YUSUKE FUKUZUMI, PETITIONER, VS. SANRITSU GREAT INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, TETSUJI MARUYAMA, AKIRA KUBOTA, YUKIO MATSUZAKA, RESPONDENTS.

Fukuzumi versus Sanritsu Great International Corporation

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Yusuke Fukuzumi against Sanritsu Great International Corporation and three individual respondents, Tetsuji Maruyama, Akira Kubota, and Yukio Matsuzaka. Fukuzumi was the defendant in a civil case for the collection of sums of money, and judgment was rendered against him. He lost his appeal not on the merits but on a single day: his notice of appeal was filed one day late. He then sought relief from that denial, and when relief was refused, he came to the Supreme Court. The case matters because it fixes the boundary between two remedies — a petition for relief under Rule 38 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 — and because it states, in uncompromising terms, that the perfection of an appeal within the prescribed period is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that clients are bound by the negligence of their counsel.

Procedural History

The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 258, rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered Fukuzumi to pay various sums. Fukuzumi moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. He then filed his notice of appeal one day beyond the reglementary period, and the trial court denied the notice of appeal. Fukuzumi filed a verified petition for relief from that order, which the trial court also denied, holding that Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was not applicable. His motion for reconsideration of that denial was likewise denied. Fukuzumi then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, which denied the petition for lack of merit.

Facts

On January 26, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Sanritsu Great International Corporation and the individual plaintiffs, ordering Fukuzumi to pay a rental deposit of 90,000 pesos, unused rental payments of 112,500 pesos, 16,500 pesos for a pressure pump and overhead tank, 8,000 pesos for hauling, 137,148.15 pesos in actual damages for hotel bills, 50,000 pesos in attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.

Fukuzumi received a copy of the decision on February 9, 1999, and filed a motion for reconsideration on February 23, 1999. The trial court denied the motion in an order dated April 27, 1999, which Fukuzumi received on May 5, 1999. Instead of perfecting his appeal on May 6, 1999, he filed his notice of appeal only on May 7, 1999 — one day beyond the reglementary period. The trial court denied the notice of appeal in an order dated June 2, 1999, which Fukuzumi received on June 10, 1999.

On June 22, 1999, Fukuzumi filed a verified petition for relief. He claimed that his counsel had suffered high blood pressure on May 6, 1999 and had been advised by his doctor to rest for three days. He attached a medical certificate issued on June 18, 1999 stating that counsel had been examined on May 6, 1999, with the impression of essential hypertension, moderate, and was advised to rest for at least three days, from May 6 to May 8, 1999. The trial court denied the petition for relief, and denied reconsideration as well.

Issues

• Whether or not a petition for relief under Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy of a party whose notice of appeal was denied by the trial court.
• Whether or not the petitioner was prevented by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence from filing his notice of appeal within the reglementary period.
• Whether or not the negligence of counsel may be imputed to the client so as to bar relief.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. When a judgment or final order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the appeal be given due course.

This is the provision under which Fukuzumi sought relief, and its requirement of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is the very ground on which his petition failed.

Section 1 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which the Court quotes, provides:

Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: (a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration; (b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (c) An interlocutory order; In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate civil action under Rule 65.

This provision identifies the correct remedy: since an order denying a petition for relief is not appealable, the aggrieved party must file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the remedy of a party whose notice of appeal is denied by the trial court, although the notice was filed within the period, is to file a motion for reconsideration of the order and, if denied, to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. But if the party is prevented by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence from filing the notice of appeal within the reglementary period, the remedy is a petition for relief in the same case under Section 2, Rule 38. The Court stressed that such relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief would be tantamount to reviving a right of appeal already lost.

On the second issue, the Court found the failure to file the notice of appeal within the period far from excusable. The medical certificate showed that counsel was examined on May 6, 1999 and advised to rest for three days, until May 8, 1999. Yet counsel was able to prepare and file the notice of appeal on May 7, 1999, when he was supposed to be resting. The petitioner also failed to allege in his notice of appeal that it was filed one day late because of his counsel's high blood pressure; that allegation came only after he received the order denying the notice of appeal, and the medical certificate was secured only on June 18, 1999. The Court thus characterized the claim as a mere afterthought to cover up the collective negligence of the petitioner and his counsel.

On the third issue, the Court held that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence, and omissions of their counsel. It further stressed that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that failure to perfect an appeal renders the judgment final and executory. The right to appeal is not a natural right or part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.

Doctrine

A party whose notice of appeal is denied may move for reconsideration and then file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. A party prevented by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence from taking an appeal may file a petition for relief under Section 2, Rule 38. Relief under Rule 38 is unavailable where the loss of the appeal was due to the party's own negligence or a mistaken mode of procedure. The perfection of an appeal within the prescribed period is mandatory and jurisdictional, and the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege. Clients are bound by the negligence of their counsel.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit, leaving the judgment against Fukuzumi final and executory.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege, not a natural right or part of due process. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between a petition for relief under Rule 38 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and to test whether the negligence of counsel binds the client.