VICENTE GARCIA VALDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The only question presented
is whether or not a criminal action for libel may be commenced and prosecuted by
the filing of a complaint signed by a private person? In other words, must all
criminal actions for libel be commenced and prosecuted by the filing or
presentation of an information? The words complaint and
information are here used in accordance with the definitions given in
sections 4 and 5 of General Orders No. 58.

The petitioner alleges that inasmuch as the complaint, which was presented
against him in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 30th day
of July, 1902, for the crime of libel, was not signed by the prosecuting
attorney of the city of Manila, the court had no jurisdiction to try him, and
the sentence was therefore null and void. The history of the complaint, trial
and sentence of the petitioner may be summarized as follows:

(1) That on the 30th day of July, 1902, a complaint was presented in the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila charging him with the crime of
libel; that said complaint was signed by Pardo de Tavera;

(2) Upon said complaint an order of arrest was issued on the 31st day of
July, 1902, and the defendant was duly arrested on the first day of August,
1902, and was furnished a copy of the complaint on the same day;

(3) That the defendant was duly arraigned, pleaded not guilty and the trial
was commenced on the 8th day of September, 1902, with Frank Ingersoll,
prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila, representing the plaintiff, and
Alfredo Chicote as attorney for the defendant;

(4) That on the 11th day of September, 1902, the trial having theretofore
been closed, a sentence was pronounced by the judge of the Court of First
Instance, in which the defendant was found guilty of the crime of libel and
sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of six months and to pay P1,000 fine and
costs. From that decision, the defendant duly appealed to the Supreme Court and
the record was received in the Supreme Court on the 2d day of October, 1902;

(5) That the cause was finally submitted to the Supreme Court and a decision
upon the questions raised by the appeal was rendered on the 16th day of May,
1903, confirming the sentence of the lower court;

(6) The record, together with the decision of the Supreme Court, was returned
and received by the lower court on the 27th day of May, 1903;

(7) That on the 27th day of May, 1903, the defendant having been admitted to
bail during the pendency of the appeal, his bondsmen were duly notified to
present him in court to receive the sentence. The bondsmen having failed to
present the defendant in court to receive the sentence imposed, by order,
deposited with the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
the amount of said bond;

(8) That during the pendency of the appeal, the defendant left the Philippine
Islands and went to Hanoi, Cochin China, and later, the exact date not appearing
of record, he returned to Manila, and on the 11th day of April, 1918, the
prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of
First Instance praying for his arrest; and on the 12th day of April, 1918, an
order of arrest was duly issued;

(9) That on the 29th day of April, 1918, the present petition for a writ of
habeas corpus was presented in the Supreme Court.

The theory of the petitioner is that by virtue of the provisions of section
14 of Act No. 277 (the Libel Law) all complaints in criminal actions
for the crime of libel must be signed and presented by the prosecuting officers.
He asserts, in effect, that under said provisions no criminal actions for the
crime of libel can be instituted by a private person. He asserts that the
provision in said section 14 that “all criminals actions * * * shall be begun
and prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecuting officers,”
means that the prosecuting officers are the only persons, or officials, who can
present an information for libel.

No objection whatever was made in the court below to the complaint, either as
to its form or as to its sufficiency. The defendant was represented by an
attorney-at-law. While the complaint was signed by a private person, the
petitioner herein, in his brief presented in the appeal to the Supreme Court on
the 14th day of November, 1902 admitted that he had been accused of the
crime of libel in a complaint presented by the prosecuting
attorney in the name of the United States.

The record shows that the trial of the defendant took place under the sole
direction of the prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila. We have, then, the
admission of the defendant that the complaint was presented by the
prosecuting attorney, and the fact, which appears of record, that the case
was prosecuted under the sole direction and control of the prosecuting
attorney.

The law provides that all criminal actions for libel shall be begun and
prosecuted under the sole direction and control of the ordinary prosecuting
officers. Criminal actions must be prosecuted by a complaint or
information (section 3, General Orders No. 58). Criminal
actions, like civil actions, are begun by the presentation of a
complaint or information. Said section 14 (Act No. 277) while it requires that
the action shall be begun and prosecuted under the sole direction of the
ordinary prosecuting officers, does not provide that they shall present
an information. The prosecuting officers may present a
complaint. They may begin the action by filing a complaint or
information, and if the complaint or information is presented by
the ordinary prosecuting officers, even though the complaint is signed by a
private person, we are of the opinion that the “criminal action for liber” is
“begun” in conformity with the requirements of section 14 (Act No. 277).

Formerly, and prior to Act No. 1773, the crimes of calumnia and
injuria could only be prosecuted upon the complaint of the offended
person, with certain exceptions (par. 2, art. 467, Penal Code; arts. 253-257,
Penal Code). Formerly, the prosecuting attorney had no intervention in the trial
of those crimes. Now those crimes (calumnia and injuria) are
regarded as public crimes and an action may now be commenced either by complaint
or information, but must be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
ordinary prosecuting officers. We are of opinion that all that said section 14
requires is that the ordinary prosecuting officers must begin the criminal
action for libel and must control its prosecution and that they may
begin such action by the presentation of either a complaint or
information. The purpose of the law evidently is that no person shall be
annoyed with a prosecution for libel without the consent and intervention of the
ordinary prosecuting officers.

Our attention is called to certain decisions in which it has been held that
the courts acquire no jurisdiction over the crimes of adultery, estupro
and injuria unless the complaint is signed by the aggrieved person, or
the parents or grandparents of such person. (Section 1, Act No. 1773; U. S.
vs. Narvas, 14 Phil. Rep., 410; U. S. vs. De la Cruz, 17,
Phil. Rep., 139; U. S. vs. Castanares, 18 Phil. Rep., 210; U. S.
vs. Ortiz and Regalado, 19 Phil. Rep., 174; U. S. vs. De los
Santos, 33 Phil. Rep., 397.)

Said Act (No. 1773) is different in its terms from the one we are now
discussing. It (Act No. 1773) provides that “no prosecution (for the crimes
mentioned) shall be instituted except upon the complaint of the
aggrieved person, etc.” But even that Act (No. 1773) contemplates that the
prosecution shall be under the control of the ordinary prosecuting officers,
like all other public crimes. If the crimes mentioned cannot be prosecuted
except upon the complaint of certain persons, then, of course, if the
terms of the law are mandatory, the courts acquire no jurisdiction until the
action is commenced or instituted in accordance with the provisions of the
law.

While section 3 of General Orders No. 58 requires criminal actions to be
begun either by a complaint or information, Act No. 1773 only permits criminal
actions for adultery, estupro and injuria to be commenced by a
complaint (not by information) of particular persons. There is a very
wide difference between the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 1773 and section
14 of Act No. 277. The one requires the complaint to be signed by a particular
person or persons and the court has no jurisdiction to try the case unless the
complaint is so signed. The other requires the action to be begun and
prosecuted under the sole direction of the prosecuting officer. Section 3 of
General Orders No. 58 provides that all criminal actions must be begun either by
a complaint or information. The filing or presentation of a complaint or
information in court is the beginning of the action. If the complaint is
presented by the fiscal or by the prosecuting officers, he, or they, have begun
the action and the law is thus satisfied and complied with. And, moreover, it
has been frequently held that any objection to a complaint, made for the first
time in the Supreme Court, will not be considered unless the objection goes to
the jurisdiction of the court. (U. S. vs. De los Santos, 33 Phil. Rep.,
397; Ex parte Tice, 32 Oregon, 179; Ex parte Hays, 15 Utah,
77; In re Wilson, 140 U. S., 575.)

It will be remembered that in the present case the defendant made no
objection to the complaint at or before the trial in the lower court, nor until
nearly fifteen years after his sentence had been affirmed by the Supreme Court.
When the complaint was presented and he was arrested and arraigned, he then had
a right to object to the complaint, both as to its form and sufficiency. He
waived those objections and demanded a judgment of the court on the merits of
the charge presented against him.

Having failed or omitted to object to the sufficiency or legality of the
complaint at the time when that opportunity was offered, he ought not, when
defeated upon the merits and found guilty, be permitted, especially after the
action had been decided by the Supreme Court and the judgment of the lower court
affirmed, to go back to the beginning of the trial, and, for the first time,
raise an objection to the form and sufficiency of the complaint. (U. S.
vs. De los Santos, 33 Phil. Rep., 397; In re Wilson, 140 U.
S., 575.)

The ordinary prosecuting officer having begun the present action by the
presentation of the complaint, and having had the sole direction and control of
the prosecution, and for the reasons given above, we are of the opinion and so
decide, that the petition for the writ of habeas corpus should be denied, and it
is hereby ordered and decreed that the petitioner be returned to the custody of
the Director of Prisons and by the latter detained for the purpose of enforcing
the sentence of imprisonment heretofore imposed upon him, with costs. So
ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, and Fisher,
JJ., concur.