TRINIDAD DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Diaz-Enriquez versus Republic of the Philippines

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez against the Republic of the Philippines, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals that reversed the trial court and dismissed her application for land registration. The action is an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land in Ternate, Cavite, filed under the Property Registration Decree. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the three questions examiners love to test in land registration: who is the real party in interest, what the applicant must prove about the identity of the land, and how possession since June 12, 1945 must be established.

Procedural History

Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez filed her application for registration before the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed it. The trial court issued an order of general default, later allowed Puerto Azul Land, Inc. to substitute as applicant, and after trial granted the application, confirming the applicant's title and directing the issuance of the decree of registration and the original certificate of title.

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court and dismissed the application. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Facts

On April 19, 1975, by an extrajudicial partition with absolute sale, Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez bought two parcels of land from Ricardo Pereña, Remedios Pereña-Panganiban, and Celsa Resplandor. One parcel was in Ternate, Cavite, and the other in Maragondon, Cavite.

On December 11, 1992, she filed an application for registration of Lot 277, Portion C, with an area of 6,917 square meters. She filed five other applications for adjacent lots, all covered by the same deed of conveyance. The Republic opposed, alleging that neither the applicant nor her predecessors had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since June 12, 1945, that her muniments did not prove bona fide acquisition, and that the land belonged to the public domain.

While the case was pending, the petitioner sold the property to Dr. Rebecco Panlilio, who in turn sold it to Puerto Azul Land, Inc., which was substituted as applicant. At trial, the company's lone witness, a geodetic engineer employed by it since 1993, testified on the applicant's ownership and possession. The trial court granted the application, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the land applied for was not the same land sold by the Pereñas and that possession was not proved.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioner is the real party in interest to file the petition.
• Whether or not the parcel of land sought to be registered is the same or part of the land purchased by the petitioner from the Pereña heirs.
• Whether or not the petitioner proved that she and her predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcel for the required number of years so as to render them absolute owners.

Applicable Provisions

Section 14, paragraph 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly-authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

This is the very basis of the application, and it fixes both the qualifying possessor and the period of possession that must be proved.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioner is not the real party in interest. She had sold the property to Puerto Azul Land, Inc. as early as October 27, 1994, and the trial court had granted the motion for substitution, making the company the party-applicant. A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Since the company was the party aggrieved by the adverse ruling of the Court of Appeals, it, and not the petitioner, should have filed the petition. The Court ruled that the petition must forthwith be denied due course.

On the second issue, the Court agreed with the appellate court that the land applied for is not the same land sold by the Pereñas. The lot applied for has an area of 6,917 square meters and specific boundaries, while the deed of conveyance describes a parcel of 1,096,433 square meters with entirely different boundaries. The Court held that the applicant must prove two facts: first, that the land sought to be registered is the same land described in the application; second, that the applicant is the owner of the land. The petitioner failed to prove the first.

On the third issue, the Court held that the petitioner failed to prove possession. The lone witness had been employed only in 1993 and had no personal knowledge of the possession of the predecessors since 1945. The Court reiterated that tax declarations and tax receipts do not by themselves prove title, and that the burden of proof lies on the applicant, since lands of whatever classification are presumed to belong to the State.

Doctrine

First, every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, meaning the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or is entitled to the avails of the suit. A seller who has parted with the land and has been substituted in the registration case cannot bring the petition for review.

Second, an applicant for land registration must prove by clear and convincing evidence two things: that the land sought to be registered is the same land described in the application, and that the applicant is the owner of that land. A variance in area and boundaries between the deed of conveyance and the land applied for is fatal.

Third, possession under Section 14, paragraph 1 of the Property Registration Decree must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, in the concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945 or earlier, and must be proved by positive evidence, not by mere conclusions or tax declarations.

Disposition

The petition was denied, the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed, and the application for registration in LRC Case No. NC-455 was ordered dismissed.

Remember This

Memorize the twin burden: the applicant must prove that the land applied for is the very land described in the application and that the applicant owns it, by clear and convincing evidence. Examiners use this case to test the real party in interest rule and the insufficiency of tax declarations to prove possession since June 12, 1945.