AUREA R. MONTEVERDE, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Time and time again, this Court has emphasized the need to stamp
out graft and corruption in the government. Indeed, the tentacles of
greed must be cut and the offenders punished. However, this objective
can be accomplished only if the evidence presented by the prosecution
passes the test of moral certainty. Where doubt lingers, as in this
case, the Court is mandated to uphold the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by our Constitution to the accused.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 29, 1999 Decision^[1] and February 3, 2000 Resolution^[2]
of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Criminal Case No. 18768. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused AUREA MONTEVERDE y RASUELO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Falsification of Commercial Document under Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code, and in default of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
she is hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of SIX (6) MONTHS of
Arresto Mayor as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS of Prision Correccional as
maximum, to pay a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) pesos with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with all the accessory
penalties of the law, and to pay the cost.

“She shall be credited with the full period of any preventive
imprisonment suffered, pursuant to and as mandated by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 85.

“The facts from which the civil liability may arise not being indubitable, there is no pronouncement as to the same.

“The bailbond of herein accused is hereby ordered cancelled.”^[3]

The assailed resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

This case originated from the Information dated February 4, 1993,
signed by Special Prosecution Officer Gualberto J. dela Llana with the
approval of then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez. Charging petitioner with
estafa through falsification of commercial documents, the accusatory
portion reads thus:

“That on or about January 17, 1991, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer,
being the Chairman of Barangay 124 of Zone 10, District 1, Malaya,
Balut, Tondo, Manila with intent to defraud, and by taking advantage of
[her] official position and to liquidate the funds donated/granted by
the Philippine Games and Amusement Corporation submitted Sales Invoice
No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991 in the amount of P13,565.00 allegedly
issued by Sanford Hardware when in truth and in fact said sales invoice
is falsified and later did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to her
personal use and benefit, to the damage of the Government and which
crime was committed in relation to her office.”^[4]

During her arraignment on April 5, 1993, petitioner, assisted by her counsel de parte,^[5] pleaded not guilty.^[6]
After trial on the merits, the Sandiganbayan acquitted petitioner of
the crime of estafa, but convicted her of falsification of a commercial
document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution’s version of the facts is curtly summarized by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) as follows:

“Petitioner Aurea A. Monteverde was from 1991 to 1993 the
Barangay Chairman of Barangay 124 of Zone 10, District 1, Malaya, Balut,
Tondo, Manila. In that capacity, she received the amount of P44,800.00
from the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). The
amount was spent for lighting, cleanliness and beautification programs
of the Barangay. To liquidate the amount, she submitted a financial
statement (Exhibits ‘1 to 1-A-3’) with copies of sales invoices/receipts
to PAGCOR.

“Sometime in August 1991, Antonio R. Araza, Jose Salvatierra,
Santos L. Lopez, and Narciso Cruz, residents of Brgy. 124, charged
Petitioner and Bella Evangelista, then Barangay Treasurer, with
Malversation of the following funds: 1.) P82,500.00 from [the] Barangay
General Fund; 2.) P44,800.00 from the PAGCOR; and 3.) P600.00 allowance
of Kagawad Lito Galinda for the period July 16, to December 1990. The
complaints were docketed as OMB-0-91-12694 and OMB-0-92-0643 (Exhs. A, B
and C).”^[7]

Version of the Defense

The foregoing account is reiterated by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Memorandum.^[8] The petitioner did not submit her own Memorandum, but merely adopted the position of the OSG which recommended her acquittal.

Version of the Sandiganbayan

The foregoing narration does not adequately explain the evidence.
In fairness to the Sandiganbayan (“SBN” hereafter) which is being
faulted with reversible errors by petitioner and the OSG, we deem it
prudent to quote the facts and the evidence it relied upon in its
assailed Decision, as follows:

“EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

In its bid to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the People presented the following documentary evidence:

1. Exhibit A which is a letter complaint addressed to the
   Ombudsman dated September 2, 1991 signed by Santos Lopez, Narciso Cruz,
   Antonio Araza and Jose Salvatierra;

2. Exhibit B which is a Joint-Affidavit of the said four
   (4) complainants subscribed and sworn to before a Notary Public on
   September 8, 1991;

3. Exhibit C which is a letter dated June 13, 1991 signed
   by complainants Jose Salvatierra and Antonio Araza addressed to Mr.
   Manuel de la Fuente of the Chief Barangay Bureau, City of Manila;

4. Exhibit D which is the cover of the Booklet of Sales invoice[s]/Receipts of Sanford Hardware.
5. Exhibit D-1 which is the duplicate original copy of Sales Invoice No. 21568 dated July 20, 1981 listing only three (3) items;
6. Exhibit D-1-A which is a genuine machine copy of Exhibit D-1;
7. Exhibit E which is a machine copy of an official
   receipt with Aurea Monteverde appearing as buyer and listing eleven
   items as articles purchased;

8. Exhibit E-1 which is a certification of Luz Co,
   Manager of Sanford Hardware stating that Exhibit E is not a genuine
   reproduction of the duplicate original;

9. Exhibit F (offered lately) is a xerox copy of Invoice No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991;
10. Exhibit G is a machine copy of an undated letter
    signed by Bella Evangelista authorizing Antonio Araza to verify the
    authenticity of Invoice No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991 in the sum of
    P13,565.00
    as well as witnesses Luz Co y Tan and Antonio Araza y Reposo.

“LUZ CO y TAN declared that she is the manager of Sanford Hardware
since 1976, that Exhibit D-1 which is [a] duplicate copy of Invoice No.
21568 dated July 2, 1981 where the amount of purchase is only P157.00 is
the invoice used by her firm in the conduct of its business; that
Exhibit E was not her receipt and that she executed a certification to
that effect (Exhibit E-1) when required by a male person; that she does
not know the entries appearing in Exhibit E but the entries in Exhibit
D-1 are of her business; that Sanford Hardware is owned by [her]
sister-in-law Delia Co; that there are three copies of the sales invoice
her business is issuing, and the third copy or last copy is the one
left in the store, and that the one who approached her and asked about
Exhibit E is one Narciso Cruz and when she answered that she did not
issue Exhibit E she was requested to execute an affidavit; that she does
not know accused Aurea Monteverde and that she had no delivery of
hardware materials to the Barangay on January 17, 1991 (TSN May 14,
1993).

“It was the testimony of ANTONIO ARAZA that he is a resident of
2256 Malaya St., Balut, Tondo, Manila and that he secured a copy of
Exhibits E and F from the Barangay Treasurer; that he brought the same
to the owner of the Sanford Hardware for verification; that Luz Co to
whom he talked x x x in said store manifested that said Exhibits E and F
are not issued by the firm; and for which he requested Luz Co to issue a
certification (Exhibit E-1); that after realizing that the receipts
used by the accused are falsified receipts, he signed letter complaints
and [a] Joint-Affidavit together with Santos Lopez, Narciso Cruz and
Jose Salvatierra, and charged the accused before the Ombudsman; that the
money involved in this case are barangay funds because it was donated
by the PAGCOR to the Barangay and he was able to secure a copy from the
PAGCOR evidencing that it was donated to the Barangay but the copy was
submitted to the Ombudsman; that the Barangay Treasurer lent to him the
receipts with the advice to verify it from the proprietor of [the]
Hardware and she even gave a letter of authorization to him (Exhibit G);
that the P13,565.00 appearing in Exhibits E and F was not used to buy
electrical materials or lightings, and the bulbs in the Meralco post
were donated by Councilor Rene Jose (TSN March 18, 1994).

“EVIDENCE FOR THE ACCUSED

“The defense presented eighty-one (81) Exhibits with Exhibits 35
to 80 dealing with certificates of commendation in favor of the accused
during her stint as Barangay Chairman from 1991 to 1993 and even prior
to her being a Barangay Chairman. Exhibits 1 with its submarkings
(Exhibits 1-A to Exhibits 1-A-3) is a letter of the accused addressed to
Alice LI Reyes of the PAGCOR with attachment she captioned Financial
Statement; Exhibits 2 to 15 are Sales Invoices/Receipts from different
hardware stores and individuals while Exhibits 16 and 17 are pictures
depicting a basketball court portion thereof being sub-marked, and
Exhibits 18 to 32 are fifteen (15) pictures depicting different alleys
at Barangay 124. Exhibit 33 is a turn-over certificate/record of the
Barangay properties signed by the incoming Barangay Chairman with the
third page submarked as Exhibits 33-A to 33-b-2; and Exhibit 34 is the
counter-affidavit of the accused sworn to before a Notary Public on
September 5, 1991. Exhibit 81 is a Joint-Affidavit of Alfonso Cua Jr.
and Joel Magbanua.

“Aside from her, the accused presented ALFONSO CUA, JR. whose
testimony is as follows: that he knows the accused to be the Chairman of
Barangay 124 from 1991 up to 1992 while he was a Barangay Tanod in the
said Barangay; that one project of the accused was the installation of
lights or lighting the streets and playgrounds in the Barangay; that in
January 1991 materials were delivered to the house of the Barangay
Chairman (accused) and around three (3) days thereafter, he helped in
the installation of the electrical materials consisting of electrical
wirings, electrical tapes, bulbs, lamps and lamp covers, and it took
them (he and the husband of the accused) about three Sundays in doing
so; that he executed a Joint-Affidavit together with one Joel Magbanua
in connection with the incident (Exhibit 81) (TSN April 2, 1997).

“Testifying in her behalf accused took the witness stand and declared:

‘That she was the Barangay Chairman in Brgy. 124 since 1989 to
1994; that in January 1991 she received donation or cash money in the
amount of P44,800.00 from PAGCOR which she used in Barangay projects
like lighting, and cleanliness and beautification; that she reported the
matter to PAGCOR and submitted [a] financial statement (Exhibits 1 to
1-A, 1-A-1); that when she purchased electrical and hardware items from
Sanford Hardware she was issued a receipt (Exhibit 9) and considering
Exhibit D-1 and D-1-A, it would appear that Sanford Hardware issued two
(2) receipts; she denied the charge of Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents, and claimed that with the meager amount involved,
she is not going to sacrifice her good name and reputation; she then
identified x x x several awards she received (Exhibits 35 to 79); that
she was the one who personally purchased the items in Exhibit F, and she
actually paid the same in cash for which she was issued Exhibit 9
(Exhibit F and 9 contain the same items); that the receipt was issued in
her name and the money was in her possession that was why it was she
and not the Barangay Treasurer who personally made the purchase; that
the PAGCOR check was issued in her name and was directly given to her
and so she was the one who encashed the check accompanied by one of the
councilors but she did not turn over the cash to the treasurer; that
even after she came to know of the existence of Exhibit E, she did not
go to Sanford Hardware to inquire about the said document; that the
original of the said exhibit was given to her but she submitted it to
PAGCOR. (TSN September 3, November 5, 1996 and April 1, 1997).’“^[9]

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The assailed Decision noted that petitioner was supposed to have
been charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a
commercial document. However, there was no clear allegation in the
Information that the falsification was a necessary means to commit the
estafa.^[10] Nevertheless, going along “with thesupposition” that a complex crime had been charged, the SBN held:

“Despite the ambiguity and disquietude, however, the court is
constrained to go with the supposition that what has been charged is
that of a complex crime, otherwise the logical consequence is that the
accused has been indicted with two crimes – that of Estafa and that of
Falsification of Commercial Document which is not beneficial to her.”^[11]

The anti-graft court acquitted petitioner of estafa, because there
was no evidence that funds had been misappropriated or converted.^[12] Neither was there proof that petitioner had been required to account for the money received.^[13] Without these proofs, no conviction for estafa was possible.^[14]

However, the court a quo convicted her for allegedly falsifying the
document she had submitted to show that the P13,565 donated by PAGCOR
was used and spent for lighting materials for her barangay. According to
the SBN, the falsification became very clear when the document was
compared with another one purporting to be a duplicate original
presented by the prosecution.^[15]
While the prosecution did not present any proof evidencing that it was
petitioner who had caused the falsification, the SBN relied on the
presumption that in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, a person
who is found in possession of a forged document, and who uses it, is the
forger.^[16]

Nevertheless, petitioner was not convicted of falsification as
defined by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, because there was no
proof that she had taken advantage of her position in committing the
crime.^[17] Instead, she was convicted of falsification under Article 172.^[18]

Hence, this Petition.^[19]

Issues

The OSG’s Memorandum which recommended acquittal, and which petitioner adopted, raised the following issues:

“Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in:

[1.] finding petitioner guilty of falsification despite its finding that no estafa was committed[;]

[2.] holding that Exhibit 9, a sales invoice, was a commercial/public document[; and]

[3.] applying the presumption that petitioner was the
author of falsification in the absence of any proof that she benefited
from it.”^[20]

This Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:
Nature of Complex Crimes

Appellant was purportedly charged with the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of a commercial document. However, even if the SBN
itself doubted whether the Information had properly charged a complex
crime, it was, as quoted earlier, “constrained to go along with the
supposition that what has been charged is that of a complex crime,
otherwise the logical consequence is that the accused has been indicted
with two crimes — that of Estafa and that of Falsification of
Commercial Document which is not beneficial to her.”^[21]

We clarify. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,^[22]
a complex crime refers to (1) the commission of at least two grave or
less grave felonies that must both (or all) be the result of a single
act, or (2) one offense must be a necessary means for committing the
other (or others).^[23]
Negatively put, there is no complex crime when (1) two or more crimes
are committed, but not by a single act; or (2) committing one crime is
not a necessary means for committing the other (or others) .^[24]

Using the above guidelines, the acts attributed to petitioner in
the present case cannot constitute a complex crime. Specifically, her
alleged actions showing falsification of a public and/or a commercial
document were not necessary to commit estafa. Neither were the two
crimes the result of a single act. The OSG correctly observed:

“x x x. The alleged falsification happened after the money was
spent and to explain how it was expended. Thus there is no complex crime
since the falsification is not a necessary means for committing the
estafa (as charged) or malversation (as suggested by Sandiganbayan in
its Order dated February 1, 2000). If at all, it was intended to conceal
the estafa or malversation.”^[25]

Well-known is the principle that an information “must charge only
one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for
various offenses.”^[26] When more than one offense is charged, the accused may move to quash the information.^[27]

In the present case, the accused should have objected to the
Information on the ground that more than one offense was charged
therein. For her failure to move to quash the indictments, she is deemed
to have waived her right to be tried for only one crime.^[28]
Furthermore, she did not object to the submission of evidence that
tended to prove the offenses charged in the Information — estafa and
falsification. Verily, when two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information, but the accused fail to object to the defect
before trial, the trial court may convict them of as many offenses as
are charged and proven, and impose on them the penalty for each offense,
setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each.^[29]

On the basis of the foregoing, we reject the argument of petitioner
that since she was acquitted of estafa, she could no longer be
convicted of falsification of a commercial document. Having, in effect,
been charged with two distinct crimes, acquittal in one will not
necessarily lead to acquittal in the other. Each crime will be evaluated
based on its own merits, and conviction will depend on the proof of the
elements of each particular offense.

Let us assume that petitioner has correctly been charged with a
complex crime, as the SBN supposed. Still, acquittal from a component
offense will not necessarily lead to an acquittal from the other (or
others).

When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is
charged, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege in the
information and prove during the trial all the elements of all the
offenses constituting the complex crime.

We stress that the failure of the prosecution to prove one of the
component crimes and the acquittal arising therefrom will not
necessarily lead to a declaration of innocence for the other crimes.
Settled is the rule that when a complex crime is charged and the
evidence fails to establish one of the component offenses, the defendant
can be convicted of the others, so long as they are proved.^[30]

Second Issue:
Nature of Sales Invoice

The OSG agrees that the subject Sales Invoice is a public and/or a
commercial document within the meaning of “falsification” as defined
under the Revised Penal Code.

Both the OSG and the OSP agree that a private document acquires the
character of a public document when it becomes part of an official
record and is certified by a public officer duly authorized by law.^[31] The OSP aptly explained this point as follows:

“x x x, [I]f the document is intended by law to be part of the
public or official record, the preparation of which being in accordance
with the rules and regulations issued by the government, the
falsification of that document, although it was a private document at
the time of its falsification, is regarded as falsification of public or
official document.

“Prosecution witness Luz Co testified that the duplicate original
of Sales Invoice No. 21568 was submitted to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). Thus this Sales Invoice is intended to be part of the
public records and the preparation thereof is required by BIR rules and
regulations. Moreover, Sales Invoice No. 21568 formed part of the
official records of PAGCOR when it was submitted by petitioner as one of
the supporting papers for the liquidation of her accountability to
PAGCOR.”^[32]

Neither can it be denied that the Sales Invoice is also a
commercial document. Commercial documents or papers are those used by
merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions.^[33] This Court has previously characterized such documents in this wise:

“x x x. In most cases, these commercial forms [receipts, order
slips and invoices] are not always fully accomplished to contain all the
necessary information describing the whole business transaction. The
sales clerks merely indicate a description and the price of each item
sold without bothering to fill up all the available spaces in the
particular receipt or invoice, and without proper regard for any legal
repercussion for such neglect. Certainly, it would not hurt if
businessmen and traders would strive to make the receipts and invoices
they issue complete, as far as practicable, in material particulars.
These documents are not mere scraps of paper bereft of probative value
but vital pieces of evidence of commercial transactions. They are
written memorials of the details of the consummation of contracts.”^[34] (Italics supplied)

Third Issue:
Proof of Guilt

The gut issue in this case is whether the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner with regard to the
crime of falsification. A determination of this question will
necessarily require an examination of the facts as presented before the
Sandiganbayan.

As a rule, an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raises only questions of law.^[35]
However, this Court, in exceptional cases, has taken cognizance of
questions of fact in order to resolve legal issues. This is especially
true in cases in which a palpable error or a grave misapprehension of
facts was committed by the lower court.^[36]
Criminal cases elevated by public officials from the SBN deserve the
same thorough treatment by this Court as criminal cases brought up by
ordinary citizens, simply because the constitutional presumption of
innocence must be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt in both
instances. Indeed, in a criminal case, a person’s life or liberty is at
stake.^[37]

Petitioner asserts that the SBN erroneously applied the presumption
that the possessor of a forged or falsified document who uses it is the
author of the forgery or falsification. The OSG concurs with her on
this point. That is why it recommended that she be acquitted.

We agree. To our mind, the prosecution’s evidence is not sufficient
to convict. As correctly observed by the OSG, the Decision of the SBN
is based on the assumption that there was only one set of sales invoices
issued by Sanford Hardware. On such a premise, petitioner’s Exhibit 9
thus becomes obviously falsified when compared with respondent’s Exhibit
D-1. But on the premise that the two Exhibits are two different Sales
Invoices, falsification becomes doubtful. The OSG is correct in
observing as follows:

“x x x. For petitioner or anybody acting on her behalf to falsify
the customer’s copy of Sales Invoice No. 21568, she/he would have to
erase or cover with correction fluid the spaces pertaining to the name
of the customer, date, quantity, unit, description of articles, unit
price and amount, before the insertions could be written. Neither the
appealed decision nor the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) point
out various tell-tale signs of falsification despite opportunity of the
prosecution to see the original of Exh. 9. The only observation the
respondent Court mentioned was with respect to the date: ‘[t]he
superimposition of January 17, 1991 is too apparent to be disregarded,
and the alteration of the date has affected both the veracity and the
effects of the said document.’ But the changing of the date was the
easiest to accomplish. The more cumbersome, as they affect wider space,
would [have been] the name of the customer and the purchases. The total
absence of any hint or sign of alteration on these areas is revealing.”^[38]

The only logical explanation for the existence of both Exhibits 9
and D- 1 is that there are two extant documents. Whether one is the
original and the other is falsified depends on the proof. This the
prosecution had to prove, but unfortunately failed to. In all criminal
prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the
accused may raise, the burden of proof establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt remains with the prosecution.^[39] Further, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information.^[40]
We repeat that, in this case, it failed to discharge this duty. We
quote with approval the OSG’s disquisition on these two documents as
follows:

“A comparison between Exh. D-1 and Exh. 9 shows that there are
two (2) sets of Sales Invoice No. 21568. While the form is identical in
most respects, there are three (3) telling differences: (1) the type set
of the sales invoice numbers are different, (2) the bottom left of Exh.
D-1 indicates the name of the printing press while no such information
is indicated anywhere in Exh. 9, and (3) the bottom right of Exh. D-1
states the BIR permit which does not appear in Exh. 9. Who could have
printed Exh. 9 is anybody’s guess. It is possible that petitioner or any
person acting on her behalf had a printing company copy this particular
Sanford Hardware invoice so she could use it to liquidate the PAGCOR
funds she received. However, it is equally possible that Sanford
Hardware had printed two (2) sets of the same receipts, one to reflect
the real business transaction, the other one – a sanitized version – for
the consumption of the BIR people. Not one of these possibilities has
been actually proven, but neither was their improbability established.”^[41] (Italics supplied)

Indeed, the OSG points out that there are material differences
between Exhibits 9 and D-1. These include: 1) the discrepancy in the
“type set” or fonts used for the sales invoice numbers in the two Sales
Invoices; 2) the presence of the name of the printing press at the
bottom left corner of Exhibit D-1 and its absence in Exhibit 9; and 3)
the presence of the BIR permit in Exhibit D-1 and its absence in Exhibit
9. It is possible that Exhibit 9 was printed by petitioner or anyone
acting on her behalf to facilitate the liquidation of funds. But it is
equally possible, as the OSG points out, that Sanford Hardware caused
the printing of two sets of receipts to serve its own purposes. However,
none of these possibilities was either actually proven or definitely
ruled out by the prosecution. At bottom, there is no clear and
convincing evidence to prove that Exhibit 9 was falsified.

The SBN relied on the settled rule that in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of — and who used,
took advantage of or profited from — a forged or falsified document is
the author of the falsification and is therefore guilty of
falsification.

To convict petitioner of falsification would mean that the
prosecution was able to establish that Exhibit 9 was a falsified copy of
an original document. But the rule itself shows that it cannot be
applied to the present case, because Exhibit 9 (Sales Invoice No 21568)
was not established beyond reasonable doubt to have been forged or
falsified. At the very least, it may be a second document that may or
may not have been printed by petitioner herself.

Respondent claims that the original document is Exhibit D-1 but, as
adverted to earlier, Exhibit 9 was not satisfactorily demonstrated to
be a copy thereof. In other words, Exhibit 9 being different from
Exhibit D-1, the prosecution cannot be deemed to have presented an
original document, of which Exhibit 9 is a falsified copy.

The question is: who made this second document marked Exhibit 9?
Petitioner consistently maintains that Exhibit 9 was issued to her by
Sanford Hardware when she purchased the items mentioned therein. On the
other hand, the manager of Sanford Hardware denies having issued such
document. Indeed, it is a time-honored principle^[42]
that greater probative value is accorded to a positive than to a
negative testimony. Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by the OSG:

“x x x [Petitioner] denied the accusation and insisted that she
would not sacrifice her name and reputation for the meager amount
involved. She submitted photographs that the lighting of alleys in
Barangay 124 was completed. There was positive testimony by Alfonso Cua,
one of the persons who installed the articles listed in Sales Invoice
No. 21568. The prosecution failed to rebut these.”^[43] (Citations omitted)

One final point. The SBN held that the “accused refused to present
the original of Exhibit 9,” and that it would have been so “easy x x x
to ask for a subpoena to direct x x x the PAGCOR to produce the original
copy, and yet the accused satisfied herself in presenting Exhibit 9 — a
mere xerox copy of the supposed document.” But, as pointed out by the
OSG in its Memorandum,^[44] the original of Exhibit 9 was presented in court during the November 5, 1996 hearing after a subpoena duces tecum
had been issued to PAGCOR, and Prosecutor Pimentel “confirmed that the x
x x xerox copies are faithful reproductions of the original.”^[45]

In all criminal cases, mere speculations cannot substitute for proof in establishing the guilt of the accused.^[46]
Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment. Where
there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even though
their innocence may not have been established. The Constitution presumes
a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy
of long standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored, and
exoneration granted as a matter of right.^[47]

Although the evidence for the defense may be frail, criminal
conviction must come, not from its weakness, but from the strength of
that for the prosecution.^[48]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.

---

^[1] Annex “A” of the Petition;
rollo, pp. 20-37. Penned by Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval (Division
chairman) with the concurrence of Justices Godofredo L. Legaspi and
Alfredo J. Gustilo (members).
^[2] Rollo, pp. 46-49; Justice Gregory S. Ong replaced Justice Gustilo.
^[3] Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 16-17; rollo, pp. 35-36.
^[4] Records, p. 1.
^[5] Atty. Eduard C. Castañeda.
^[6] Sandiganbayan Order dated April 5, 1993; records, p. 29.
^[7] OSP’s Memorandum, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 143-144.
^[8] OSG’s Memorandum, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 121-122.
^[9] Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 3-7; rollo, pp. 22-26.
^[10] Ibid., pp. 8 & 27.
^[11] Id., pp. 9 & 28.
^[12] Id., pp. 11 & 30.
^[13] Ibid.
^[14] Ibid.
^[15] Id., pp. 12 & 31.
^[16] Id., pp. 15 & 34.
^[17] Id., pp. 16&35.
^[18] Ibid.
^[19] The case was deemed
submitted for resolution on September 17, 2001, upon this Court’s
receipt of petitioner’s Manifestation signed by Atty. Vicente C.
Angeles, adopting as her own the Memorandum filed by the OSG which in
turn had been signed by Assistant Solicitor General Carlos N. Ortega and
Solicitor Maria Belen P. Montes-Nera and received by this Court on
August 15, 2001. The Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP), signed by Atty. Rodrigo V. Coquia, was received on September 14,
2001.
^[20] OSG’s Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 126.
^[21] Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 28.
^[22] Art. 48. Penalty for
complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
^[23] Cf. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book I, 1998 ed., p. 645.
^[24] People v. Honra, 341 SCRA 110, September 26, 2000.
^[25] OSG’s Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 128.
^[26] Section 13, Rule 110, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
^[27] Section 3 (f), Rule 117, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
v ^[28] Section 9, Rule 117, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
^[29] Section 3, Rule 120, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
^[30]
People v. Taboga, GR Nos. 144086-87, February 6, 2002; People v. Nanas,
GR No. 137299, August 21, 2001; People v. Calabroso, 340 SCRA 332,
September 14, 2000; People v. Gallarde, February 17, 2000; People v.
Maribung, 149 SCRA 292, April 29, 1987; US v. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog,
38 Phil 330, July 15, 1918.
^[31] Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 1998 ed., p. 244.
^[32] OSP’s Memorandum, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 148-149.
^[33] Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, supra, p. 235.
^[34] Lagon v. Hooven Comalco Industries, Inc., 349 SCRA 363, 379, January 17, 2001, per Bellosillo, J.
^[35] Section 1, Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Court.
^[36] Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222, October 16, 1996.
^[37] Ibid.
^[38] OSG’s Memorandum, p. 13; rollo, p. 133.
^[39] People v. Caiñgat, GR No. 137963, February 6, 2002.
^[40] Ibid.; Timbol v. CA, GR No. 136487, December 14, 2001; People v. Benoza, GR No. 139470, November 29, 2001.
^[41] OSG’s Memorandum, pp. 14-15; rollo, pp. 134-135.
^[42]
People v. Parcia, GR No. 141136, January 28, 2002; People v. Gonzales
Jr., GR Nos. 143143-44, January 15, 2002; People v. Dela Torre, GR No.
98431, January 15, 2002; People v. Reynes, GR No. 134607, December 12,
2001; Batiquin v. CA, 258 SCRA 334, July 5, 1996.
^[43] OSG’s Memorandum, p. 15; rollo, p. 135.
^[44] Page 14; rollo, p. 134.
^[45] TSN, November 5, 1996, p. 3.
^[46] Fernandez v. People, 341 SCRA 277, September 28, 2000.
^[47] Id., p. 299.
^[48] Layug v. Sandiganbayan, 338 SCRA 156, August 16, 2000.