 622, 626 (1997).
[25] See Lopez Sugar Corporation vs. Federation of Free Workers, 189 SCRA
179, 192 (1990), citing AFP Mutual
Benefit Association, Inc. vs.
AFP-MBAI-EU, 97 SCRA 715 (1980).
[26]
18 SCRA 183, 190 (1966).
[27] Iriga
Telephone Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, 286
SCRA 600, 609 (1998); Kathy-O
Enterprises vs. NLRC, 286 SCRA
729, 740 (1998).
[28] Mabeza vs. NLRC, 271 SCRA 670, 687
(1997), citing Bustamante vs. NLRC,
265 SCRA 61 (1996).