JANE C. ABALOS, BERNARDO A. BAMBICO, MANUEL G. MALAG, WILFREDO R. SOTELO, PERCIVAL B. AGRITO, RICHARD M. BALAN-EG, AND EDGARDO S. NILLO PETITIONERS, VS. PHILEX MINING CORPORATIO…

This petition for review assails the decision^[1] dated
July 30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50167, which affirmed
the order^[2]
dated December 11, 1998 of Arbitrator Juan Valdez of the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board, Cordillera Administrative Region, Baguio City. That order partially modified an earlier one
dated March 5, 1994,^[3]
by directing respondent Philex Mining Corporation to pay petitioners their
separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement.

The factual antecedent are uncomplicated.

A manpower audit conducted by respondent Philex, for brevity,
revealed that 241 of its employees were redundant. Thus, Philex undertook a retrenchment program that resulted in
the termination of petitioners’ employment effective June 30, 1993.
Consequently, petitioners filed a case for illegal dismissal against
respondent. The case was submitted for
arbitration through a submission agreement coursed through the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board, Cordillera Administrative Region, Baguio
City.

On March 5, 1994, Voluntary Arbitrator Juan Valdez rendered his
decision, concluding that:

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, Respondent is hereby ordered to
reinstate the Complainants and Intervenors to their former positions with back
wages without loss of seniority and privileges within 10 days from receipt
hereof except the two employees namely Pedro Otgalon and Miguel Guyapat who
have applied for and granted early retirement; provided that the amount of
separation pay already received by them shall be deducted from their backwages;
and provided further that should the backwages of the employee concerned be
less than the amount of separation pay received, the employee concerned shall
refund to Respondent the balance thereof; and for Respondent to pay to Counsel
of the Complainants and Intervenors 10% each of the total amount of backwages
due the employees represented by them as attorney’s fees. No award of damages.

SO ORDERED.^[4]

Philex appealed to this Court and the case was remanded to the
Court of Appeals. On July 22, 1997, the appellate court promulgated its
decision, thus:

In view of the foregoing, we rule that, while there was indeed a
valid reason for retrenchment, the means employed were disadvantageous, thus
inequitable, to the affected workers. The fact that these workers signed
quitclaims and received their separation pay would not estop them from seeking
reinstatement. The Supreme Court said: The reason why quitclaims are commonly
frowned upon as contrary to public policy, and why they are held to be
ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the workers’ legal rights, is
the fact that the employer and the employee obviously do not stand on the same
footing. (Marcos vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 111744, 248
SCRA 146 [1995]).

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.^[5]

Philex elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari,
which we denied in a resolution dated January 14, 1998. Entry of judgment was made on April 27,
1998.

On August 14, 1998, Philex filed a manifestation and motion for
leave to offer separation pay to petitioners, in lieu of reinstatement, before the Office of Voluntary Arbitrator
Juan Valdez. Philex alleged that
petitioners’ positions no longer existed and that there arose strained
relations between the parties that effectively barred reinstatement.

Arbitrator Juan Valdez granted Philex’s motion in his order dated
December 11, 1998, thus:

In the light of the foregoing, Respondent is ordered to pay the
Complainants and Intervenors the amounts of backwages and separation pay stated
above less the total amount of salary they received as a result of their
reinstatement thru payroll from November 24, 1997 to date within twenty (20)
days from receipt hereof plus ten percent (10%) thereof as attorneys’ fees,
otherwise this Office will direct the proper Sheriff to execute this Order.

SO ORDERED.^[6]

Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals on the ground that Arbitrator Juan Valdez acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction. On July 30,
1990, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the order of
Arbitrator Valdez. It likewise denied
the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for review, anchored on a single assignment
of error:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF
LAW IN AFFIRMING THE DECEMBER 11, 1998 ORDER OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
JUAN B. VALDEZ ALTERING AND MODIFYING HIS MARCH 5, 1994 DECISION WHICH
HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY ON APRIL 27, 1998.^[7]

Petitioners aver that when the March 5, 1994 order directing
their reinstatement became final and executory, Arbitrator Valdez no longer had
jurisdiction to modify the same. According to them, an order that has become final and executory can no
longer be modified or altered.

Petitioners further insist that Philex failed to sufficiently
establish (1) that there were supervening events which rendered enforcement of
the final order unjust, and (2) that the positions vacated by them no longer
existed and there were no similar positions available for them. Petitioners point out that Philex did not
conduct any investigation as to the manner and purpose of the abolition of
their former positions. They also assert
that Philex subcontracted to outsiders the work previously performed by the
retrenched employees, which proved that there was no need to abolish their
positions.

As to the alleged strained relations between the parties,
petitioners maintain that this was also not proven adequately. Petitioners submit that for this doctrine to
apply, it must be shown that the affected employees occupied positions of trust
and confidence, or that the employees’ differences with their employer are of
such nature or degree as to preclude reinstatement. Petitioners argue that neither of these conditions is present in
this case.

For its part, respondent contends that it presented evidence
showing the impossibility and inappropriateness of reinstatement, which justify
the modification of the March 5, 1994 arbitration order. Arbitrator Valdez found proof of this fact
and upon appeal, the Court of Appeals declared said finding as sufficiently
supported by evidence. Invoking the
principle embodied in Compania Maritima, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,^[8]
respondent avers that this factual finding must be accorded great weight, in
the absence of any showing that it is whimsical, capricious, or arbitrary.

A basic tenet in our rules of procedure is that an award that is
final and executory cannot be amended or modified anymore. Nothing is more settled in law than that
once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or
by the highest court of the land.^[9] However, this rule is subject to
exceptions as stated in the case of David
vs. CA, 316 SCRA 710 (1999), cited by respondent:

One exception is that where facts and/or events transpire after a
decision has become executory, which facts and/or events present a supervening
cause or reason which renders the final and executory decision no longer
enforceable. Under the law, the court may modify or alter a judgment even after
the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying
or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has
become final and executory.^[10]

In David, we held also
that “where an execution order [which] has been issued is still pending, all
proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.”^[11] As such, modification of the execution
of such judgment is allowed.

In Torres vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 330 SCRA 311 (2000), this Court ruled that:

Execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the suit. It
cannot be frustrated except for serious reasons demanded by justice and equity.
In this jurisdiction, the rule is that when a judgment becomes final and
executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution
to enforce the judgment. A writ of execution may however be refused on
equitable grounds as when there was a change in the situation of the parties
that would make execution inequitable or when certain circumstances, which
transpired after judgment became final, rendered execution of judgment unjust. The fact that the decision has become final
does not preclude a modification or an alteration thereof because even with the
finality of judgment, when its execution becomes impossible or unjust, it may
be modified or altered to harmonize the same with justice and the facts (emphasis
supplied). ^[12]

In Deltaventures Resources
Inc. vs. Cabato, 327 SCRA 521 (2000), we held that “jurisdiction once
acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the
case is terminated.”^[13] The power of a voluntary arbitrator to
issue a writ of execution carries with it the power to inquire into the
correctness of its execution and to consider whatever supervening events
transpire during execution.^[14] Therefore, we are in agreement with the
appellate court that a voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction to amend the mode
of executing an award if and when the case merits such amendment.

However, we find respondent’s reliance on the doctrine of
“strained relations” misplaced. In Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Quijano,^[15]
we stated that said doctrine is inapplicable to a situation where the employee
has no say in the operation of the employer’s business. Petitioners herein are part of the rank-and-file workforce; they
are cooks, miners, helpers and mechanics of the respondent.^[16] As held also in the Mercury Drug case:

To protect labor’s security of tenure, we emphasize that the
doctrine of strained relations should be strictly applied so as not to deprive
an illegally dismissed employee of his right to reinstatement. Every labor
dispute almost always results in strained relations and the phrase cannot be
given an overarching interpretation, otherwise an unjustly dismissed employee
can never be reinstated.^[17]

Considering the circumstances in the present case, we find that
the only issue to be resolved is whether the supervening events are grave
enough to warrant a modification in the execution of the judgment. Both the voluntary arbitrator and the Court
of Appeals found that reinstatement is no longer possible due to the fact that
respondent has been continuously suffering business losses and reducing the
number of its employees pending litigation, and so the positions held by
petitioners were abolished as a cost-cutting measure.^[18] Petitioners argue, however, that “to excuse the respondent from
reinstating the petitioners would be to allow it to do indirectly what it was
not allowed to do directly – the retrenchment of the petitioners.” They add
that what is so scheming about this ploy is that respondent now tries to
justify its refusal to reinstate the petitioners “by its very own act of
abolishing their positions.”^[19]

Despite our sympathy for the workers’ plight, however, we find no
legal support for their opposition to the conclusion and findings of the voluntary
arbitrator and the Court of Appeals. On
record, there is no showing that the abolition of the petitioners’ positions
was capricious or whimsical. The
appellate court, as well as the voluntary arbitrator, based their decisions on
applicable law and the evidence. As
confirmed by the appellate court, the voluntary arbitrator also found that
petitioners’ reinstatement had become not only inappropriate but also
impossible.

Regrettably, petitioners now raise questions the determination of
which would require the Court to look into the evidence adduced by the
parties. This cannot be done in a
petition for review on certiorari. It is outside its purview under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Court. Factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to
have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction are
generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind us when
supported by substantial evidence.^[20] It is not our function to assess and
evaluate the evidence all over again, particularly where the findings of both
the arbitrator and the Court of Appeals coincide. Thus, in this case, absent a showing of an error of law committed
by the court below, or of whimsical or capricious exercise of its judgment, or
a demonstrable lack of basis for its conclusions, we may not disturb its
factual findings,^[21] much
less reverse its judgment outright.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision dated July 30, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50167, sustaining the order dated December
11, 1998 of the Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board,
Cordillera Administrative Region, Baguio City, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Acting Chief Justice, Mendoza, Austria-Martinez,
and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 9-16.

^[2]
CA Rollo, pp. 51-56.

^[3]
Id. at 10-24.

^[4]
Id. at 23-24.

^[5]
Id. at 31-32.

^[6]
Id. at 56.

^[7]
Rollo, p. 42.

^[8]
318 SCRA 169, 177 (1999).

^[9]
Gallardo-Corro
v. Gallardo, 350 SCRA 568, 578 (2001).

^[10]
At pp. 718-719, quoting Aboitiz Shipping
Employees Association v. Trajano, 278 SCRA 387, 391 (1997).

^[11]
Id. at 719, citing Balais v. Velasco, 252 SCRA 707, 708
(1996).

^[12]
At pp. 316-317.

^[13]
At p. 530.

^[14]
Balais v. Velasco, 252 SCRA 707,
720(1996).

^[15]
354 Phil. 112, 124 (1998).

^[16]
Rollo, p. 50.

^[17]
Supra note 15 at 122.

^[18] Records, p. 215-216; Rollo, p. 12-13.

^[19]
Rollo, p. 199.

^[20]
C.
Planas Commercial vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 121696, 303 SCRA 49, 56-57
(1999).

^[21]
Telefunken
Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143013-14, 348 SCRA 569, 579-580 (2000).