G.R. No. 14070. March 29, 1961
MARIA GERVACIO BLAS, ETC., ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. ROSALINA SANTOS, IN HER CAPACITY AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE …
LABRADOR, J.:
the estate of Maxima Santos, to secure a judicial declaration that
one-half of the properties left by said Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, the
greater bulk of which are set forth and described in the project of
partition presented in the proceedings for the administration of the
estate of the deceased Simeon Blas, had been promised by the deceased
Maxima Santos to be delivered upon her death and in her will to the
plaintiffs, and requesting that the said properties so promised be
adjudicated to the plaintiffs. The complaint also prays for actual
damages in the amount of P50,000. (Record on Appeal, pp. 1-65.) The
alleged promise of the deceased Maxima Santos is contained in a
document executed by Maxima Santos on December 26, 1936 attached to the
complaint as Annex “H” and introduced at the trial as Exhibit “A”. (Ibid.,
pp. 258-259.) The complaint also alleges that the plaintiffs are
entitled to inherit certain properties enumerated in paragraph 3
thereof, situated in Malabon, Rizal and Obando, Bulacan, but which
properties have already been included in the inventory of the estate of
the deceased Simeon Blas and evidently partitioned and conveyed to his
heirs in the proceedings for the administration of his (Simeon Blas)
estate.
Defendant, who is the administratrix of the estate
of the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, filed an answer with a
counterclaim, and later, an amended answer and a counterclaim. The said
amended answer admits the allegations of the complaint as to her
capacity as administratrix; the death of Simeon Blas on January 3,
1937; the fact that Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz begot three children,
only one of whom, namely, Eulalia Blas, left legitimate descendants;
that Simeon Blas contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos on
June 28, 1898. She denies, for lack of sufficient information and
belief, knowledge of the first marriage of Simeon Blas to Marta Cruz,
the averment that Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz acquired properties
situated in Obando, Bulacan, that said properties were utilized as
capital, etc. As special defenses, she alleges that the properties of
the spouses Blas and Santos had been settled and liquidated in the
project of partition of the estate of said Simeon Blas; that pursuant
to the project of partition, plaintiffs and some defendants had already
received the respective properties adjudicated to them; that the
plaintiffs and the defendants Marta Gervacio and Jose Chivi are
estopped from impugning the validity of the project of partition of the
estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and from questioning the ownership
in the properties conveyed in the project of partition to Maxima Santos
as her own exclusive property; that the testament executed by Maxima
Santos is valid, the plaintiffs having no right to recover any portion
of Maxima Santos’ estate now under administration by the court. A
counterclaim for the amount of P50,000 as damages is also included in
the answer, as also a cross-claim against Marta Gervacio Blas and Jose
Chivi.
Trial of the case was conducted and, thereafter, the
court, Hon. Gustavo Victoriano, presiding, rendered judgment dismissing
the complaint, with costs against plaintiff, and dismissing also the
counterclaim and cross-claim filed by the defendants. From this
decision, the plaintiffs have appealed to this Court.
The
facts essential to an understanding of the issues involved in the case
may be briefly summarized as follows: Simeon Blas contracted a first
marriage with Marta Cruz sometime before 1898. They had three children,
only one of whom, Eulalia, left children, namely, Maria Gervacio Blas,
one of the plaintiffs, Marta Gervacio Blas, one of the defendants, and
Lazaro Gervacio Blas. Lazaro died in 1953 and is survived by three
legitimate children who are plaintiffs herein, namely, Manuel Gervacio
Blas, Leoncio Gervacio Blas and Loida Gervacio Blas. Marta Cruz died in
1898, and the following year, Simeon Blas contracted a second marriage
with Maxima Santos. At the time of this second marriage, no liquidation
of the properties acquired by Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz was made.
Three of the properties left are fishponds located in Obando, Bulacan.
Maxima Santos does not appear to have apported properties to her
marriage with Simeon Blas.
On December 26, 1936, only over a
week before his death on January 9, 1937, Simeon Blas executed a last
will and testament. In the said testament Simeon Blas makes the
following declarations:
I
“2. Sa panahon ng aking pangalawang asawa, Maxima Santos de Blas,
ay nagkaroon ako at nakatipon ng mga kayamanan (bienes) at pag-aari
(propiedades) na ang lahat ng lupa, palaisdaan at iba pang pag-aari ay
umaabot sa halagang anim na raan pitong pu’t walong daan libo walong daan at walong pung piso (678,880.00) sang-ayon sa mga halaga sa amillarimento (valor Amillarado.)”II
“1.
Ang kalahati ng lahat ng aming pag-aari, matapos mabayaran ang lahat ng
aking o aming pag-kakautang na mag-asawa, kung mayroon man, yayamang
ang lahat ng ito ay kita sa loob ng matrimonio (bienes gananciales) ay
bahagi ng para sa aking asawa, Maxima Santos de Blas, sang-ayon sa batas.” (Record on Appeal, pp. 250-251.)
The above testamentary provisions may be translated as follows:
I
“2.
During my second marriage with Maxima Santos de Blas, I possessed and
acquired wealth and properties, consisting of lands, fishponds and
other kinds of properties, the total assessed value of which reached
the amount of P678,880.00.”II
“1.
One-half of our properties, after the payment of my and our
indebtedness, all these properties having been acquired during marriage
(conjugal properties), constitutes the share of my wife Maxima Santos
de Blas, according to the law.”
At the time
of the execution of said will, Andres Pascual, a son-in-law of the
testator, and Avelino Pascual and others, were present. Andres Pascual
had married a descendant by the first marriage. The will was prepared
by Andres Pascual, with the help of his nephew Avelino Pascual. The
testator asked Andres Pascual to prepare a document which was presented
in court as Exhibit “A”, thus:
“Q— Was there anybody who asked you to prepare this document? A— Don Simeon Blas asked me to prepare this document (referring to Exhibit ‘A’).” (t.s.n., Sarmiento, p. 24).
The reason why the testator ordered the preparation of Exhibit “A” was
because the properties that the testator had acquired during his first
marriage with Marta Cruz had not been liquidated and were not separated
from those acquired during the second marriage. Pascual’s testimony is
as follows:
“Q— To whom do you refer with the word ‘they’? A— Simeon
Blas and his first wife, Marta Cruz. When Marta Cruz died they had not
made a liquidation of their conjugal properties and so all those
properties were included all in the assets of the second marriage, and
that is the reason why this document was prepared.” (t.s.n., Sarmiento,
p. 36.)
The above testimony is fully corroborated by that of Leoncio Gervacio, son-in-law of Simeon Blas:
“Q— Please state to the Court? A— My
children were claiming from their grandfather Simeon Blas the
properties left by their grandmother Marta Cruz in the year 1936. * * ** * * * * * *
“Q— And
what happened with that claim of your children against Simeon Blas
regarding these assets or properties of the first marriage that were
left after the death of Marta Cruz in 1936?A— The
claim was not pushed through because they reached into an agreement
whereby the parties Simeon Blas, Maxima Santos, Maria Gervacio Blas,
Marta Gervacio Blas and Lazaro Gervacio Blas agreed that Simeon Blas
and Maxima Blas will give one-half of the estate of Simeon Blas.”
(t.s.n., Sarmiento, pp. 143-144).
The document which was thus prepared and which is marked as Exhibit “A” reads in Tagalog, thus:
“MAUNAWA NG SINO MANG MAKABABASA:
Na akong si Maxima Santos de Blas, nasa hustong gulang kasal kay Simeon Blas, taga bayan ng Malabon, Rizal, Philippines, sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay malaya kong ipinahahayag:
Na aking nabasa at naunawa ang testamento at huling kalooban na nilagdaan ng aking asawa, Simeon Blas,
at ipinahahayag ko sa ilalim ng aking karangalan at sa harap ng aking
asawa na igagalang at pagpipitaganan ng lahat at bawa’t isang bahagi ng
nabanggit na testamento at ipinangangako ko pa sa pamamagitan ng
kasulatang ito na ang lahat ng maiiwang pag-aari at kayamanan naming
mag-asawa, na nauukol at bahaging para sa akin sa paggawa ko naman ng
aking testamento ay ipagkakaloob ko ang kalahati (1/2 sa mga herederos
at legatarios o pinamamanahan ng aking nabanggit na asawa, Simeon Blas,
sa kaniyang testamento, na ako’y makapipili o makahihirang sa kahi’t
kangino sa kanila ng aking pagbibigyan at pamamanahan sang-ayon sa
paggalang, paglilingkod, at pakikisama na gagawin sa akin.Sa katunayan ng lahat ng ito,
ay nilagdaan ko ang kasulatang ito ngayon ika 26 ng Diciembre ng taong
1936, dito sa San Francisco del Monte, San Juan, Rizal, Philippines.”
(Exh. “A”, pp. 29-30—Appellant’s brief).
(Fdo.) Maxima Santos de Blas
and which, translated into English, reads as follows:
“KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
“That I Maxima Santos de Blas, of legal age, married to Simeon Blas, resident of Malabon, Rizal, Philippines, voluntarily state:
That I have read and knew the contents of the will signed by my husband, Simeon Blas,
(2) and I promise on my word of honor in the presence of my husband
that I will respect and obey all and every disposition of said will (3)
and furthermore, I promise in this document that all the properties my
husband and I will leave, the portion and share corresponding to me
when I make my will, I will give one-half (1/2) to the heirs and
legatees or the beneficiaries named in the will of my husband, (4) and
that I can select or choose any of them to whom I will give depending
upon the respect, service and treatment accorded to me.In witness whereof,
I signed this document this 26th day of December, 1936 at San Francisco
del Monte, San Juan, Rizal, Philippines.” (Exh. ‘A’, pp. 30-31,
Appellant’s brief).
(Sgd.) Maxima Santos de Blas
The
court below held that said Exhibit “A” has not created any right in
favor of plaintiffs which can serve as a basis of the complaint; that
neither can it be considered as a valid and enforceable contract for
lack of consideration and because it deals with future inheritance. The
court also declared that Exhibit “A” is not a will because it does not
comply with the requisites for the execution of a will; nor could it be
considered as a donation, etc.
Both the court below in its
decision and the appellees in their brief before us, argue vehemently
that the heirs of Simeon Blas and his wife Marta Cruz can no longer
make any claim for the unliquidated conjugal properties acquired during
said first marriage, because the same were already included in the mass
of properties constituting the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and
in the adjudications made by virtue of his Will, and that the action,
to recover the same has prescribed. This contention is correct. The
descendants of Marta Cruz can no longer claim the conjugal properties
that she and her husband may have acquired during their marriage
although no liquidation of such, properties and delivery thereof to the
heirs of Marta Cruz have been made, no action to recover said
properties having been presented in the proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of Simeon Blas.
But the principal basis for
the plaintiffs’ action in the case at bar is the document Exhibit “A”.
It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of
Simeon Blas for the reason that the conjugal properties of his first
marriage had not been liquidated; that it was prepared at the same time
as the will of Simeon Blas on December 26, 1936, at the instance of the
latter himself. It is also not disputed that the document was signed by
Maxima Santos and one copy thereof, which was presented in court as
Exhibit “A”, was kept by plaintiffs’ witness Andres Pascual.
Plaintiffs-appellants argue before us that Exhibit “A” is both a trust
agreement and a contract in the nature of a compromise to avoid
litigation. Defendants-appellees, in answer, claim that it is neither a
trust agreement nor a compromise agreement. Considering that the
properties of the first marriage of Simeon Blas had not been liquidated
when Simeon Blas executed, his will on December 26, 1936, and the
further fact that such properties were actually included as conjugal
properties acquired during1 the second marriage, we find, as contended
by plaintiffs-appellants, that the preparation and execution of Exhibit
“A” was ordered by Simeon Blas evidently to prevent his heirs by his
first marriage from contesting his will and demanding liquidation of
the conjugal properties acquired during his first marriage, and an
accounting of the fruits and proceeds thereof from the time of the
death of his first wife.
Exhibit “A”, therefore, appears to
be the compromise defined in Article 1809 of the Civil Code of Spain,
in force at the time of the execution of Exhibit “A”, which provides as
follows:
“Compromise is a contract by which each of the parties in interest, by giving, promising,
or retaining something avoids the provocation of a suit or terminates
one which has already been instituted.” (Italics supplied.)
Exhibit “A” states that, the maker (Maxima Santos) had read and knew
the contents of the will of her husband Simeon Blas—she was Evidently
referring to the declaration in the will (of Simeon Blas) that his
properties are conjugal properties and one-half thereof belongs to her
(Maxima Santos) as her share of the conjugal assets under the law. The
agreement or promise that Maxima Santos makes in Exhibit “A” is to hold
one-half of her said share in the conjugal assets in trust for the
heirs and legatees of her husband in his will, with the obligation of
conveying the same to such of his heirs or legatees as she may choose
in her last will and testament. It is to be noted that the conjugal
properties referred to are those that were actually existing at that
time, December 26, 1936. Simeon Blas died on January 9, 1937. On June
2, 1937, an inventory of the properties left by him, all considered
conjugal, was submitted by Maxima Santos herself as administratrix of
his estate. A list of said properties is found in Annex “E”, the
complete inventory submitted by Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, as
administratrix of the estate of her husband, dated March 10, 1939. The
properties which were given to Maxima Santos as her share in the
conjugal properties are also specified in the project of partition
submitted by said Maxima Santos herself on March 14, 1939. (Record on
Appeal, pp. 195-241.) Under Exhibit “A”, therefore, Maxima Santos
contracted the obligation and promised to give one-half of the above
indicated properties to the heirs and legatees of Simeon Blas.
Counsel for the defendant-appellee claims Exhibit “A” is a worthless piece of paper because it is not a will nor a donation mortis causa
nor a contract. As we have indicated above, it is a compromise and at
the same time a contract with a sufficient cause or consideration. It
is also contended that it deals with future inheritance. We do not
think that Exhibit “A” is a contract on future inheritance. It is an
obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her
share in the conjugal properties acquired with her husband, which
properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will
of the husband. The conjugal properties were in existence at the time
of the execution of Exhibit “A” on December 26, 1936. As a matter of
fact, Maxima Santos included these properties in her inventory of her
husband’s estate of June 2, 1937. The promise does not refer to any
properties that the maker would inherit upon the death of her husband.
The document refers to existing properties which she will receive by
operation of law on the death of her husband, because it is her share
in the conjugal assets. That the kind of agreement or promise contained
in Exhibit “A” is not void under Article 1271 of the old Civil Code,
has been decided by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of
October 8, 1915, thus:
“Que si bien el art.
1271 del Codigo civil dispone que sobre la herencia futura no se podra
celebrar otros contratos que aquellos cuyo objeto sea practicar entre
vivos la division de un caudal, conforme al articulo 1056, esta
prohibicion no es aplicable al caso, porque la obligacion que contrajo
el recurrido en contrato privado de otorgar testamento e instituir
heredera a su sobrina de los bienes que adquirio en virtud de herencia,
procedentes de su finada consorte que le quedasen sobrantes despues de
pagar las deudas, y del ganancial que se expresa, asi como de
reconocer, ademas, con alguna cosa a otros sobrinos, se refiere a bienes conocidos y determinados existences cuando tal compromiso se otorgo,
y no a la universalidad de una herencia que, segun el art. 659 del
citado Codigo civil, se determina a muerte del causante,
constituyendola todos los bienes, derechos y obligaciones que por ella
no se hayan extinguido: * * *” (Italics supplied.)
It will be noted that what is prohibited to be the subject matter of a contract under Article 1271 of the Civil Code is “future inheritance.”
To us future inheritance is any property or right not in existence or
capable of determination at the time of the contract, that a person may
in the future acquire by succession. The properties subject of the
contract Exhibit “A” are well-defined properties, existing at the time
of the agreement, which Simeon Blas declares in his testament as
belonging to his wife as her share in the conjugal partnership.
Certainly his wife’s actual share in the conjugal properties may not be
considered as future inheritance because they were actually in existence at the time Exhibit “A” was executed.
The trial court held that the plaintiffs-appellants in the case at bar
are concluded by the judgment rendered in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas for the reason that the
properties left by him belonged to himself and his wife Maxima Santos;
that the project of partition in the said case, adjudicating to Maxima
Santos one-half as her share in the conjugal properties, is a bar to
another action on the same subject matter, Maxima Santos having became
absolute owner of the said properties adjudicated in her favor. As
already adverted to above, these contentions would be correct if
applied to the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants that said properties
were acquired with the first wife of Simeon Blas, Marte Cruz. But the
main ground upon which plaintiffs base their present action is the
document Exhibit “A”, already fully considered above. As this private
document contains the express promise made by Maxima Santos to convey
in her testament, upon her death, one-half of the conjugal properties
she would receive as her share in the conjugal properties, the action
to enforce the said promise did not arise until and after her death
when it was found that she did not comply with her above-mentioned
promise. (Art. 1969, old Civil Code.) The argument that the failure of
the plaintiffs-appellants herein to oppose the project of partition in
the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas, especially that portion of
the project which assigned to Maxima Santos one-half of all the
conjugal properties, bars their present action, is, therefore, devoid
of merit. It may be added that plaintiffs-appellants did not question
the validity of the project of partition precisely because of the
promise made by Maxima Santos in the compromise Exhibit “A”; they
acquiesced in the approval of said project of partition because they
were relying on the promise made by Maxima Santos in Exhibit “A”, that
she would transmit one-half of the conjugal properties that she wag
going to receive as her share in the conjugal partnership, upon her
death and in her will, to the heirs and legatees of her husband Simeon
Blas.
Neither can the claim of prescription be considered in
favor of the defendants. The right of action arose at the time of the
death of Maxima Santos on October 5, 1956, when she failed to comply
with the promise made by her in Exhibit “A”. The plaintiffs-appellants
immediately presented this action on December 27, 1956, upon learning
of such failure on the part of Maxima Santos to comply with said
promise. This defense is, therefore, also without merit.
It
is next contended by the defendant-appellee that Maxima Santos complied
with her above-mentioned promise,—that Andres Pascual, Tomasa Avelino,
Justo Garcia, Ludovico Pimpin and Marta Gervacio Blas were given
substantial legacies in the will and testament of Maxima Santos. To
determine whether she had actually complied with the promise made in
Exhibit “A”, there is herein set forth a list only of the fishponds
and their respective areas as contained in the list of properties she
acquired as her share in the conjugal partnership, which list includes,
besides, many ricelands as well as residential lots, thus:
Paco, Obando, Bulacan hectares Pangjolo, Obando hectares Batang Pirasuan, Lubao, Pampanga hectares Calangian, Lubao, Pampanga hectares Bakuling, Lubao, Pampanga hectares Bakuling, Lubao, Pampanga hectares Bangkal, Sinubli, hectares Tagulod, hectares Bangkal Pugad, hectares hectares hectares Magtapat, Bangkal, Lubao, Pampanga hectares hectares hectares Pinanganakan, Lubao, Pampanga hectares Emigdio, Lingid, Lubao, Pampanga hectares Propios, Lubao, Pampanga hectares Batang Mabuanbuan, Sexmoan, Pampanga hectares Binatang Mabuanbuan, Sexmoan, Pampanga hectares Sapang Magtua, Sexmoan, Pampanga hectares Kay Limpin, Sexmoan, Pampanga hectares Calise Mabalumbum, Sexmoan, Pampanga hectares Messapinit Kineke, Sexmoan, Pampanga hectares hectares hectares hectares hectares hectares hectares hectares hectares Dalang, Banga, Sexmoan, Pampanga hectares Alaminos, Alaminos, Pangasinan hectares Mangasu, Sexmoan, Pampanga hectares Don Tomas, Sexmoan, Pampanga hectares Matikling, Lubao, Pampanga hectares Total area ……………………………………… hectares
In her will, Maxima Santos devised to Marta Gervacio Blas the
80-hectare fishpond, situated in Lubao, Pampanga. The fishpond devised
is evidently that designated as “Propios” in Lubao, Pampanga, item No.
48 in the list of properties adjudicated to her in the project of
partition. (Record on Appeal, p. 215.) Considering that the total area
of the fishpond, amounts to 1,045.7863 hectares, the 80 hectares
devised to Marta Gervacio Blas is not even one-tenth of the total area
of the fishponds. Add to this the fact that in the will she imposed
upon Marta Gervacio Blas de Chivi an existing obligation on said
fishponds, namely, its lease in 1957 and the duty to pay out of the
rentals thereof an obligation to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
(RFC). (Ibid., pp. 262-263.) Angelina Blas was given only a lot
of 150 square meters in Hulong Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, and Leony Blas,
the sum of P300.00 (Ibid., p. 264.)
It is evident
from a1 consideration of the above figures and facts that Maxima Santos
did not comply with her obligation to devise one-half of her conjugal
properties to the heirs and legatees of her husband. She does not state
that she had complied with such obligation in her will. If she intended
to comply therewith by giving some of the heirs of Simeon Blas the
properties mentioned above, the most that can be considered in her
favor is to deduct the value of said properties from the total amount
of properties which she had undertaken to convey upon her death.
All the issues in the pleadings of the parties and in their respective
briefs, have now been fully discussed and considered. Reiterating what
we have stated above, we declare that by Exhibit “A”, a compromise to
avoid litigation, Maxima Santos promised to devise to the heirs and
legatees of her husband Simeon Blas, one-half of the properties she
received as her share in the conjugal partnership of herself and her
husband, which share is specified in the project of partition submitted
by herself on March 14, 1939 in the settlement of the estate of her
husband, and which is found on pages 195 to 240 of the record on appeal
and on pages 27 to 46 of the project of partition, submitted by Maxima
Santos herself before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil
Case No. 6707, entitled “Testamentaria del Finado Don Simeon Blas,
Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, Administradora”; and that she failed to
comply with her aforementioned obligation. (Exhibit “A”).
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the
defendant-appellee, administratrix of the estate of Maxima Santos, is
ordered to convey and deliver one-half of the properties adjudicated to
Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal properties in said Civil
Case No. 6707, entitled “Testamentaria del Finado Don Simeon Blas,
Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, Administradora”, to the heirs and the
legatees of her husband Simeon Blas. Considering that all said heirs
and legatees, designated in the will of Simeon Blas as the persons for
whose benefit Exhibit “A” had been executed, have not appeared in these
proceedings, the record is hereby remanded to the court below, with
instructions that, after the conveyance of the properties hereinabove
ordered had been effected, the said heirs and legatees (of Simeon Blas)
file adversary pleadings to determine the participation of each and
every one of them in said properties. Costs against the
defendant-appellee Rosalina Santos.
Padilla, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
CONCURRING OPINION
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Labrador, and would only add
that the doctrine in the decision of 8 October 1915 of the Supreme
Court of Spain, applied in the main opinion, is not a mere accident nor
an isolated instance, but one of a series of decisions reaffirming the
legal proposition therein laid down. Thus, the Presiding Justice Castan
of the Spanish Tribunal Supremo, in volume 3 of his Treaties on Civil
Law (1951 Edition, page 344, footnote 2), observes that:
“(2)
La sentencia de 16 de mayo de 1940 declara que segun la doctrina
sentada por el Tribunal Supremo en sus fallos de 8 de octubre de 1915 y
26 de octubre de 1926 y por la Direccion de los Registros en su
resolucion de 19 de mayo de 1917, la prohibicion contenida en el art.
1.271 so refiere unica y exclusivamente a los pactos sobre la
universalidad de una herencia que, segun el art. 659, se determina a la
muerte del causante, constituyendola todos los bienes, derechos y
obligaciones que por ella no se hayan extinguido y no al pacto sobre
bienes conocidos y determinados, existentes, cuando tal compromiso se
otorgo, on el dominio del cedente.”
And in
a later decision of 25 April 1951, the Supreme Court of Spain once more
insisted on the rule that a successional agreement concerning property
already owned by the grantor at the time the contract was perfected is
not banned by Article 1271 of the Spanish Civil Code (corresponding to
Article 1347 of the Civil Code of the Philippines):
“Considerando:
Que el tercer motivo del recurso de doña M. G. G, y el sexto del
formulado por doña D. G. G., hacen referencia a la ultima de las tres
cuestiones que son objeto del debate en ambos recursos interpuestos,
esto es, la discutida cesion que las hermanas señoras G. G., hoy
recurrentes, hicieron a doña C. A. de la mitad de los bienes muebles e inmuebles que recibiesen por herencia de doña M. P.,
procedentes de la de doña M. A. P., antes N., consignada en documento
privado de fecha 2 de noviembre de 1928, firmado y reconocida su
autenticidad por las tres señoras interesadas, cuya validez y eficacia
es objeto de la cuarta pieza de los presentes autos acumulados, y si se
examina con detenimiento el documento aludio y el pacto que en el so
consigna habra de advertirse de mode notorio que se halla afectado de
vicio de nulidad, porque su objeto son unos bienes que claramente se expresa que han de entrar en el patrimonio de las cedentes mediante una transmission hereditaria, lo que constituye el pacto sobre herencia futura prohibido por el parrafo segundo del articulo 1271 del Codigo Civil, ya
que no se concreta sobre bienes conocidos y determinados, existentes en
el dominio del cedente cuando el compromiso se otorgo sino que se
refiere a la universalidad de bienes que habrian de adquirirse a la
muerte del causante, sentido en el que conforme a la jurisprudencia
de esta Sala es de plena aplicacion la norma substantiva antes citada,
y al no haberlo asi entendido la Sala de instancia, ha incurrido en la
infraccion de interpretar erroneamento y por ello ha hecho aplicacion
indebida de dicho preccepto y procede la estimacion de los motivos que
al principio se citan y que denuncian la estimada infraccion,
produciendo la casacion de la sentencia recurrida en el extremo a que
los dichos motivos se refieren.” (Sentencia 25 abril 1951) (Italics
supplied)
It can thus be seen that the
constant authoritative interpretation of the prohibition against
agreements involving future inheritance requires not only that a future
succession be contemplated but also that the subject matter of the
bargain should be either the universality or complex or mass of
property owned by the grantor at the time of his death, or else ah
aliquot portion thereof. Castan, in his Treatise already mentioned,
sums up the rulings in this wise:
‘Por
otra parte, se ha de entender: 1.º Que la cesio o enajena cion de los
derechos hereditarios puede hacerse una vez fallecido el causante,
aunque no se haya entrado en posesion material de los bienes, 2.º Que
la prohibicion legal se reñere solo a los contratos concludos sobre la
herencia misma o alguna de sus cuotas, no sobre objetos aislados que,
eventualmente, hayan de adquirirse a virtud de la herencia.”
It has been contended that the doctrine thus stated confuses future inheritance (herencia futura) with future property
(bienes futuros). This is a misapprehension. In construing the term
“future inheritance” as the contingent universality or complex of
property rights and obligations that are to pass to the heirs upon the
death of the grantor, the rule advocated merely correlates the
prohibition against contracts over “future inheritance” with the
definition of “inheritance” given in Article 659 of the Spanish Civil
Code, which is now Article 776 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
“Art.
776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations
of a person which are not extinguished by his death.”
The inheritance of a person may, and usually does, include not only
property that he already owns at a given time, but also his future
property, that is to say, the property that he may subsequently
acquire. But it may include only future property whenever he should
dispose of the present property before he dies. And future inheritance
may include only property he already owns at any given moment, if he
should thereafter acquire no other property until his death. In any
case, the inheritance or estate consists of the totality of assets and
liabilities he holds at the time of his demise, and not what he
possesses at any other time. If the questioned contract envisages all
or a fraction of that contingent mass, then it is a contract over
“herencia futura”, otherwise it is not. The statutory prohibition, in
other words, is not so much concerned with the process of transfer as
with the subject matter of the bargain. It is addressed to “future
inheritance”, not “future succession”.
Of course, it can be
said that every single item of property that a man should hold at any
given instant of his life may become a part of his inheritance—if he
keeps it long enough. But is that mere possibility (or even
probability) sufficient to stamp upon a contract over an individualized
item of existing property the outlaw brand of “contract over future
inheritance”? If it should ever be, then no agreement concerning
present property can escape the legal ban. No donation intervivos, no reversionary clause, no borrowing of money, and no alienation, not even a contract of sale (or other contract in praesenti
for that matter), with or without deferred delivery, will avoid the
reproach that it concerns or affects the grantor’s “future
inheritance”. It is permissible to doubt whether the law ever
contemplated the sweeping away of the entire contractual system so
carefully regulated in the Code.
The restrictive
interpretation given by the Spanish Supreme Court to the codal
prohibition of agreements involving future inheritance is justified not
only by the fact that the prohibition limits contractual freedom (and
therefore, should not be given extensive interpretation), but also
because there is no real or substantial difference between (1) an
agreement whereby a person, for a valuable consideration, agrees to
bequeath some of the property he already owns, and (2) a contract
whereby he disposes of that property, subject to the condition that he
will be entitled to its usufruct until the time he dies. The court has
repeatedly sanctioned even donations inter vivos wherein the
donor has reserved to himself the right to enjoy the donated property
for the remainder of his days, and defers the actual transfer of
possession to the time of his death (Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633; Balagui vs. Dongso, 53 Phil., 673; Laureta vs.
Mata, 44 Phil., 668). Whatever objection is raised against the effects
of the first kind of contracts can be made to apply to the second.
Mature reflection will show that where present (existing) property is
the object of the bargain, all arguments brandished against convention
over future succession (post mortem) are just as applicable to other
contracts de praesenti with deferred execution, the validity of
which has never been questioned. Thus, the loss of the power be
bequeath the bargained property to persons of the grantor’s choice, and
the awakening of the grantee’s desire for the early death of the
grantor (the Roman “votum mortis captandae”) in order to obtain prompt
control of the contracted goods, occur in both cases. In truth, the
latter ground would bar even a contract of life insurance in favor of a
stated beneficiary. It may also be noted that since the later part of
the nineteenth century, the civilists have recognized that the progress
in social relations has rendered such objections obsolete (Puig Peña,
Derecho Civil, Vol. V, part I, p. 613 et seq.).
But where
the contract involves the universality of the estate that will be left
at a person’s death (the “herencia futura” as understood by the Spanish
Tribunal Supremo), there is another reason which I believe to be the
true justification for the legal interdiction, and it is this: that if
a man were to be allowed to bargain away all the property he expects to
leave behind (i.e., his estate as a whole), he would practically remain
without any incentive to practice thrift and frugality, or to conserve
and invest his earnings and property. He would then be irresistibly
drawn to be a wasteful spendthrift, a social parasite, without any
regard for his future, because whatever he leaves will belong to
another by virtue of his contract. The disastrous effects upon family
and society if such agreements were to be held binding can be readily
imagined. Hence, the interpretation given to Article 1271 (now Art.
1347) by the Supreme Court of Spain appears amply supported by
practical reasons, and there is no ground to deny its application.
Much
emphasis has been placed on the provisions of the contract Exhibit “A”
that the widow, Maxima Santos de Blas, would execute a testament in
favor of the appellees. To me this is purely secondary, since it is
merely the method selected by the parties for carrying out the widow’s
agreement to convey to the appellees the property in question without
her losing its enjoyment during her natural life, and does not affect
the substance or the validity of the transaction. To ensure the widow’s
possession of the property and the perception of its fruits while she
was alive, the means logically selected was to return it by will, since
such a conveyance could only be operative after death. There might be a
doubt as to the validity of this arrangement if the widow’s promise had
been purely gratuitous, because then it could be argued that the
promise involved a hybrid donation mortis causa yet irrevocable;[1] but here the obligation to return is concededly irrevocable and supported by adequate consideration duly received in advance.
Since the agreement in the instant case did not refer to the future
estate of the widow of Blas, but only to part of her present property
at the time the contract was made; since the promise to retransfer
one-half of her conjugal share was supported by adequate consideration
as shown in the main decision; since the contract obviated protracted
litigation and complicated accounting in settling the conjugal
partnership of Blas and his first (deceased) wife; and since the
testament that the widow promised to make was merely the mode chosen to
perform the contract and carry out the promised devolution of the
property, being thus of secondary importance, I can see no reason for
declaring the entire arrangement violative of the legal interdiction of
contracts over future inheritance, and disappoint the legitimate
expectation held by the heirs of the first wife during all these years.
[1]
Note that the original “pactum successorium” was essentially
gratuitous: che e essenzialmente a titolo gratuito”, (Stolfi, Diritto
Civile, Vol. 6. p. 89).
CONCURRING OPINION
BARRERA, J.:
It seems to me clear/that the document Exhibit “A”, basis of the action
of the plaintiffs-appellants, refers specifically to and affects solely
the share of the grantor Maxima Santos in the conjugal properties as
determined and specified in the will of her husband Simeon Blas, whose
provisions, which she expressly acknowledged to have read and
understood, constitute the raison d’etre of her promise to
deliver or convey, by will, one-half of that specific share to the
heirs and legatees named in her husband’s will (who are his heirs by
his first marriage). Nowhere in the document Exhibit “A” is there
reference to her hereditary estate that she herself would leave behind
at the time of her own demise which legally would be her “future
inheritance”. For this reason, I believe the contractual obligation
assumed by Maxima Santos in virtue of Exhibit “A” does not come within
the prohibition of Article 1271 of the Spanish Civil Code, now Article
1347 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
I, therefore, concur in the opinions of Justices Labrador and Reyes.
DISSENTING OPINION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
While I agree with the theory that the document Exhibit A does not
involve a contract on future inheritance but a promise made by Maxima
Santos to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal property
acquired during her marriage to Simeon Blas to the heirs and legatees
of the latter, I am however of the opinion that herein appellants have
no cause of action because Maxima Santos has substantially complied
with her promise.
It should be noted that Maxima Santos’
promise to transmit is predicated on the condition that she can freely
choose and select from among the heirs and legatees of her husband
those to whom she would like to give and bequeath depending on the
respect, service and companionship that they may render to her. Her
commitment is not an absolute promise to give to all but only to whom she may choose and select. And here this promise has been substantially complied with.
Thus, it appears that Maxima Santos selected eight of such heirs and
legatees instituted in the will of her husband. Note that appellant
Marta Gervacio Blas, who was given a legacy of only P38,000.00 in the
will of Simeon Blas, was given by her a legacy worth around
P400,000.00; appellants Loida Gervacio Blas (or Luding Blas) and
Leoncio (Leony) Gervacio Blas were given a legacy of P300.00 each every
year to last during their lifetime: and Lorenzo Santos was given a
legacy; of two fishponds and one-tenth of the whole residuary estate.
It may be stated that although appellant Maria Gervacio Blas was not
given any legacy in Maxima Santos’ will, yet her son Simeon Dungao was
given a legacy of a residential land in Tonsuya, Malabon.
I,
therefore, consider not in keeping with the nature of the pledge made
by Maxima Santos the decision of the majority in ordering her
administratrix to convey and deliver one-half of her share in the
conjugal property to all the heirs and legatees of her husband
Simeon Blas, because only such heirs and legatees are entitled to share
in the property as may be selected by Maxima Santos, and this she has
already done. For these reasons, I dissent.