PRIMO PANTI, ET AL., PETITIONERS. PRIMO PANTI, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CATANDUANES, ETC., AND THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Catanduanes dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed
by herein appellant Primo Panti and four others for being insufficient
in substance to justify the relief prayed for.

For a better understanding of the case, the antecedent proceedings,
which are on record, are here stated as follows: On September 4, 1957,
Governor Juan Alberto of the province of Cantanduanes, finding merit
after proper investigation in certain complaints preferred against
Mayor Primo Panti of Virac, his vice-mayor and some councilors, sent
letters to the Provincial Board wherein he formally lodged charges of
irregularities against said officials. On September 5, Governor Alberto
notified Mayor Panti of his suspension effective on said date. The
mayor was likewise notified of the hearing of the charges which was set
on September 12.

When the day set for the hearing arrived, Mayor Panti and his
co-respondents, however, did not appear so that the hearing had to be
postponed. After two more postponements due to their absence, or on
October 7, of that Panti, et al. vs. Provincial Board of
Catanduanes, and Hon. Executive Secretary same year, the said officials
filed with the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes two separate
petitions, one for certiorari with preliminary injunction and another
for mandamus, disputing the legality of their suspension and praying
for their reinstatement.

On October 11, the date last set for the hearing of the
administrative charges, Mayor Panti and his co-respondents appeared for
the first time before the Provincial Board with their counsel. At that
hearing, however, they questioned for the first time the Board’s
jurisdiction to try the case because, according to them, the charges
bear no relation with their official duties. As the question was
resolved adversely, Mayor Panti again moved for postponement. The
motion, however, was denied and the Board ordered the fiscal to present
his evidence. After the hearing, the Provincial Board, on October 21,
rendered decision finding the charges substantiated and recommending
the dismissal of the suspended officials. Thereafter, the record of the
case was forwarded to the Executive Secretary for final action.

In the meantime, the two cases filed before the Court of First
Instance of Cantanduanes were consolidated because of the interrelation
existing between them, and after trial, the court rendered decision
dismissing the case insofar as Mayor Panti was concerned for lack of
merit, but ordering the reinstatement of the other respondents, it
being held that the Governor exceeded his authority in ordering their
suspension. That decision, on appeal by Mayor Panti to this Court, was
affirmed, the Court holding that the alleged irregularities as duly
substantiated by sufficient evidence were committed by him in
connection with the performance of his official duties and that his
preventive suspension was within the 30-day period authorized by law,
the interruptions in the hearing having been due to his requests for
postponement or to his absence. (Panti vs. Alberto, supra, p. 181).

On February 28, 1958, the Executive Secretary, acting upon the
appeal by the suspended officials, ordered a rehearing of the charges
in the interest of justice, with the warning, however, that no petition
for postponement will be entertained. Complying with that order, the
Provincial Board of Catanduanes set the rehearing of the administrative
charges on March 21, 1958. When the Board convened on that date, Mayor
Panti and his co-respondents appeared but they again asked for
postponement to give them reasonable time to bring in their counsel and
witnesses. The request, however, was denied although the Board allowed
the suspended officials until March 25 to enter into trial. On that
last date mentioned, Mayor Panti and his co-respondents were present
before the Board. They were, however, without counsel and for that
reason they reiterated their motion for postponement. Their motion
having been denied, they filed with the Court of First Instance of the
province a petition for certiorari and mandamus against the Provincial
Board joining as party respondent the Hon. Executive Secretary. The
petition alleges, among other things, that notice of the hearing of the
administrative charges set for March 21, 1958 was received by
petitioner Primo Panti only at about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
March 20, when it was relayed to him in Manila by his wife from Virac;
that he returned on that same date to Virac and from there sent
telegrams to their lawyers in Manila, informing them of the hearing;
that the said attorneys, who could not come, requested for postponement
of the hearing to March 26, which request was denied by the Provincial
Board, that the denial of the postponement of the hearing has caused
great and irreparable injury to petitioner for “the alleged
administrative case against them shall be decided finally, on
unilateral evidence of the prosecution alone;” that there is no appeal,
or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to petitioners
in the ordinary course of law; and that the order of the respondent
Board denying the petitioners’ request for postponement of the hearing
was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to an act in excess of its
jurisdiction. The petition, therefore, prays that respondents be
required to answer; that a preliminary injunction be issued to restrain
respondents from further proceeding with the administrative case until
after the special civil action shall have been terminated; and that
after hearing on the merits, the order of the respondent Board dated
March 21, 1958 denying petitioners’ motion for postponement be declared
null and void and the respondents be ordered to reset the
administrative case for hearing giving petitioners reasonable time to
bring in their counsel and witnesses.

On June 9, 1958, the lower court finding “the substance of the
petition insufficient as to warrant the issuance of an order or process
to compel the respondents to answer”, issued an order dismissing the
petition without pronouncement as to costs. From that order, Primo
Panti has appealed to this Court.

The order of dismissal must stand.

The matter of adjournments and postponements of trial is generally
within the discretion of the hearing board or tribunal. Such discretion
will not be interfered with by mandamus or by appeal, unless a grave
abuse thereof is shown. (See Moran’s Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1957 ed.,
pp. 439-440.) Considering the instruction of the Hon. Executive
Secretary—as contained in an indorsement attached to the petition below
as Annex “B”—that no further postponement shall be entertained during
the rehearing, we do not think that the dismissed petition had made out
a case against the respondent Provincial Board, and much less against
the Executive Secretary, as could be the proper subject of the
extraordinary civil remedies of certiorari and mandamus.

In any event, the rule is settled that no recourse to courts can be
had until all administrative remedies have been exhausted and that
special civil actions against administrative officers should not be
entertained if superior administrative officers could grant relief. The
lower court in its order of dismissal held that the order of the
Provincial Board denying appellant’s motion for postponement could very
well be corrected by the Executive Secretary. That said official has
such power is not denied. As a matter of fact, the petition itself
avers that when appellant together with the other suspended officials
complained and appealed to the Executive Secretary against the alleged
irregularity committed by the Provincial Board in the conduct of the
hearing of the charges against them, the said Secretary ordered a
re-hearing. Appellant’s apprehension, therefore, that this worthy
official will not grant him relief from the alleged irregularities, if
warranted by the facts and circumstances, is groundless.

In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J. B, L., J., concurs on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.