PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO PERRERAS @ PEPOT AND BOY FERNANDEZ (AT LARGE), ACCUSED.

People versus Perreras

The Case

This is People versus Perreras, a criminal case for murder, in which the People of the Philippines prosecute Pedro Perreras, also known as Pepot, for the killing of Estanislao Salo. The accused was convicted by the trial court and sentenced to death, and the case reached the Supreme Court on automatic review. It matters to every reviewee for three reasons: it is a clean illustration of treachery and dwelling as qualifying and aggravating circumstances; it applies the rule that aggravating circumstances must now be alleged in the information; and it is a working model for computing loss of earning capacity and for trimming excessive damages.

Procedural History

Pedro Perreras and his co-accused Boy Fernandez were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City. After trial, the court found Pedro Perreras guilty of murder, sentenced him to death, and ordered him to pay the heirs of Estanislao Salo seventy five thousand pesos as civil indemnity, ninety one thousand eight hundred three pesos and fifty nine centavos as actual and compensatory damages, one million seven hundred twenty eight thousand pesos for lost earnings, and one hundred thousand pesos as moral damages. Because the penalty imposed was death, the case went to the Supreme Court on automatic review. His co-accused Boy Fernandez remained at large and was not included in the decision.

Facts

On the night of twenty one July 1998, in Bacayao Norte, Dagupan City, Pedro Perreras and his nephew Boy Fernandez approached Leonardo Salazar at the neighborhood waiting shed. Pedro asked whether Manoling Pastoral was home and asked for directions to his house. Leonardo, feeling suffocated in the crowd, excused himself and walked toward the house of Estanislao Salo, about ten meters away, for some fresh air. Pedro and Boy followed, each holding a bottle of beer, and asked Estanislao's son Joel for the same directions.

Pedro then stopped by the window of Estanislao's house. The place was lit by a mercury lamp about twelve meters away. As soon as Pedro saw Estanislao, he rolled up his sleeves, drew a gun from his waist, and fired, hitting the victim on the head. Leonardo, only about ten meters away, had a clear view of Estanislao sitting on a chair and watching television when he was shot. Leonora Salo, the victim's wife, heard the gunshot, rushed to the living room, and saw her husband slumped on the floor. Looking out the window, she saw Pedro holding a gun and staring at her husband's body. Upon seeing her, Pedro fled, with Boy trailing some twenty meters behind. Estanislao was rushed to the hospital but died at five thirty the following morning. The autopsy showed a gunshot wound on the left side of the top of the head, fired at close range from a low caliber pistol, with the victim possibly shot while seated.

Pedro was arrested in Echague, Isabela, on twenty two August 1998. He denied the charge, claimed he had been in Isabela since eleven July 1998, and said he was forced to sign the warrant of arrest. He also claimed that Boy Fernandez had been dead for three years and presented a death certificate. On rebuttal, the prosecution showed that the person in that certificate was Boy's father, and that Boy was still alive.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in lending weight to the testimony of Leonardo Salazar despite the alleged inconsistencies pointed out by the accused.
• Whether or not the defense of alibi and denial can prevail over the positive identification of the accused.
• Whether or not the killing was attended by treachery, qualifying it to murder.
• Whether or not dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance to impose the death penalty when it was not alleged in the information.
• Whether or not the awards of actual damages, lost earnings, civil indemnity, and moral damages were proper in amount.

Applicable Provisions

Section 8 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 8. Designation of the Offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

This is the provision that bars the Court from appreciating dwelling, since it was not alleged in the information.

Section 9 of the same Rules provides:

Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

This reinforces the requirement that the accused be informed of every circumstance that will raise his penalty.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court upheld the trial court. The alleged inconsistency about which direction Leonardo was facing was a misunderstanding by the defense counsel, who confused the waiting shed with the place near the victim's house where Leonardo actually stood when the shooting happened. The discrepancy about the distance of the electric post was a minor detail that cannot affect credibility, because inconsistencies on collateral matters do not impair a testimony that is consistent on the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailant. The Court also relied on the trial court's ocular inspection and on the hornbook doctrine that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal.

On the second issue, the Court held that positive identification, categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive, prevails over alibi and denial. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else; it must be shown that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. The Court took judicial notice that a trip from Isabela to Dagupan City takes only eight to nine hours, so it was not impossible for the accused to have been in Dagupan that night.

On the third issue, the Court found treachery. The victim was in the comforts of his own home, enjoying a televised basketball game, unaware of the attempt on his life, and was shot in the head while seated, with the gunman having all the time in the world to roll up his sleeves and take careful aim. The two elements concurred: the means of execution gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and the means were deliberately adopted.

On the fourth issue, the Court agreed that dwelling aggravated the felony, since the victim was attacked inside his own house even if the assailant fired from outside. But the Court held that the death penalty could not be imposed, because the Rules now require that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances, and dwelling was not alleged in the information. With no modifying circumstance left to appreciate, the penalty is reclusion perpetua.

On the fifth issue, the Court reduced the actual damages to sixty one thousand eight hundred thirteen pesos and fifteen centavos, because only that amount was supported by receipts. It sustained an award for loss of earning capacity on testimonial evidence alone, computed under the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, yielding one million eighty thousand pesos. It reduced the civil indemnity to fifty thousand pesos, since murder was not qualified by any circumstance authorizing death, and lowered the moral damages to fifty thousand pesos to conform with current jurisprudence.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, treachery requires the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and the deliberate or conscious adoption of those means. Second, dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party, and it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house although the assailant fired from the outside. Third, and most importantly, an aggravating circumstance not alleged in the information cannot be appreciated to raise the penalty, under Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, and this rule is given retroactive application where favorable to the accused. Fourth, positive identification prevails over alibi and denial, and alibi must show that the accused was so far away that he could not have been present at the scene. Fifth, actual damages must be substantiated by receipts, while loss of earning capacity may rest on testimonial evidence and be computed by formula.

Disposition

The Court modified the trial court's decision: Pedro Perreras was found guilty of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay the heirs fifty thousand pesos as civil indemnity, sixty one thousand eight hundred thirteen pesos and fifteen centavos as actual damages, one million eighty thousand pesos in lost earnings, and fifty thousand pesos as moral damages, with no costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: an aggravating circumstance not alleged in the information cannot be appreciated to raise the penalty, so the death penalty falls and reclusion perpetua stands. Examiners use this case to test treachery and dwelling, the retroactive application of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, and the computation of loss of earning capacity.