ARMITA B. RUFINO, ZENAIDA R. TANTOCO, LORENZO CALMA, RAFAEL SIMPAO, JR., AND FREDDIE GARCIA, PETITIONERS, VS. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA, MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO, PATRICIA C. SISON, IRMA P…

Rufino versus Endriga

The Case

This is a consolidated petition for review on certiorari arising from a quo warranto proceeding between two contending sets of trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines. On one side stand the Rufino group, appointed by then President Joseph Estrada in December 1998; on the other, the Endriga group, who were elected by the sitting Board and who insist that the charter of the Center reserves the filling of vacancies to the trustees themselves. The case matters because it forces the Court to fix the boundary between the President's constitutional power to appoint and the power that Congress may vest in the heads of boards, and to decide whether the charter provision allowing trustees to elect their own colleagues can stand against the Constitution.

Procedural History

The Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto directly before the Supreme Court, questioning the appointments made by President Estrada. The Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action, in observance of the hierarchy of courts. The Court of Appeals rendered judgment in favor of the Endriga group, declaring them entitled to their offices for the full four-year term and ousting the Rufino group, except Zenaida Tantoco, against whom the case was dismissed. The Rufino group moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the argument that the charter provision is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals denied the motion, declining to pass on the constitutional question because it was raised only in the motion for reconsideration, and likewise denied the Endriga group's motion for immediate execution. Both groups then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari, and the petitions were consolidated. Angara, the incumbent Chairperson, later filed a petition in intervention adopting the Rufino group's position.

Facts

In June 1966, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30, creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of seven trustees. In October 1972, soon after the declaration of martial law, he issued Presidential Decree No. 15, the charter of the Center, converting it into a non-municipal public corporation free from the pressure or influence of politics, and increasing the Board to nine trustees. A later executive order raised the number to eleven. After the People Power Revolution, President Corazon Aquino asked for the courtesy resignations of the incumbent trustees and appointed new ones. By the time of President Fidel Ramos, the Board included the members of the Endriga group.

On 22 December 1998, President Joseph Estrada appointed seven new trustees for a term of four years, to replace the Endriga group and two other incumbents. Except for Tantoco, the new appointees took their oaths and assumed their duties in early January 1999. The Endriga group refused to yield, insisting that under the charter only the remaining trustees may fill vacancies by election, and that the President may appoint only when the Board is left entirely vacant.

The Endriga group then filed the quo warranto petition. In the meantime, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the Presidency in January 2001, the Rufino group tendered their resignations, and in July 2001 a new set of eleven trustees was appointed and thereafter elected by the Board to the same positions, without prejudice to the resolution of the constitutional questions before the Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the quo warranto petition should be dismissed as moot because of the supervening resignation of the Rufino group and the expiration of the terms of the Endriga group.
• Whether or not Section 6(b) and Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree No. 15, allowing the remaining trustees to elect their fellow trustees, constitute an invalid delegation of the President's appointing power under the Constitution.
• Whether or not the provision deprives the President of his constitutional power of control and supervision over the Cultural Center of the Philippines.
• Whether or not the Endriga group has a clear legal right to hold the offices of trustee.
• Whether or not a writ of quo warranto involving a public office should be deemed immediately executory.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6(b) of Presidential Decree No. 15, as amended, provides:

Vacancies in the Board of Trustees due to termination of term, resignation, incapacity, death or other cause as may be provided in the By-laws, shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting following occurrence of such vacancy. The elected trustee shall then hold office for a complete term of four years unless sooner terminated by reason of resignation, incapacity, death or other cause. Should only one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the Center. Such officers shall be designated in the Center's Code of By-Laws. Should for any reason the Board be left entirely vacant, the same shall be filled by the President of the Philippines acting in consultation with the aforementioned ranking officers of the Center.

This is the provision under attack, and its validity determines which group lawfully holds office.

Section 6(c) of the same decree provides:

No person may serve as trustee who is not a resident of the Philippines, of good moral standing in the community and at least 25 years of age: Provided, That there shall always be a majority of the trustees who are citizens of the Philippines. Trustees may not be reelected for more than two (2) consecutive terms.

This provision limits the terms of trustees and is inextricably related to the manner of filling vacancies.

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

This is the source both of the President's appointing power and of the authority of Congress to delegate the appointment of lower-ranked officers to the heads of boards.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that although supervening events had rendered the personal claims of the parties stale, the constitutional question was capable of repetition yet evading review. Every new President would want to appoint his or her own trustees, and the same clash would recur every four years. The Court therefore brushed aside procedural barriers and resolved the merits.

On the second issue, the Court upheld the charter provision. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution contemplates a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The trustees of the Center are such officers, lower in rank than the appointing power, and Congress validly vested their election in the Board itself. The Court distinguished the four groups of officers under Section 16 and noted that if the charter provision were unconstitutional, the President would appoint the trustees as officers of the third group.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the argument that the provision deprives the President of control and supervision. The power of supervision and control does not carry with it the power to appoint, and the charter's design was precisely to insulate the trusteeship from the pressure or influence of politics.

On the fourth issue, the Court found that the Endriga group had been validly elected by the remaining trustees under the clear language of the charter, which allows the President to fill the Board only when it is left entirely vacant.

On the fifth issue, the Court held that a quo warranto judgment involving a public office is not self-executing and does not become immediately executory by the mere filing of a notice of appeal.

Doctrine

First, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive, but Congress may by law vest the appointment of officers lower in rank in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. Second, the power of control and supervision over a government corporation does not include the power to appoint its trustees where the law has vested that power elsewhere. Third, a case otherwise moot may still be decided where the constitutional question is capable of repetition yet evading review. Fourth, where the charter provides that the President fills the Board only when it is left entirely vacant, the remaining trustees must fill vacancies by election.

Disposition

The petition of the Rufino group was denied and the petition of the Endriga group was likewise denied, with the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirmed insofar as it upheld the validity of the charter provision and the right of the Endriga group to their offices.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: the power to appoint may be delegated by law to the heads of boards as to officers lower in rank, and supervision and control does not carry the power to appoint. Examiners use this case to test the four groups of appointing power under Section 16, Article VII, and the doctrine of capable of repetition yet evading review.