PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ANUNCIACION VDA. DE GOLEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

On October 2, 1957, the provincial fiscal of Negros Occidental filed
an information in the Court of First Instance of that province charging
Anunciacion Vda. de Golez with the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence, as follows:

“That on or about the period comprised from December
12, 1956 to December 24, 1956, in the municipality of San Carlos,
province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable, Court, the herein accused, without being duly
licensed to practice medicine and with reckless negligence and without
taking due precaution, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously diagnose, prescribe, and treat one Susana Tarn, who had
been suffering for sometime with bodily ailment, knowing fully well
that she is incompetent and not possessing the necessary technical or
scientific knowledge or skill, and as a consequence of such negligence
and carelessness and lack of medical skill, said Susana Tam died
thereafter.”

The accused pleaded not guilty to the information.

When the case was called for trial, the assistant fiscal made a
manifestation that the accused had also been charged with the crime of
illegal practice of medicine before another sala of the same court. In
view of this manifestation, the trial court motu proprio
dismissed the information for being fatally defective, without
prejudice to the filing of the proper information against the same
accused. The grounds given for the dismissal were the following:

“In view of the foregoing manifestation of the
Fiscal, the Court finds that the information is fatally defective and,
therefore, should be dismissed under Par. (a), Sec. 2 of Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court inasmuch as the facts charged do hot constitute the
offense of homicide thru reckless imprudence because illegal practice
of medicine is malicious per se, and when the accused practiced medicine without academical preparation and without a license to do so, then she is per se
committing a criminal act for which the criminal intent is presumed.
Although the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence can be
committed by a duly licensed physician when in the practice of his
profession he fails to exercise due care and diligence from which the
criminal act arises, this crime cannot be imputed to a person who has
no authority to practice this profession, which act is malicious per se.
The crime described in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code results
from the performance of a lawful act which was done without exercising
the care and diligence that is required by the circumstances, and not
from the performance of an unlawful act which is the subject of the
information in this case because a quack doctor who practices medicine
does so against the law, and, therefore, his act is necessarily
malicious and criminal.”

From the above order, the provincial fiscal appealed to this Court,
and, through the Solicitor General, urges that the court below erred in
dismissing the information for being fatally defective because the
facts charged therein allegedly do not constitute the crime of homicide
thru reckless imprudence.

We agree with appellant that the order of dismissal is erroneous, in
that the crime of illegal practice of medicine is a statutory offense
wherein criminal intent is taken for granted, so that a person may be
convicted thereof irrespective of his intention and in spite of his
having acted in good faith and without malice; i.e., even if he was not
motivated by an evil desire to injure or hurt another, but by an honest
desire to cure or alleviate the pain of a patient. In fact, as defined
by Section 2678 of the Revised Administrative Code (the law then in
force), the offense consists in the mere act of practicing medicine in
violation of the Medical Law, even if no injury to another, much less
death, results from such malpractice. When, therefore, the patient
dies, the illegal practitioner should be equally responsible for the
death of his patient, an offense independent of and distinct from the
illegal practice of medicine.

The allegations in the information ill this case that the accused
acted with reckless negligence in diagnosing, prescribing for, and
treating the deceased Susana Tarn, knowing that she did not possess the
necessary technical knowledge or skill to do so, thus causing her
death, sufficiently charge the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence, since ordinary diligence counsels one not to tamper with
human life by trying to treat a sick man when he knows that he does not
have the special skill, knowledge, and competence to attempt such
treatment and cure, and may consequently reasonably foresee harm or
injury to the latter. In a similar case wherein the accused, not being
a regular practitioner, undertook to render medical assistance to
another, causing physical injuries to the latter, said accused was
found guilty and convicted by this Court of physical injuries through
imprudence under the old Penal Code (U. S. vs. Feliciano Divino, 12 Phil, 175).

However, in view of the error of the lower court in dismissing the
information, we cannot sustain this appeal for the reason that it would
place the accused in double jeopardy. The present information being
valid and sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, the
dismissal thereof by the court after the accused had pleaded not guilty
to the charge and without his consent constitutes jeopardy as to bar
further proceedings upon the case (U.S. vs. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil., 67; People vs. Hernandez, 94 Phil., 49; 49 Off. Gaz. No. 12, 5342; People vs. Ferrer,
100 Phil., 124; 55 Off. Gaz. [4] 620). The failure of the accused to
file a brief and raise the question of double jeopardy in this appeal
does not mean that section 2, Rule 118, providing that the People can
not appeal if the defendant would be placed in double jeopardy would no
longer apply (People vs. Bao, 106 Phil., 243; 56 Off. Gaz. [51] 7768).

The unfortunate result in this case could have been avoided if the
trial court had proceeded more deliberately, without allowing its
judgment to be influenced by preconceived notions or undue haste in
dispatching cases.

The appeal is, therefore, dismissed, with costs de ofico.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez, David, JJ., concur.