DEOGRACIAS MUSA, ROMEO AND ANDRO MUSA, AS REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MARILYN MUSA, PETITIONERS, VS. SYLVIA AMOR, RESPONDENT.

Musa versus Amor

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Deogracias Musa and his sons Romeo and Andro, through their attorney-in-fact Marilyn Musa, against Sylvia Amor. The petitioners claim to be tenants of a 9.9611 hectare agricultural landholding in Dancalan, Donsol, Sorsogon, formerly owned by Antonio Dasig and sold in March 1993 by his mother and administratrix Rosario Dasig to the respondent. The petitioners sought to annul that sale, to be reinstated, and to be recognized as tenants. The case matters because it fixes two enduring rules: tenancy must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and the identification of agrarian reform beneficiaries belongs to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, not to the courts.

Procedural History

The petitioners first filed a case for redemption with the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Adjudicator. When the respondent moved to eject them, they withdrew that case and filed instead a complaint for annulment of sale, reinstatement and damages. The Regional Adjudicator ruled for the petitioners on June 30, 1994, declaring them tenants, nullifying the deed of absolute sale, ordering their reinstatement, and directing agrarian officials to act on the land transfer. On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board modified the ruling, declaring the petitioners bona fide tenants entitled to security of tenure. The respondent then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which on September 27, 1999 modified the Board's ruling by holding that the petitioners should not be considered tenants, while affirming all other respects, including the ruling that the question of coverage under Presidential Decree Number 27 and Republic Act Number 6657 lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration on December 29, 1999. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

The landholding, formerly owned by Antonio Dasig, consisted of two hectares of riceland and the rest devoted to coconuts. When Antonio migrated to the United States, his mother Rosario Dasig administered the property. On March 5, 1993, Rosario, representing her son, sold the property to the respondent Sylvia Amor for 300,000 pesos.

The petitioners claimed that in 1979 Deogracias entered into a verbal tenurial arrangement with Antonio through Rosario, sharing harvests on a two thirds to one third basis on the riceland and sixty forty on the coconut produce, and that his sons Romeo and Andro took over the cultivation when he suffered a stroke in 1990. They said they were surprised by the sale, which was made without their knowledge and consent. A notice dated September 8, 1993 placed the entire property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, prompting the complaint for annulment of sale, which they grounded on a Voluntary Offer to Sell allegedly signed by Antonio.

The respondent answered that the petitioners were not bona fide tenants but hired workers on a pakyaw basis; that Deogracias had admitted in an affidavit executed on July 4, 1982 that he was a hired worker; that the Voluntary Offer to Sell was forged, as Antonio attested in an affidavit dated November 23, 1993; and that the petitioners were themselves landowners and thus not qualified beneficiaries. Rosario Dasig did not participate in the proceedings before the Regional Adjudicator.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the petitioners, having been declared not to be tenants, are not qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the respondent's petition for failure to state a written explanation why service was not done personally.

Applicable Provisions

Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.

This governs whether the respondent's petition before the Court of Appeals should have been dismissed for lack of a written explanation of service by mail.

Section 22 of Republic Act Number 6657, quoted by the petitioners, provides:

Section 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority: a.) agricultural lessees and share tenants; b.) regular farmworkers; c.) seasonal farmworkers; d.) other farmworkers; e.) actual tillers or occupants of public lands; f.) collective or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and g.) others directly working on the land.

This bears on the petitioners' argument that beneficiaries are not limited to tenants but include farmworkers.

Administrative Order Number 10, Series of 1989, provides in its prefatory statement:

Pursuant to Section 15, Chapter IV, of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, the DAR, in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), as organized pursuant to RA 6657, shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. This Administrative Order provides the Implementing Rules and Procedures for the said registration.

This confirms that registration and identification of beneficiaries is an administrative function of the Department of Agrarian Reform.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found no reason to depart from the finding that the petitioners were not bona fide tenants. Their statements conflicted: they first claimed cultivation since 1979, yet Deogracias executed an affidavit in July 1982 attesting that he was not a tenant, and later they claimed cultivation began only after that affidavit, and still later that they took over from Juan Manlangit in 1984. The witness Manlangit changed his story three times, executing an affidavit, retracting it, and then re-affirming it. On this evidence, the claim of tenancy was not substantially proved.

But the Court held that the Court of Appeals went too far in saying the petitioners were not qualified beneficiaries. The identification of actual and potential beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and the Court of Appeals itself had ruled that the question of coverage lies within that official's exclusive jurisdiction. Since the Department had issued a Notice of Coverage placing the land under the program, the statement that the petitioners were not qualified beneficiaries was mere obiter dictum, unnecessary to the resolution of the case.

On the second issue, the Court held that the sufficiency of service before the Court of Appeals is governed by the Rules of Court. Personal service was not practicable given the distance between the appellate court and Donsol, Sorsogon, so a written explanation might have been superfluous. Moreover, the rule uses the word may, signifying permissiveness, so a violation leaves the court discretion whether to consider the paper as not filed. Rigid application may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice.

Doctrine

First, a claim of tenancy in an agrarian dispute must be established by substantial evidence; contradictory assertions by the claimants and a vacillating witness defeat the claim. Second, the identification and registration of actual and potential beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is an administrative determination vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee, pursuant to Section 15, Chapter IV of Republic Act Number 6657 and Administrative Order Number 10, Series of 1989. A court pronouncement on beneficiary qualification, made outside the issues necessary to the decision, is obiter dictum. Third, under Section 11, Rule 13, the requirement of a written explanation for service by mail is directory, not mandatory, because the rule says a violation may cause the paper to be considered not filed; courts may relax it in the interest of substantial justice.

Disposition

The petition was denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed; the respondent prevailed, and the petitioners were not recognized as tenants.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, not the courts, identifies who qualifies as a beneficiary under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Examiners use this case to test the deference owed to administrative findings on tenancy and beneficiary identification, and the relaxation of procedural rules on service of pleadings.