METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION AND APOLINARIO AJOC, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND COL. MARTIN P. SABALBURO, NAPOLEON G. SABALBURO, MARTIN G. SABALBURO, JR., BABY M…

On appeal is the decision^[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on August
25, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45002, which affirmed in
toto
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, in Civil
Case No. 16062. The trial court found herein petitioners liable for the
death of Florentina Sabalburo in a vehicular accident involving a
passenger bus owned by petitioner Metro Manila Transit Corporation
(MMTC) and driven by petitioner Apolinario Ajoc, and ordered them to pay
damages to private respondents.

The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court of
Appeals, is as follows:

The eyewitness account of plaintiffs’ witness, Maria
Zenaida
Baylon, tends to show that in the afternoon of December 24, 1986, she,
her daughter Maria Zenia and the victim, Florentina Sabalburo, were on
their way to Baclaran to buy foodstuffs for their Noche
Buena. For some time, they stood on the island at the
intersection of St. Andrews Street^[2]
and Domestic Road, [Pasay City] waiting for the traffic light to change
so they could cross to the other side of St. Andrews Street where they
intended to take a ride for Baclaran. When the traffic light turned red
and the vehicles along St. Andrews Street had stopped, the three of them
stepped off the island. Just as they started to cross the street, she
(Baylon) saw an MMTC bus coming from their right (Tramo) which was
moving at a fast speed. The next moment, the left front portion of the
bus hit the victim on the right side of her head. The impact was of such
force that the victim’s right ear was slashed off and she thereupon
fell on the cement and became unconscious. The victim was brought by the
bus driver, Apolinario Ajoc and the bus conductress to the San Juan de
Dios Hospital where she was given medical attention. Florentina
Sabalburo never regained consciousness and it was on January 3, 1987
that she succumbed to her injuries.^[3]

On February 16, 1987, private respondents filed a
complaint^[4]
for damages against MMTC and its driver, Ajoc, with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. Docketed as Civil Case No. 16062, the complaint
essentially alleged that Ajoc drove the MMTC bus in a wanton and
reckless manner, in gross violation of traffic rules and regulations,
without due regard for the safety of others, thus causing the untimely
death of the victim.

Petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint,

disclaimed any liability for the incident, and insisted that the
accident was solely due to the victim’s own negligence. The appellate
court summed up their version of the incident as follows:

x x x

That at the time material to this case, bus no. 033, with
defendant Ajoc driving, then bound towards the direction of Baclaran
proper, was slowly accelerating speed on the outer right lane of the
road, in response to the go signal of the traffic light situated in the
intersection of Domestic Road [and Andrew Avenue], while the vehicles on
the inner right lane which were going to turn left towards Domestic
Road were at a stop position, the deceased FLORENTINA G. SABALBURO,
whose stationary position was then covered from Ajoc’s peripheral vision
by a big truck then bound to MIA Road [that] was at a stop position,
suddenly, without regard to her own safety and in total defiance of
traffic signs designed to protect pedestrian[s], suddenly darted across
the road; Ajoc, thus caught by surprise, tried to prevent impact by
releasing his accelerator pedal and applying his brakes but the time lag
between the deceased’s negligent act and Ajoc’s prudent and diligent
reaction to the former made the impact a certainty.^[5]

As special and affirmative defenses, petitioners also claimed
that:

(1) MMTC “hires its drivers, conductors and other employees
only
after they have successfully passed rigid and extensive theoretical and
practical examinations designed to determine their skills and
competence…and imposes upon its drivers the duty to undergo regular
seminars in defensive driving techniques and road safety habits;”^[6]

(2) MMTC had “taken every human care and foresight possible
in
carrying their passengers safely to their respective place (sic) of
destination as well as in avoiding harm to the life and limbs or risk
against pedestrians so that they not be held liable;”^[7] and

(3) “[T]he buses of the defendant corporation, including its
bus
no. 033 were all properly maintained…before the buses left the garage
for their respective routes on that particular day, as in all other
days, they were rigidly inspected and examined and properly certified as
roadworthy.”^[8]

The trial court found private respondents’ version more
credible and on August 12, 1993, decided the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants as follows:

1. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay
   plaintiff
   Martin Sabalburo actual damages in the sum of P63,943.88 representing
   the unpaid expenses of plaintiff in connection with the death of
   Florentina Sabalburo;

2. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay

   plaintiffs the sum of P180,000.00 for the loss of the earning capacity
   of the deceased for a period of ten (10) years;

3. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay
   plaintiff Martin Sabalburo the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages;

4. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay
   plaintiff Martin Sabalburo the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

5. Ordering defendants [to] jointly and severally
   pay plaintiff Martin Sabalburo the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

6. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay
   plaintiffs the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.^[9]

Petitioners seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
docketed their appeal as CA-G.R. CV No. 45002. Before the appellate
court, petitioners insisted that the accident was solely the fault of
the victim since she suddenly crossed a very busy street with complete
disregard for her safety and in violation of traffic rules and
regulations designed to protect pedestrians.

As earlier stated, the appellate court, in CA-G.R. CV No.
45002, affirmed the trial court’s decision, thus:

IN JUDGMENT, we hold that the appeal interposed by
appellants is
not meritorious and the judgment of the lower court which we find to be
in accordance with law and the evidence is therefore AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.^[10]

Petitioners then moved for reconsideration, but the appellate
court denied their motion in its resolution of December 10,
1999.^[11]

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioners submit as sole issue for our resolution the
following:

WHETHER OR NOT ARTICLE 2179^[12] AS AN EXCEPTION TO ARTICLE 2176^[13] OF THE CIVIL CODE IS
APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE.

Petitioners insist that a closer look at the facts
established by
the trial court would show that the incident happened at around 3:30 in
the afternoon of December 24, 1986 or barely eight (8) hours before
Christmas Eve. Thus, the victim’s thoughts were naturally directed
towards the Noche Buena. The victim then crossed
busy Andrew
Avenue for the purpose of getting a ride to Baclaran to buy food for the
Christmas Eve celebration. Since her thoughts were on the Christmas Eve
feast, she crossed where there was no pedestrian lane and while the
green light for vehicular traffic was on. Petitioner MMTC submits that
petitioner Ajoc cannot be charged with negligence considering that he
cannot see what is in the mind of a pedestrian. Considering that the
victim’s own negligence was the direct and proximate cause of her
injuries and untimely demise, it was error for the Court of Appeals not
to have applied Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the instant case.

Petitioners’ claim that at the time of the incident, the victim’s mind
was preoccupied with the preparations for the Noche
Buena,
is naught but pure conjecture and speculation, with nary a scintilla of
proof to support it, according to respondents. Both the trial and
appellate courts established that the immediate and proximate cause of
the victim’s death was the negligent and careless driving by petitioner
Ajoc. Therefore, the full force of Article 2176 of the Civil Code
applies, concluded respondents.

In asking us to apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code, we note
that
petitioners are asking us to make a finding that the victim’s own
negligence was the direct and proximate cause of her death. This we
cannot do. The issue of whether a person is negligent or not is a
question of fact.^[14] The Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts,^[15]
although it has the power and authority to review and reverse the
factual findings of lower courts where these do not conform to the
evidence^[16] or
where the courts below came up with contradictory factual
findings.^[17]

We have thoroughly perused the records of this case, and
nowhere do
we find evidence to support petitioners’ claim that the victim was so
engrossed in thinking about Noche Buena while
crossing a busy street. Petitioners’ stance regarding the victim’s
alleged negligence is non sequitur.
It simply does not follow that one who is run over by a vehicle on
Christmas Eve (or any other holiday for that matter) is negligent
because his thoughts were on the holiday festivities.

Instead, the records support private respondents’ claim that
the
MMTC bus was being driven carelessly. As found by the trial court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the victim and her companions were
standing on the island of Andrew Avenue, waiting for the traffic light
to change so they could cross. Upon seeing the red light, the victim and
her companions started to cross. It was then when petitioner Ajoc, who
was trying to beat the red light, hit the victim. As the court a quo
noted, Ajoc’s claim that “he failed to see the victim and her companions
proves his recklessness and lack of caution in driving his
vehicle.”^[18]
Findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme
Court.^[19]
More so, as in this case, where petitioners have not adequately shown
that the courts below overlooked or disregarded certain facts or
circumstances of such import as would have altered the outcome of the
case. Contrary to petitioners’ insistence, the applicable law in this
case is Article 2176 of the Civil Code and not Article 2179.

Petitioner MMTC next contends that the Court of Appeals erred
in
finding it solidarily liable for damages with its driver/employee, Ajoc,
pursuant to the relevant paragraphs of Article 2180^[20]
of the Civil Code. It argues that the act of Ajoc in bringing the
victim to a hospital reflects MMTC’s diligence in the selection and
supervision of its drivers, particularly with regard to safety measures.
Hence, having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its employees to prevent damage, MMTC
should not be held vicariously liable.

It should be stressed, however, that whenever an employee’s
negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence
on the part
of the employer, either in the selection of the employee (culpa in
eligiendo) or the supervision over him after the selection (culpa in
vigilando).^[21]
Hence, to
escape solidary liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee,
an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting convincing proof
that in the selection and supervision of his employee, he has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family.^[22] In the present case,
petitioner MMTC failed to rebut the presumption of negligence on its
part.

The claim that Ajoc’s act of bringing the victim to the
nearest
medical facility shows adequate supervision by MMTC over its employees
deserves but scant consideration. For one, the act was after the fact of
negligence on Ajoc’s part. For another, the evidence on record shows
that Ajoc’s act was neither voluntary nor spontaneous; he had to be
prevailed upon by the victim’s companions to render assistance to his
victim.^[23]
Moreover, the
evidence to show that MMTC had exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees consisted merely of the pertinent
guidelines for the screening and selection of its drivers, as well as
periodic seminars on road safety. As found by the trial court, and
affirmed by the appellate court, petitioner MMTC failed to show that its
driver, Ajoc, had actually undergone such screening or had attended
said seminars. As previously held, “[t]he mere formulation of various
company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied
with is not sufficient to exempt (an employer) from liability arising
from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to
show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment
procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were
followed.”^[24]
In this case, MMTC has made no satisfactory showing that it had paid
more than lip service to its guidelines and policies in hiring and
supervision. Its failure to do so cannot but warrant the proper
sanctions from this Court, considering that MMTC is a government-owned
public utility organized for the public welfare. Having failed to rebut
the presumption of negligence on its part, MMTC is primarily and
directly liable for the damages caused by its employee, the erring
driver, Ajoc, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which provides
as follows:

ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable
not only for one’s own acts or omissions-, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother,
are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official
to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided
in Article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

The owners of public utilities fall within the scope of this
article.^[25]
As earlier stated, MMTC is a public utility, organized and owned by the
government for public transport service. Hence, its liability to
private respondents, for the negligent and reckless acts of its driver,
Ajoc, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is both manifest and clear.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is DISMISSED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45002 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and
Corona, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Rollo, pp.
27-36.
^[2] The
appellate court
erroneously kept on referring to the thoroughfare where the accident
took place as “St. Andrews Street.” The records show that the proper
name of the road is Andrew Avenue. See CA Rollo, p. 43. See also TSN,
January 13, 1989, p. 3; TSN, March 5, 1991, pp. 3-4.
^[3] Rollo, pp.
27-28.
^[4] A separate
criminal
complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence, docketed as Crim.
Case No. 87-11229-P, was also filed against Ajoc before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 111. On July 10, 1990, Ajoc was found
guilty of the charge and sentenced to suffer a prison term ranging from
two years and four months of prision correccional as a minimum to six
years of prision correccional as a maximum. Records, pp. 196-200.

^[5] Rollo, p.
29.
^[6] Id. at 28.

^[7] Supra note
5.
^[8] Id. at
29-30.
^[9] Records, p.
229.
^[10] CA Rollo,
p. 78.
^[11] Id. at 88.

^[12] Civil Code,
ART. 2179.
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

^[13] Civil Code,
ART. 2176.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
^[14] Thermochem
Inc. v. Naval, G.R. No. 131541, 344 SCRA 76, 82 (2000).
^[15] Ceremonia
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103453, 314 SCRA 731, 736 (1999).

^[16] Cang v.
Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 105308, 296 SCRA 128, 144-145 (1998), citing
Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 43972, 187 SCRA
735, 739 (1990).
^[17] Yobido v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113003, 281 SCRA 1, 7-8 (1997).
^[18] Rollo, p.
32.
^[19] Austria v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133323, 327 SCRA 668, 674 (2000).
^[20] Civil Code,
ART. 2180.
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

x x x

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

x x x

^[21]
Castro v. Acro
Taxicab Co., No. 49155, 82 Phil. 359, 373 (1948). See also Phoenix
Construction, Inc. v. IAC, No. L-65295, 148 SCRA 353, 370 (1987);
Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, G.R. Nos. 79050-51, 179 SCRA
384, 393-394 (1989).
^[22] Pantranco
North Express, Inc, v. Baesa, supra; Umali v. Bacani, No. L-40570, 69
SCRA 263, 267-268 (1976).
^[23] TSN,
January 13, 1989, pp. 14-20.
^[24] Metro
Manila Transit
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104408, 223 SCRA 521, 541 (1993),
citing Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, supra.
^[25]
Tolentino, V Civil Code 615 (1992).